

# HISTORY

SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE

1 July – 31 December 1957

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**SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE**

**1 July – 31 December 1957**

**SUBORDINATE UNITS**

5th Air Division

65th Air Division (Defense)

3977th Support Wing

3906th, 3926th, 3970th Air Base Groups

3936th, 3973rd, 3964th Air Base Squadrons

5th, 6th, 10th Aviation Depot Squadrons

13th Air Postal Squadron

49th Communications Squadron


3971st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron

3927th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron

3978th School Squadron

Prepared by:  
Historical Division  
Office of Information Services  
Headquarters, 16th Air Force  
Strategic Air Command  
United States Air Force

Approved by:

  
H. K. MOONEY  
Major General, USAF

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## FOREWORD

This volume is the first installment of the Sixteenth Air Force history, and covers, in part, the period from 1 July to 31 December 1957. Emphasis has been placed on the series of events that resulted in placing this component of the Strategic Air Command in Spain. In addition, since residence of American forces in this country, as in any other, was directly influenced by governmental agreements, some of the applicable documents have been discussed.

Description of purely routine functions has been minimized, except where such functions vary from pre-set standards due to local influences. Also, as the life of the American overseas was governed by the mores of the country, as well as by the freedoms granted or restrictions placed by the host nation, this facet of history was included.

In brief, arriving at USAF and SAC goals was no just a matter of knowing the concepts, or of understanding and applying the rules. Instead, accomplishment was gauged, in many instances, by the ability to cope with whatever local situations arose which called for perseverance, ingenuity, and tact, as well as following the regulations. Influencing this was the fact that no two countries where American forces were stationed were alike, and in each case the nation concerned wished to retain its individuality and sovereignty.

As in all volumes of this kind, this history is subject to correction and change when newly collected data reveals a need for such action.

  
Mary E. Hayes  
DAF Civilian  
Historian

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	3
Chronology	7
Glossary	12

### CHAPTER I, THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND IN EUROPE AND AFRICA

Background	14
International Peace Organizations	14
A Military Alliance	15
The Far East	16
American Forces in Europe	17
Spain and the United States	18
Spain, 1957	26
The USAF in Africa	27
US in the Mid-East	31
Atlantic and English Bases	31
Summary	32

### CHAPTER II, ESTABLISHING THE SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE

Changes in Planning for Spain	37
Mission and Organization	37
Intra-Service Agreements	39
Summary	39

### CHAPTER III, OPERATIONS

Mission and Organization	42
SAC Aircraft Operations in the Sixteenth Area	42
Military Aircraft in Spain	42
Moroccan Flights	44
Mid-East Operations	44
Spanish Base Exercises	44
San Pablo Exercises	45
Zaragoza Exercises	49
Moroccan Operations	54
Summary	56

### CHAPTER IV, DEFENSE DIVISION

Aircraft Control and Warning Network	59
--------------------------------------	----

65th Air Division (Defense) Mission	63
Organization and Manning	63
Fighter Squadrons	64
Summary	65

## **CHAPTER V, COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS**

Agreements in Spain	66
Land-Line and Radio Communications	66
Organization in Spain	67
Mission, 49th Communications Squadron	68
Sixteenth Organization	68

## **CHAPTER V, COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS**

Relay Center, Torrejon Air Base	69
Single Side Band Facilities	72
Madrid Installation	72
Other SSB Stations	73
Tropospheric Scatter Circuit	73

## **CHAPTER VI, PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES**

Personnel	74
Admission to Spain	74
Assignment of Americans to Spain	75
Clothing Regulations	77
Import and Export of Personal Effects	77
Personal Vehicles	78
Spanish Personnel	78
Administrative Services	79
Postal Services	80
Operational Problems	81
Staff, 16th Air Force, 31 December 1957	83
Bibliography	84
Distribution	85
[Endnotes]	86

## ILLUSTRATIONS

Map, North Atlantic Treaty Signatory Nations

Map, The USAF in Spain, 1957

Map the USAF in Morocco, 1957

Chart, Organization, Sixteenth Air Force

Table, Air Bases and Organizations Assigned to Sixteenth Air Force, Strategic Air Command,  
31 December 1957

Table, San Pablo Runways

Table, San Pablo Exercise Schedule, FY-58

Table, Valenzuela Take-Off Data – B-47 Aircraft

Table, Exercises at Zaragoza Air Base, Spain, July-December 1957

Map, Aircraft Control and Warning Sites, Spanish-American, 1957

Table, Aircraft Control and Warning Program, U.S. Air Forces in Europe

Table, Aircraft Control and Warning Site Status, Spain

Table, On-Line Relay Facilities, 1958, Torrejon Air Base, Spain

## CHRONOLOGY

The chronological data presented here is only that pertaining to the organizational assignments. A more complete chronology will be prepared and included in later histories.

### 1957

#### July

- 1 16th Air Force relieved as a special operating organization of USAF and assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

Headquarters, 16th Air Force assigned to 16th Air Force with station at Madrid, Spain (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

5th Air Division relieved of assignment to Strategic Air Command and assigned to the 16th Air Force with no change in station (Sidi Slimane Air Base, Morocco (SAC, GO 35, 1957)

13th Air Postal Squadron assigned to the 16th Air Force with station at Madrid, Spain (SAC, GO 35, 1957; reorganized (SAC, GO 30, 1957); attached to 3970th Air Base Group for administration and logistical support (16 AF, GO 40, 1957).

Detachment 1, attached to 3977th Air Base Group for logistical support with station at Seville, Spain (16 AF, GO 53, 1957).

Detachment 2, attached to 3974th Air Base Squadron for logistical support with station at Zaragoza Air Base, Spain (16 AF, GO 53, 1957).

65th Air Division (Defense) assigned to 16th Air Force (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

Headquarters, 65th Air Division (Defense) assigned to 65th Air Division (Defense); with station at Torrejon Air Base, Spain (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

July 1 (continued)

871st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron assigned to 65th Air Division (Defense) with station at Villatobas Aircraft Control and Warning Station, Villatobas, Spain (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

872nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron activated and assigned to 65th Air Division (Defense), with station at Constantina, Spain (SAC, GO 41, 1957).

3970th Air Base Group designated and organized with Headquarters, Air Police, Food Service, Installations, Transportation, Operations, Supply and Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadrons, United States Hospital, with station at Torrejon Air Base, Spain; assigned to 16th Air Force (SAC, GO 35, 1957). (This Group replaced the 7600th Air Base Group, Madrid, Spain.).

3971st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron designated and organized with station at Torrejon Air Base, Spain; assigned to 16th Air Force (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3973rd Air Base Squadron, redesignated from 7605th Air Base Squadron, with station at Moron Air Base, Spain; assigned to 16th Air Force (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3974th Air Base Squadron, redesignated from 7603rd Air Base Squadron, with station at Zaragoza Air Base, Spain; assigned to 16th Air Force (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3974th USAF Hospital redesignated from 7603rd USAF Hospital with station at Zaragoza Air Base, Spain; assigned to 16th Air Force; attached to 3974th Air Base Squadron for all purposes (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3977th Support Wing assigned to 16th Air Force (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

July 1 (continued)

Headquarters, 3977th Support Wing, redesignated from Headquarters, 7602nd Support Wing, assigned to 3977th Support Wing with station at Madrid, Spain (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3977th Air Base Group, redesignated from 7602nd Air Base Group, with station at Seville, Spain, assigned to 3977th Support Wing (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3977th Personnel Processing Squadron, redesignated from 7602nd Personnel Processing Squadron, with station at Madrid, Spain, assigned to 3977th Support Wing (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3977th Supply Squadron (POL) redesignated from 7602nd Supply Squadron (POL), with station at Seville, Spain, assigned to 3977th Support Wing (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3977th USAF Dispensary, redesignated from 7602nd USAF Dispensary, with station at Seville, Spain, assigned to the 3977th Support Wing, attached to 3977th Air Base Group for all purposes (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

3978th School Squadron, redesignated from 7608th School Squadron, with station at Madrid, Spain, assigned to 16th Air Force (SAC, GO 35, 1957).

Installations transferred from 16th Air Force, operating as a major command, to SAC, and assigned to 16th Air Force:

Barajas Fuel Storage Annex;

Cadiz Port Office;

Constantina Aircraft Control and Warning Station

(Redesignated Constantina Air Station);

Cuatro Vientos Communications Annex;

Getafe Air Auxiliary;

Jul 1 (continued)

Madrid Complex Annex;  
Moron Air Base;  
Muntados Fuel Storage Annex;  
San Pablo Air Base;  
Seville Field Office;  
Sonseca Meteorological Station;  
Spain Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants System  
Tabladilla Air Storage Station;  
Villatobas Aircraft Control and Warning Station  
(Redesignated as Villatobas Air Station);  
Zaragoza Administrative Annex;  
Zaragoza Air Base;  
Zaragoza Medical Annex.

(SAC, GO 61, 1957).

### September

1 3926th Food Service Squadron, designated and organized with station at Ben Guerir, Morocco; assigned to 3926th Air Base Group (SAC, GO 61, 1957).

10 3978th School Squadron detachments organized:

Detachment 2, organized with station at Zaragoza Air Base, Spain; attached to the 3974th Air Base Squadron for administration and logistical support (16 AF, GO 53, 1957).

Detachment 3, organized with station at Seville, Spain; attached to the 3977th Air Base Group for administrative and logistical support (16 AF, GO 53, 1957).

## September (continued)

- 12 49th Communications Squadron, with station at Madrid, Spain, assigned to the 16th Air Force (SAC, GO 42, 1957); attached to 3970th Air Base Group for administration and logistical support (16 AF, GO 49, 1957).

## October

- 3 1148th USAF Special Activities Squadron (JUSMG, Spain) attached to 3970th Air Base Group for administrative support (16 AF, Go 51, 1957).

## November

- 4 65th Air Division (Defense), attached to the 3970th Air Base Group for logistical support (16 AF, Go 54, 1957).

Team 313 attached to the 16th Air Force (Headquarters) for General Courts-Martial jurisdiction (Headquarters Command, USAF, GO 51, 1957); attached to 3970th Air Base Group for special and summary courts-martials, administrative and board proceedings, article 15's (16 AF, GO 54, 1957).

## December

- 15 Detachment 1, Headquarters, Sixteenth Air Force, designated and organized (16 AF, Go 56, 1957).

## GLOSSARY

(As this is the first volume of history for the 16th Air Force, as a part of SAC, this Glossary includes all abbreviation. Future volumes will only include those that are considered as not being commonly used.)

AACS	Airways and Air Communications Service
ACW	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADCC	Air Defense Control Center
ADI	Anti-Detonation Injection
AMC	Air Materiel Command
AREFS	Air Refueling Squadron
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company
ATCC	Air Traffic Control Center
BOD	Beneficial Occupancy Date
CBR	Chemical, Biological, Radiological
ComZ	Communications Zone
CTNE	[left blank]
DAF	Department of the Air Force
DOD	Department of Defense
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
EWP	Emergency War Plan
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
IFR	In-Flight Refueling
ITT	International Telephone and Telegraph
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JUSMG	Joint United States Military Group

LOX	Liquid Oxygen
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Pact
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
METO	Middle East Treaty Organization
MSA	Mutual Security Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
POL	Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
PTT	Posts, Telephones, Telegraphs
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAF	Spanish Air Force
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty
SOCS	Strategic Operations Control System
SSB	Single Side Band
UHF	Ultra-High Frequency
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Force in Europe
USN	United States Navy
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VHF	Very High Frequency
ZI	Zone of Interior [Now known as CONUS or Continental U.S.]

## CHAPTER I

### THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND IN EUROPE AND AFRICA

#### Background

From the time man first discovered the use of his fists as weapons or either protection or destruction, through the years of development of stone axes, flame throwers, gunpowder, and finally, the utilization of atomic energy, the maintaining of peace throughout the world has been difficult. With this growth of war equipment, the scope of conflict grew from tribal disputes to, in the twentieth century, two wars that either involved or affected all nations of the globe. The ending of World War II came with the deliver by air of the first nuclear bomb over Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945. This culmination of centuries of development of the capability for destruction, however, did not yield the desired peace among nations, but it did emphasize that the adoption of a policy of isolation by any country would probably result in national suicide.

#### International Peace Organizations

A product of World War I, the League of Nations was based on a Covenant of 26 articles, and recognized the need for disarmament. Provisions were made for guarantees of territorial status quo against aggression, and for arbitration and conciliation in disputes. However, from 1919 through 1931 it became increasingly apparent that the League was destined to die a lingering death due to refusal of member nations to adhere to the decisions of the group. The withdrawal of Japan started the trend, and the Munich Pact in 1938 virtually discarded the organization. Officially, however, it lingered until April 1946 when its services and real estate were transferred to its successor, the United Nations Organization.

In the midst of a two-theater war, the first day of 1942 yielded a joint declaration of 26 nations that concerted action would be continued among the allied countries participating in World War II against Germany, Italy, and Japan. Nearly two years later the Moscow declaration, issued by the United States (US), Great Britain, china, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), stated a need for a replacement to the League. Over the next two years various meetings resulted in the holding of a final conference, with representatives of 51 nations meeting at San Francisco, California, from 25 April to 26 June 1945. Out of this came the United Nations Charter,

signed on the last day of the meeting, and ratified by the requisite number of member countries by 24 October of that year.

On the European continent, Germany and Italy were excluded by reason of their part in the war. Spain, which had remained neutral was not asked to participate. Thus, by 1952 the following nations were members on the continent:

Belgium	Greece	Sweden	Belorussia	Luxembourg	Ukraine
Denmark	Netherlands	USSR	France	Norway	Yugoslavia

### A Military Alliance

The division of Germany and Austria following the end of World War II among the four major powers: US, Great Britain, France, and the USSR, set the stage for withdrawal of the USSR behind what came to be known as the “iron curtain.” Thus, quite effectively, the European continent was divided into two camps: one following the principles of independence for each nation, the other attempting to demonstrate the practicality of the theories of Karl Marx.

Harassing actions by the USSR both within the United Nations (UN) and outside of it provided food for serious thought among the peoples of the Americas and western Europe. To offset this threat, and to provide a means of mutual assistance against possible aggression, a military alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being. This document, while not committing member nations to war in [the] event of an attack on one of them, did provide for collective security and pledged assistance. Signatory countries in 1949 were the US and Canada in North America, Iceland in the Atlantic, and Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal in Europe. Then in 1951, the mid-eastern countries of Greece and Turkey also entered this alliance.

To support this Treaty, the US Congress passed the Mutual Security Act in 1951, and by this action replaced the European Recovery Program that had been in operations since 1948, as administered by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). This provided a coordinated program of economic, military and technical aid.



NATO Treaty Signatory Nations (*Original Illustration*)

### The Far East

Following the ending of the war in the Far East with the unconditional surrender of Japan, the country was occupied by allied powers under the command of General MacArthur of the US. The nearby peninsula of Korea was divided at the 38th parallel with occupation of the north portion by USSR troops, and of the south by American forces. Here again, as in Europe, a curtain descended.

The uneasy peace which the world had become more or less accustomed to living with came to an abrupt end on 25 June 1950. On that day North Korean troops violated the treaty line and invaded South Korea. The UN immediately declared the North Korean nation as an aggressor and supported the south by police action, with troops, arms and supplies. In retrospect, this

invasion may well be considered as having more influence on the world's thinking than any other single event after the war. Above all, it demonstrated with clarity the dedication of those furthering communist principles, and emphasized the fact that force would be used to gain converts if no other means sufficed.

### American Forces in Europe

At the end of World War II, American forces remained in Germany, Austria and Italy, sharing the occupation with the other three powers. However, gradual phase-out of troops was planned over the years, with Germany and Austria finally being returned to their original boundaries. For Austria this was an accomplished fact in 1954, but Germany remained a nation divided in two parts. The zones previously occupied by the British, French and US forces were integrated and forces reduced. The USSR, however, did not withdraw their forces from the remainder of the country. Berlin remained as a four-power occupied zone.

During the years of 1950 and 1957, the United States Air Force (USAF) released various bases and returned them to control of the German Air Force. At the same time USAF tactical units were gradually shifted from bases located in the former American zone, which bordered the Russian-occupied area, to bases further west, formerly occupied by French and British troops. During all of this period the headquarters for the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) remained at Wiesbaden.

In France, the US Army maintained a "Line of Communications," commonly known as ComZ, in accordance with an agreement signed in 1948. This was necessary in view of the fact that US forces in Germany and Austria were, due to geographical division into four parts, excluded from direct access to surface shipping lines. Thus, the ocean port on the Atlantic, La Rochelle, provided an ingress point for supplies that could be utilized if the international situation became such that entrance through the British zone of northern Germany could not be made. The headquarters for this organization was in Orleans, 75 miles south of Paris.

Immediately after the onset of the police action in Korea, the US, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, negotiated two agreements with France to permit construction of air bases in both continental France and in the protectorate of Morocco. In France, tactical bases were located at Bordeaux, Chaumont, Dreux, Etain, Evreux and Phalsbourg. At Chateauroux a supply and maintenance depot was activated in 1951, with satellited installations at St. Mihiel and Foret

de Chize for ammunition storage, at Moulins for vehicle maintenance, at Villefranche-sur-Allier for storage, and at Bordeaux for port operations and storage.

These two countries, then, formed the USAF defense network on the continent of Europe until 1953, when negotiations were climaxed in Spain for location of bases in that country.

### Spain and the United States

Prior to 4 November 1950, official action on the part of the US to include Spain in the network of defense was impossible. This date marked the removal of the United Nations ban which had virtually isolated the Spanish people from political and military affiliations with the rest of the world. The ban, voted by the UN in December 1946, was the result of a long series of events, which began primarily in 1931.

The ending of the monarchy in Spain, with the departure of King Alfonso XIII in mid-April 1931, presaged a period in the history of the Iberian Peninsula that was to be marked by the struggle of opposing ideologies for dominance. A vacillating government provided fertile ground for infiltration of Communist trained agents capable of gradually taking over affairs within the country. The resultant veering from right to left, and the changing from a traditionally religious nation to one almost vehemently anti-clerical, made of Spain a mirror of Marxist theories. Coupled with this was the rise of Socialist parties and the warring of the various factions among themselves made life and property of little value.

By the time national elections were held in early 1936 some progress had been made toward combining the leftist elements, with the result that, despite the fact the center and right parties had more votes, the leftist, Popular Front, had won the most seats in the *Cortes*, the governing body of Spain.

This unhealthy state of affairs continued until mid-July when, based on the traditional pronunciamiento, a military revolt was declared. Normally, strategically located garrisons would declare allegiance to the rebel general and the existing government would abdicate in favor of a military dictatorship. This type of rule would then last until a new government could be formed.

Three generals of the Army were primarily involved in the revolution: Sanjurjo, Mola and Franco. Of these General Sanjurjo was killed in an airplane crash when leaving Portugal for Spain only two days after the first revolts in Spanish Morocco. A few months later General Mola was dead, also in a plane crash. General Franco, on 19 July, left his station in the Canary Islands and

flew to Tetuan, Morocco, where he found the troops in revolt, with the fighting having already spread to the peninsula. Within a few days battle lines had been established and thus began one of the bitterest, and most debated civil wars of modern times.

The remainder of Europe watched uneasily as Germany and Italy, on one hand, and Russia on the other, supported the divided country. General Franco, as leader of the *Nationalists*, received support from the Axis nations, and had help in the form of planes, guns, and munitions, as well as pilots and technicians from Germany, and soldiers from Italy. The Soviets ran and dominated the Republican war, with the Comintern's International Brigade, plus munitions, mobile equipment, and tanks, and France also assisted this side of the battle.

During the remainder of 1936, and through 1937 and 1938, the war continued within the borders of Spain. Essentially, although it was fed by the Communists on one hand, and by the Axis on the other, the Spanish retained their individuality and identity as a nation when it was all over. Finally, on 1 April 1939, General Franco officially announced that the Civil War was ended.

The cessation of hostilities ushered in only a lull of conflict, rather than a lasting peace. Forty days later the world's attention was focused on central Europe where Germany had invaded Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Thus, Spain was left to bind her own wounds and to retire into neutrality as far as World War II was concerned.

The keeping of Spain out of active hostilities during World War II was undoubtedly in the best interest of the country. The devastation of the revolution, with the accompanying drain on manpower and the strain on the economic system, would have placed Franco and his hard-won victory in a highly vulnerable position if any additional commitments had been made. Seemingly, Franco leaned toward the Axis forces, at least during the initial stages of the war. However, it must be remembered that he had been supported by these forces during the revolution. As the country recovered slightly from her own problems, assistance was given to the Allied forces in limiting activities of Axis agents, in "forwarding" of Allied personnel forced down within the country or escaping across the Pyrenees, and in maintaining a non-belligerency status during the critical North African and Italian campaigns.

Spain was omitted from discussion in [the] forming of the United Nations. Past association with the then defeated Axis power, propaganda by Communists that at times was far from subtle, and association of Franco with the word "dictator," meant that public opinion placed the country outside the realm of peace-loving nations.

During these years of Spanish isolation, from 1946 to 1950, the US studied relations, and in January 1948 the National Security Council (NSC) “concluded that US relations with Spain were politically and militarily unsatisfactory and that we should work towards a normalization of US-Spanish relations, both political and economical.”<sup>1</sup> This was followed a year later by the completion of a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that economic aid to Spain, as well as military cooperation, was in the best interests of the United States. However, the Department of State recommended that the US not press for Spanish participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unless “reasonably assured that all member nations would agree to it and that the US should not advocate bilateral military cooperation outside of NATO.”<sup>2</sup>

From 1946 to 1950 the tenor of thought toward Spain changed gradually, particularly after the onset of the Korean war. The European nations and the US re-examined the Spanish situation, particularly in regard to the strategic location of the country. As a result of this the political ban on Spain was revoked on 4 November 1950, thus permitting resumption of diplomatic relations between the US and that country. Seven weeks later, on 27 December 1950, Mr. Stanton Griffis was appointed as US Ambassador to Spain, and he presented his credentials to General Franco on 5 March 1951.

The NSC expressed the US policy toward Spain which highlighted the strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula when considered in the defense of western Europe. On 28 Jun 1951, the President approved the statement, which in part was as follows:

1. To approach the Spanish Government in order to acquire facilities as bases for long range bombers and fighter operations and behind-the-lines staging areas. This approach was to include bases for naval operations, also
2. To provide for the following in the field of military and naval operations:
  - a. Complete surveys concerning the military requirements and capabilities of Spain
  - b. Provide for mutual interchange of information
  - c. Consult regarding Spanish Defense plans
  - d. Give technical advice on Spanish military and naval supplies
  - e. Consult and give technical advice concerning the improvement of Spanish ports, roads, railroads, telecommunications and air fields.

Early in July 1950, Admiral Forest Sherman was appointed to visit Spain for preparatory talks on surveys of Spanish military facilities. He met with Franco and reported that "... He went very thoroughly into the necessity to prepare a nation completely in the economic as well as the military field of war, if that nation were to grant operating rights status whenever these rights were used in war."<sup>3</sup>

As a result of this conference the Joint United States Military Survey Team conducted surveys in the late summer of installations to determine facilities that would meet US requirements.<sup>4</sup> In October Congress appropriated \$100,000,000 for aid to Spain to be used at the discretion of the President. These actions were followed, in November, by the forming of the Mutual Assistance Advisory Group, composed of representatives of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, and the ECA "... to prepare a package for use in future negotiations containing on the one hand, military facilities the United States desires in Spain and on the other, types and amount of aid the United States is prepared to extend."<sup>5</sup> Thus, this group was charged with preparation of "Terms of Reference" for negotiations.

Through the winter of 1951-1952 meetings continued between the agencies on the essential items to be discussed with the Spanish. Primarily, the results consisted of an unclassified, three article paper, *Defense Agreement*, with a classified 26 article Technical Agreement, prepared by the three military services of DOD. The MSA (Mutual Security Agency) prepared drafts for mutual defense assistance and economic aid.

In late March 1952, members of a Joint United States Military Group (JUSMG) left the US for Germany, where, on 4 April, they received instructions from Ambassador MacVeagh (who had replaced Ambassador Griffis) to enter Spain. Permission had been given to Mr. MacVeagh by the Spanish Foreign Minister Martin Artago [Alberto Martin-Artajo y Alvarez, corrected as Artajo hereafter], for Major General Kissner to contact officials who were to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Spanish Government. General Kissner was the head of the JUSMG organization. Lieutenant General Juan Vigon Suerodiaz conducted negotiations for the Spanish.

From the time of their arrival in Spain until the signing of the agreements on 26 September 1953, drafts and counter-drafts were prepared, and changes varied from individual words to whole paragraphs. Essentially the Spanish wished to maintain their sovereignty rights and to avoid excessive impacts on the Spanish economy. At the same time, the US wanted to have somewhat of a free hand and to accomplish the base construction as rapidly as possible, particularly in view

of the unsettled international situation. However, in accordance with Spanish wishes, crash programs were avoided.

Official authorization was received on 25 September from Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to sign the Defense, Technical, Economic Aid, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements. General Kissner had previously received authority to sign the first four technical schedules from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roger Keyes. Thus,

In a private meeting the morning of 26 September, Kissner and Vigon signed the Technical Schedules and Dunn and Artajo signed the Technical Agreement. In the afternoon of the same day, Dunn and Artajo signed publicly the Defense Agreement and Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. These ... /granted/ the United States ... many rights and privileges ...<sup>6</sup>

Essentially, the *Defense Agreement* provided for the US to support the Spanish defense efforts, and in return the Government of Spain authorized the American defense forces to utilize certain areas under the jurisdiction of Spain for military purposes.<sup>7</sup> The duration of the agreement was placed at ten years, with automatic extensions for two successive periods of five years each, unless one of the Governments indicated an intention to cancel.<sup>8</sup> The areas agreed upon for use by the US were to remain under Spanish Flag and command, and as in the case of the agreements made earlier with France, Spain was charged with external security.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to this brief unclassified agreement, there were the extensive technical agreements and interpretative notes that served to amplify the basic terms and to outline, in detail, various operating procedures to be followed. For example, Article III, which provided for joint utilization with the bases remaining under the Spanish flag and command, contained a brief paragraph that the "... time and manner of wartime utilization ..." was to be agreed upon. Thus, a *Note*, signed by Ambassador Dunn and Minister Artajo provide that in event of Communist aggression threatening the security of the west, the US could make use of facilities in Spain for action against military objectives.<sup>10</sup>

A 26-article technical agreement was annexed to the Defense Agreement, with a security classification of Secret, as compared to the unclassified basic document. This provided in greater detail the provisions for acquiring of land, security, facilities, legal jurisdiction, establishment of messes and other personnel servicing agencies, import and export restrictions, and employment of

personnel.<sup>11</sup> Further expansion was made in four technical schedules and 22 procedural agreements. (These will be discussed in appropriate sections in this and future histories.)

The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, signed at the same time, provided that each country was to:

Join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;

Take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;

Fulfill the military obligations which it has assumed in multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to which both Governments are parties.<sup>12</sup>

The seven articles comprising the agreement covered admission of Military Assistance Advisory Group personnel, exchange of patent rights and technical information, control of trade with aggressors, and funds. Additionally, a separate Annex on Tax Relief, with an interpretative note, was included.

The third and last, agreement signed that day was the *Economic Aid Agreement* which recognized "... that individual liberty, free institutions and genuine independence in all countries, as well as defense against aggression, rest largely on the establishment of a sound economy."<sup>13</sup> This ten-article agreement, with one annex and three confidential notes, provided for administration and utilization of US assistance to Spain.

Under Technical Schedule Number 1, also signed on 26 September by Generals Kissner and Vigon, provision was made for the following air base sites:

1. Madrid-Torrejon, minimum capacity for one strategic reconnaissance wing, one fighter intercept squadron, an air division headquarters, and a military transport service.
2. El Copero: one medium bombardment wing and supply depots.
3. Moron de la Frontera: one medium bombardment wing.
4. Sanjurjo-Valenzuela: two strategic fighter wings.
5. Mutadas or Reus: one fighter interceptor squadron.
6. Los Llanos: two medium bombardment wings.
7. Los Palacios: two medium bombardment wings.
8. Alcala and San Pablo: four units as may be mutually agreed.


Of these potential USAF bases, only three became reality during the period 1953 to mid-1957: Torrejon, 15 miles east of Madrid; Sanjurjo-Valenzuela (Zaragoza Air Base), 4 miles west of Zaragoza; and Moron Air Base, 35 miles southeast of Seville, near Moron de la Frontera. However, runway facilities were utilized at the Spanish air base of San Pablo with inclusion of this base in operations plans as a refueling site for KC-97s from Ben Guerir Air Base, Morocco, during the last half of 1957.

In addition to these sites, off-loading and fly-away facilities were scheduled for Matagorda, and the US Navy was allotted air base facilities at Rota, near Cadiz, in southern Spain.

For these sites, the American forces were to be permitted to construct and/or expand for aircraft and/or ship maintenance and operation; command and administration areas; storage and distribution of materiel, supplies and munitions; facilities for personnel to include housing, messing and recreation; communications and navigational and landing aids; transportation facilities; and staging areas. Where necessary, access road and railroad spurs could be constructed. Sites for aircraft control and warning stations were to be agreed upon, as well as locations for materiel storage, telecommunications networks, firing ranges, amphibious training areas, or for other purposes as deemed necessary.

Construction of new subterranean storage facilities and expansion of existing sites for petroleum-oil-lubricants (POL) and ammunition was scheduled for San Cristobal, Cartagena, El Ferrol, Palma, Mahon, Soller, and Tarifa. POL storage facilities were permitted in Cadiz, Bilbao, Madrid, Seville, Albacete, and Barcelona. Additionally, provisions were made for construction of POL pipelines.

By mid-1957, air base facilities were well under construction at Torrejon, Moron and Zaragoza, and the POL pipeline was ready and in operation. The US Navy was moving into its facilities at Rota, and American supplies were being off-loaded at the ports of Barcelona, Cadiz, Seville, and Algeciras.



The USAF in Spain, 1957 (Original Illustration)

Construction during this period was under the general supervision of JUSMG, with operation headquarters in Madrid. The US Navy's Bureau of Yards and Docks was the responsible agent for contracting the work, supervising its accomplishment, following coordination with USAF and US Navy (USN) agencies.

In mid-1956 the 16th Air Force was activated as a special activity under Headquarters, USAF, and assigned to Spain with offices in Madrid. This organization existed as such until 1 July 1957 when it was released from direct USAF control and assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with the responsibility of operational control of SAC bases in Spain and Morocco. During this formative period of the Sixteenth, the Fifth Air Division in Morocco, based on SAC instructions, established a *Liaison Team* to work with the Sixteenth. This Group, also

stationed in Madrid, were concerned primarily with assuring that the specialized requirements for SAC operations would be fulfilled at the bases. In addition, establishment of adequate communications facilities was of concern, as well as establishing the many support functions required for operations.

Thus, in mid-1957, the nucleus of the Sixteenth headquarters was in Spain, and based on SAC plans, the three air bases, headquarters and support facilities in Madrid and Seville, and POL line, became part of the overall strategic capability of the USAF.

### Spain, 1957

American assistance to Spain included not only support of the defense forces, but also included grants in agricultural commodities. It was expected that the Spanish would ask for additional funds in 1958, particularly following discussions between Generalissimo Franco and the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in mid-December. Congress had already voted \$40,000,000 in “defense support,” in addition to \$70,000,000 in agricultural products for this country.

The civil war, the isolation of the country during the War, and in the five years following, had all left their mark. Rail facilities, communications, housing, and even food supplies were the cause of concern.

In the field of international relations, Spain’s position had improved over the period of 1950 to 1957, and had resulted in admittance to the United Nations in 1955. However, it was still excluded from the NATO group, but the attitude of other nations was changing. This was illustrated quite well in an article published in the *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*<sup>14</sup> on the occasion of Mr. Dulles’ visit that following on the heels of the NATO conference in Paris in December:

Mr. Dulles’s visit to Madrid tomorrow is a natural pendant to the N.A.T.O. conference. After deliberating with 14 of her allies, the United States has similar questions of mutual defense to discuss with a fifteenth which belongs strategically to the same group, but is politically excluded from it. Spain has long been ready to join N.A.T.O. Primarily this is for reasons of prestige, though more materialistic motives may well be sharpened by the American promise of massive new economic aid to the alliance.

Militarily, Spain's exclusion makes no sense at all. She would be on the same side in any war against Communist aggression, and her absence from joint planning to prevent it merely leaves loose ends which would have to be hastily tied in an emergency. Nevertheless, the political obstacle remains insuperable as long as there is the possibility of one black ball being cast against Spain, because the admission of new members must be unanimous. Prejudice must be left to die quietly in its own unreason.

It is worth noting, however, that there is one source of past tension between some of the N.A.T.O. allies which Spain's admission to their counsels would certainly not aggravate, but to which she might supply a helpful solvent. Her interests in the Arab world is of long standing and Gen. Franco has been at pains to consolidate friendships that would justify Spain's claim to be a link between Europe and the Moslem countries. The role is of cardinal importance, and it would be of great advantage if it were played from within N.A.T.O. In her internal regime Franco Spain never made the smallest concession to the hostility of foreign democracies; she was content to wait until their boycott dissolved under pressure of necessity and common sense. A little more patience on her part, and a little more realism on theirs, may bring Spain into the Atlantic defense community where she so clearly belongs.

#### The USAF in Africa


Six months after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, and within the NATO agreements, the US and France signed an agreement permitting the USAF to construct bases in the French protectorate of Morocco.<sup>15</sup> Followed by a Technical Agreement between the USAF and the French Air Force (FAF) in May 1951, three bases for strategic operations and one for supply and maintenance were built.<sup>16</sup>

In January 1951 the Fifth Bombardment Wing (Heavy), of World War II, was redesignated as the Fifth Air Division and reactivated with the mission to man, train and equip assigned SAC units, and to prepare assigned installations in French Morocco for the support of the emergency war plans (EWP) and operations.<sup>17</sup> In May 1951 and advance organization opened its headquarters

at Rabat, Morocco, and the first rotational training group arrived at Sisi Slimane in December 1951.

The three bases assigned to SAC were located at Sisi Slimane, 35 miles inland from the USN installation at Port Lyautey (Kenitra), at Ben Guerir, approximately 150 miles inland from Safi, and Boulhaut, about 20 miles north of Casablanca. The first two were capable of handling heavy aircraft, while the last was basically capable of accepting fighters. A fourth base, Nouasseur Air Depot, was located 18 miles east of Casablanca, and under the jurisdiction of the Air Materiel Command (AMC). This site was the headquarters of the Southern Air Materiel Area, one of the three serving the European bases. However, under the revised support concepts that came into effect during 1956-1957, the AMC portion of this base was in the process of deactivation in mid-1957, and it was scheduled to be added to the SAC family in mid-1958.

The residence of SAC and AMC personnel in Morocco during the period 1950-1957 was not always without problems. Internal difficulties within the country required some changes at various times from what might be called “routine existence.” It was during this period that eleven centuries of Arab domination resulted, for the first time, in a nation with one native leader banded together for one cause – freedom and independence.



The USAF in Morocco, 1957 (Original Illustration, with enhancements)

Known from the time of the Phoenicians, Morocco received the first members of the Moslem faith in the seventh century, and during the next thousand years the fortunes of Morocco waxed and waned. Expansion varied from occupation of [Andalusia] in the Iberian Peninsula to residence of the Spanish and Portuguese in the Central Littoral Plain. Developing commerce in the 1700s increased the number of foreign persons in the country, but not the tolerance of religions necessary to always permit them free passage. Certain concessions were given to Christians, but various crises during the years caused intervention by Spain and France to protect European nationals. Pirates established a stronghold near the Grottoes of Hercules, thus creating problems for those desirous of trade with this country. Finally, in 1880, the *Convention of Madrid* settled the questions relative to commerce and protection for this part of Africa.

In 1906 European nations participated in the Treaty of Algeciras that established the international zone of Tanger, and also allotted occupation areas to the Spanish in the north, the French in the south, and established the Spanish enclave of Ifni. The French protectorate was firmly established on 30 March 1912, when Sultan Moulay Hafid signed a treaty giving the French ruling power. Under this treaty, Marshal Lyautey of France eventually brought the outlying Berber tribes into the fold, and by the mid-1930s Morocco was fairly well unified. However, these formerly free tribes, with no fixed villages in the inland mountain region, maintained a certain degree of independence, just as they had accepted the Moslem religion with certain reservations.

Following World War II, a movement began with gradually increasing intensity, that climaxed in an internal rebellion against the French and Spanish occupation. The years of 1953-1954 were marked by clashes between the well-organized foreign troops and the Army of Liberation (AOL) of the Moroccans. Mohammed Ben Youssef, had been replaced shortly after World War II for his support of the liberation movement by his uncle, the French chosen Mohammed Ben Arafa. But, Arafa shifted his allegiance from the French to Ben Youssef, and the protectorate government recalled him to the throne. He returned to Rabat on 16 November 1955, and this ended one phase of the Moroccan return to independence. As a last gesture, the French agreed in principle to this on 4 March 1956, and on 7 April the Spanish renounced their interests in the northern area, but did not release Ifni.

American policy during this period had to be one of non-intervention. Bases were occupied by virtue of agreements with the French, and with the granting of independence, these documents were still utilized as a guide for dealing with the Moroccan government. However, the French did

not leave in one concerted move, but rather gradually. Troops of both nationalities were still present in the country in 1957 with no date on which their evacuation would be effective. Ostensibly, they remained for protection of the remaining French and Spanish nationals.

It was not possible to compare the Morocco of 1957 with other countries of the world in the light of economic progress and civilization. With the exception of a few Europeanized cities, such as Tanger, Casablanca, Rabat and Marrakesh, the life, dress, habits and superstitions of the people had changed little in the thousand years since the influx of followers of the Koran. The ruler was both the head of state and of the church. Education for the masses was only starting to become a reality, having been in the past limited to a chose few at schools that taught primarily the Islamic religion. However, the King was advocating higher education, enlargement of the school system, and was urging the release of women from the limitations imposed by Koranic precepts. Economically, the country was in the doldrums. The departure of businessmen for their homelands, as well as many leaving from the agricultural areas, contributed to the high unemployment rate. There were few native personnel trained to take over the empty spots so that people formerly employed by these industries or farms were left without a means of livelihood. Probably some of these returned to their earlier nomadic way of life, but many gravitated to the cities. Thieving was prevalent, evidently on sort of a “share the wealth” program, and Americans were frequently victims of past masters of the art.

Under discussion in mid-1957 were new agreements that were to govern American occupation of the four bases. This was one of the subjects that King Mohammed V (Ben Youssef) wished to discuss during his visit to the US in the fall of the year. However, it was felt by Americans in Morocco that this might not be advisable, since representation by US personnel at such meetings might not include those familiar with the problems facing the USAF in this part of the world. American financial aid had already been given to the country, and the contribution to the local economy by US personnel in the area was undoubtedly quite well understood, at least by those responsible for handling the nation’s finances. However, any move that might jeopardize the hard-won independence of the Moroccans, certainly would not be acceptable to either the King or his subjects.

Another site in North Africa was utilized for exercises by SAC: Wheelus Air Base, five miles east of Tripoli, Libya. This base, under control of USAFE, was the location of Headquarters, Seventeenth Air Force, and was operated by the 7273rd Air Base Wing. Prior to the inception of

new alert procedures in mid-1957, this facility, with runways capable of taking heavy bombers, was frequently included in operations originating from the SAC Moroccan bases.

### US in the Mid-East

In 1955, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Great Britain and Pakistan joined in the *Baghdad Pact* or *Middle East Treaty Organization* (METO). The US, while not a signer, was an interested party in this treaty, the purpose of which was to provide a defense shield along the southern boundary of the USSR.

The USAF utilized two bases in this area. One of these was in Saudi Arabia at Dhahran, and while it could be used by SAC, the facilities were also shared by Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and by civilian airlines. The other, six miles east-northeast of Adana, Turkey, was Incirlik Air Base. Both of these bases were capable of accepting heavy bombers on strike or post-strike activity.

### Atlantic and English Bases

Aircraft coming to the European and North African areas could utilize, by the northern route, a series of SAC bases after leaving the eastern part of the US. In Newfoundland, Ernest Harmon Air Force Base was available, in Labrador there was Good Air Base, and in the Baffin Island area, Frobisher was utilized. To the north and further east in Greenland were three bases: Narsarsuak [Narsarsuaq]<sup>1</sup>, Sondrestrom, and Thule.

Going on to England, the SAC aircraft used four bases: Brize-Norton, Lakenheath, Fairford, and Greenham Commons. In addition, emergency use could be made of some thirteen other bases. SAC's Seventh Air Division was at South Ruislip.

On the southern route, SAC had jurisdiction of Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico. In addition, the Military Air Transport Service (MATC) site of Kindley Air Force Base in Bermuda, was utilized frequently on rotational and/or training flights by SAC aircraft.

Off the Africa coast in the Azores, Lajes Field and Santa Maria Field were available for use by bombers and SAC tankers supporting over-flights and landings of strategic aircraft.

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<sup>1</sup> This base was inactivated, effective 1 July 1957, per SAC General Order 9, 1958.

## Summary

Immediately following World War II, the average person relaxed with the idea that the United Nations could handle international disputes, and that peace and calm would prevail. However, when the aims of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were emphasized in 1950 by the invasion of Korea, it was apparent that the United States, as a major power, must cooperate with the remainder of the free world to deter aggression. As a result, the US became involved in a series of international treaties aimed at strengthening defense capabilities. In the western hemisphere the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty, joined 21 and 19 countries, respectively, in 1947 and 1948. Then came the North Atlantic Treaty involving the US, Canada, and by 1947, 13 other nations. Moving on to the far-east, the US signed the Southeast Asia Treaty (SEATO) in September 1954, which involved Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. Finally, in 1955, the US, as pointed out earlier, sponsored but did not join the Baghdad Pact.

Counter-moves by the USSR in the international realm included, in 1955, the Warsaw Pact, involving the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This document was generally similar to the North Atlantic Treaty in what it provided for a unified military command, and that an attack on one of them would be considered an attack on all. Additionally, the wooing of independent states such as Egypt and Syria was stepped up in pace, and they were furnished arms as well as the people with the ability to train natives in their use. In Europe, the refusal to permit the reuniting of Germany and the military action taken in quelling the revolt in Hungary in 1956, indicated that even though it was one of the members of the UN, the USSR was not inclined to “live and let live.”

All of these moves in the field of international relations were reflected in the assistance the US gave to foreign nations, and as a result the USAF became involved, and consequently SAC. As the long-range striking force of the defense organization, the positioning of SAC bases in Spain and Morocco provided sites required for emergency action. When SAC bases were combined with those in other countries capable of supporting heavy aircraft activity, a network covering a quarter of the globe was available.

In establishing these bases many phases of operations and support had to be considered that were often without precedent. Perhaps one of the most important was the necessity to combine American and native standards with regard to construction. Another critical item was

communications adequacy, which was paramount for SAC operations. Re-supply for fuels had to be considered in all countries, as well as storage capacity sufficient to support emergency plans.

To accomplish all of the preparation required to permit SAC operations it was necessary to follow not only the agreements between the US and the various nations, but also for personnel manning these sites to be cognizant of local laws and customs. Acceptance by Americans of the differences in the ways of life in the various countries was an influencing actor in our foreign relations.

## CHAPTER II

### ESTABLISHING THE SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE

Following signing of the agreements with the Spanish in 1953, the USAF developed plans for utilization of the allotted bases. Programming documents indicated that seven bases would be under their control, and it was proposed that the Fifth Air Division, stationed at Sidi Slimane Air Base, Morocco, would move to Spain to take over control. One advantage seen in this was that the rigid troop ceilings in existence in Morocco, under agreements with the French would not be applicable in Spain; but heed also had to be paid to a provision contained in the Spanish agreements whereby the US was "... authorized to bring into territory under Spanish jurisdiction the minimum number of military members of United States forces which are considered necessary for the operation, administration and control of bases and facilities therein, to carry out the purposes of the Defense Agreement dated 26 September 1953."<sup>2</sup>

Planning in early 1955 was that the Fifth would move to Spain six months prior to the scheduled beneficial occupancy dated (BOD) of SAC bases, or during the period of April-June 1956. However, a small contingent of personnel would remain in Morocco – 53 spaces authorized – to maintain liaison with the local authorities and generally supervise operations in that country. At this time Torrejon, at Madrid, and Zaragoza were scheduled for a BOD of March 1957, Moron in April 1957, Ecija (Seville) and Los Llanos (Albacete) in April 1958, with one other base, site unknown, scheduled for February 1959. It was anticipated that the Fifth would move from offices in Madrid to Torrejon during the last three months of 1957.

The SAC position before the Air Staff was that the Spanish depot system should remain under the Air Materiel Command (AMC), and that JUSMG in Spain should be expanded into an area command directly under the control of USAF as an Executive Agent of the JCS. This latter command would handle all negotiations, constructions, and theater policy.

In March 1956 the Fifth was told that SAC planning was that they were to move to Torrejon and assume control of the SAC bases during October-December 1956. Upon this move area responsibility was to be with JUSMG, or as designated by USAF, and depot support was to remain under AMC. Operational programming was for one peacetime rotational base, with medium bomb, medium reconnaissance and fighter type wings being assigned on a rotational basis, with

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<sup>2</sup> Ref. Technical Schedule No. 4, Personnel. This will be discussed more completely in a later chapter.

only one wing to a base. Sites not used for rotations would be maintained for emergency war plans (EWP) use only.

It was considered by the Fifth that a group of perhaps four people should be stationed in Madrid to coordinate with JUSMG requirements for SAC. When approached with this plan, opposition was met both on this, and on the projected combining of the Moroccan and Spanish headquarters under one organization. The results of this visit to JUSMG, where the Chief of Staff and the Plans Directorate were contacted, was that these two segments of JUSMG favorably received the proposal, although they felt that the members of such a liaison team should be integrated into JUSMG. However, when General Kissner, commander of JUSMG, was approached, he voiced opposition to movement of the Fifth which he based on political considerations, and stated that he recommended creation of a separate division to control SAC operations in Spain. A draft of a letter was prepared on this subject, but Fifth personnel were not given an opportunity to review it. In regard to the four-man liaison team, he stated that he opposed it and that troop ceilings in Spain were controlled by the Secretary of the Air Force, and it would be "... utterly impossible to consider four people for this duty." He did agree that one highly qualified officer, of perhaps the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel could be integrated into his staff. If a specialist were required, then one could be sent on temporary duty from the Fifth.

In June 1955 planning changed completely on this project. The Fifth received notification that it would not move, but that an air division would be activated at Madrid and move to Torrejon in the first part of 1957. The 49th Communications Squadron, Sidi Slimane, was scheduled to move to Torrejon in October-December 1956, and in view of this the Fifth had to give consideration to planning another organization to support their own operations in Morocco, or to attempt to re-program and have this group remain on site.

In mid-1956, SAC, aware of the responsibilities it would assume for bases in Spain, did establish a liaison team as a detachment of the Fifth. This group monitored the SAC interests and reported monthly on progress on construction.

Since the program for construction in Spain did not progress as originally planned, SAC told the Fifth in September 1956 to hold all plans in abeyance pending further advice. As a result, during the last months of 1956 the moving date changed from the April-June period to July 1957.

In early 1957 all of the previous planning was obviated when the Air Staff approved the proposal for assignment of the newly activated 16th Air Force to SAC. However, until the bases

would become operational this group operated as a special activity under control of USAF. Then from 15 February to 3 March 1957, a conference was held in Madrid with JUSMG, Sixteenth and SAC personnel attending, and plans were made for the change of command. This was followed by publication of SAC Programming Plan No. 9-57, 14 May 1957, which provided for the assignment of the Sixteenth to SAC on 1 Jul 1957, and of the Fifth to the Sixteenth at the same time. After that date the Fifth was scheduled for a phase-down to a small group of people who would serve as a focal point for coordination of SAC activities in Morocco.

Of primary consideration during the transition period was the maintaining of capability to execute the emergency war plans. Thus, since the bases in Spain were still in varying stages of construction, particularly in the communications area, movement of those activities directly supporting the war plans – and for which no comparable facilities existed in Spain – could not be accomplished on the 1 July 1957 date, but instead had to be planned for the future.

All of these negotiations and plans culminated in the assignment of the Sixteenth to SAC on 1 July 1957, along with other USAF organizations in Spain, with the exception of JUSMG, as well as the transfer of the Fifth from direct jurisdiction of SAC to the Sixteenth.

Concurrent with this change, the air base organizations in Spain were redesignated from the 7600th, 7602nd, 7603rd, and 7605th, to the 3970th (Torrejon), 3977th (Support Wing, Madrid), 3973rd (Moron), and the 3974th (Zaragoza). The 65th Air Division (Defense) was also assigned along with the two satellite squadrons: 871st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (ACW) for Villatobas Air Station, and the 872nd ACW scheduled for Constantina Air Station. The 3971st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron was also organized on this same date and assigned to the Sixteenth. The 49th Communications Squadron was transferred from Sidi Slimane to Torrejon at the same time.<sup>18</sup>

Personnel already assigned to Spain were transferred with these organizations, as well as the 30 persons assigned to the Liaison Team mentioned earlier. These assigned people formed the nucleus for the Sixteenth in Spain.

For the Moroccan area, planning was carried out in which personnel of the Fifth were retained on their jobs until the function was taken over by the Sixteenth. However, as personnel rotated to the ZI [Zone of Interior, now known as Continental United States or CONUS], or were transferred to Madrid, no replacements were made. The gradual build-up of strength within the new headquarters permitted taking over of functions as capability within the Fifth was lessened.

Thus, during the period of 11 July through 31 December 1957 all responsibilities were shifted with the exception of operational control of SAC aircraft. It was not until 15 January 1958 that this last job was assumed by the Sixteenth. The Moroccan bases: Sidi Slimane, Ben Guerir and Boulhaut, along with three aviation depot squadrons and a reconnaissance technical flight were functionally phased in along with the Fifth and thus complete control was gained. The last act of this series of events was the inactivation of the Fifth Air Division and creation of the 3510th Air Division (headquarters), which became the focal point in Morocco for SAC *Reflex* activities.

### Changes in Planning for Spain

From the time the agreements were signed until mid-1957 changes were made in the overall planning for utilization of the Spanish sites. This was primarily accomplished in October 1956 when the USAF published the *USAF Program for Spain* which reduced the number of bases for stationing of bomber or fighter wings from seven to three.<sup>19</sup> Thus, Torrejon, Zaragoza and Moron were scheduled for support of SAC peace and war missions, while San Pablo was to have minimum support facilities. Aircraft control and warning sites, originally planned at ten with one control center, were reduced to seven sites and the center. However, the possibility was present that the USAF would furnish the communications-electronics schemes required for the sites if the Spanish would build them. Fuel support remained as originally scheduled with construction of the pipeline from Rota to Zaragoza, with a supply capability for Moron and Torrejon.

One variance from normal support procedures occurred when, on 1 January 1957, the Sixteenth accepted the function normally accomplished by an AMC-type organization, including responsibility for the pipeline. The only exception to this was the procurement and facilities assistance program, with related contract administration, which was retained by AMC. Normal depot area functions also remained the job of AMC, but such items as subsistence, transportation, and similar support items were turned over to a support wing assigned to the Sixteenth.

### Mission and Organization

With the assumption of responsibility for the Sixteenth by SAC, a directive was published which outlined the mission for this new Air Forces as follows:

Man, train, and equip assigned units and prepare assigned installations for the primary purpose of supporting Strategic Air Command units in accordance with emergency war plans and operations orders.

Be prepared to perform those tasks assigned in the current emergency plans and related operations orders.

Unless directed otherwise, assume operation responsibility for all Strategic Air Command units operating from bases assigned to the Sixteenth Air Force

Establish with the CINUSAFE and Chief, JUSMG, Spain, mutually satisfactory working agreements and procedures on matters not fully covered in existing directives

Execute the Department of the Air Force service support responsibilities as outlined in applicable Air Force regulations.<sup>20</sup>

To accomplish this mission the headquarters was organized on SAC lines, with the commander's office, seven staff and seven directorate offices. A chart of this organization may be found [below].

ORGANIZATION, SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE		
<u>Commander</u>		
<u>Staff Offices</u>		<u>Directorates</u>
Adjutant		Comptroller
Judge Advocate		Intelligence
Chaplain		Personnel
Surgeon		Operations
Inspector General		Materiel
Information		Installations
Safety		Plans

## Intra-Service Agreements

In addition to the AMC-SAC agreement mentioned [earlier], talks were being held during the last six months of 1957 to formulate policies to govern SAC relations with various USAF organizations in the area. Among these was one with the Military Air Transport Service (MATs) concerning utilization of bases and facilities in Spain. In addition, a SAC-USAFE document was being prepared concerning responsibility for real estate, as well as other items of mutual interest. However, none of these had been completed by the end of the year.

## Summary

The series of international events discussed in Chapter I which involved the USAF and SAC, resulted in activation of the new Sixteenth Air Force, and its assignment to the Strategic Air Command. The Moroccan bases posed little difficulty in capability for execution of the emergency war plan since they were already operational. However, the newness of the Spanish sites, where construction ran far behind schedules, resulted in delayed occupancy for operational purposes. In addition, SAC was required to accept unfamiliar activities – support and defense within Spain. A table on the next page outlines the bases and organizations assigned to the Sixteenth. However, this chart does not include all operating locations of the Sixteenth personnel, but only those bases actually assigned. For example, San Pablo-Seville Airfield was utilized for SAC in operational refueling missions during the last half of 1957, and also courier and MATs flights. Personnel of the 3977th Support Wing were assigned to this field.

AIR BASES AND ORGANIZATIONS ASSIGNED TO SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 31 December 1957							
Activity	Ben Guerir Air Base, Ben Guerir, Morocco	Boulhaut Air Base, Boulhaut, Morocco	Moron Air Base and Seville, Spain	Sidi Slimane Air Base, Sidi Slimane Morocco	Torrejon Air Base and Madrid Spain	Zaragoza Air Base, Zaragoza, Spain	Nouasseur Air Base, Casablanca, Morocco (Non-SAC)
Air Base Group	3926			3906	3970		
Air Base Squadron		3936	3973			3974	
Air Division				5	65		
Air Division (Defense)					13		
Air Postal Squadron							
Aviation Depot Squadron	10			5			6
Communications Squadron					49		
Reconnaissance Technical Flight				3927			
Reconnaissance Technical Squadron					3971		
School Squadron					3978		
Support Wing					3977		

## CHAPTER III

### OPERATIONS

The transfer of functions involving the Operations Directorate from the Fifth to the Sixteenth was predicated on the availability of personnel and facilities to maintain [Emergency War Plan] EWP capability. Thus, it was not until 1 November 1957 that the Sixteenth assumed a portion of these activities. In the field of current operations, the following functions were transferred at the time:

1. Operational responsibility for exercises, including large scale, USCM's, CPX's, forward bases, and Spanish bases.
2. Establishing requirements and procedures for navigational aids and instrument approach procedures for Moroccan activities.
3. Establishing requirements for monitoring established air refueling areas.
4. Obtaining foreign and diplomatic clearances, altitude reservations, for SAC operations.
5. Maintaining liaison with other USAF, USN, and civil authorities within the area.
6. Supervision of base operations functions in Morocco.
7. Supervision of operation of the 16 AF/5 ADiv SOCS/communications/network.

Such transfer, however, did not include responsibility for *Reflex* mission requirements, as this remained a part of the Fifth Air Division until in the spring of 1958.

In addition to the above outlined transfers, the function of electronic countermeasures was shifted at this same time.<sup>21</sup> A week later, on 8 November, the support of the Regional Air Operations Center, Naples, Italy, was changed.<sup>22</sup> These moves were followed, on 1 December, by the Sixteenth assuming responsibility for Operations Training.<sup>23</sup> (Communications-electronics responsibilities will be discussed in a separate chapter.)

As a result of all this, the Sixteenth issued instructions that operations orders in being should be amended to reflect the changeover responsibility, e.g., *Rough Game* and *Snow Flurry*.<sup>24</sup> Thus, by the mid-January deactivation of the Fifth, the Sixteenth assumed complete responsibility with this one exception, *Reflex*, mentioned above.

## Mission and Organization

The mission of the Operations Directorate was outlined as:

Responsible for operational planning, implementation of tactical doctrine and procedures, aircraft operations, communications-electronics, and promulgation of the training program.

The organization in the Fifth had included four Divisions: Current Operations, Training, Operations Plans, and Communication-Electronics. These first two were formed in lieu of the normal SAC Operations and Training Division.<sup>25</sup> However, when the Sixteenth was organized, the Current Operations became merely Operations, and the remainder of the organization was accepted.

To accomplish this workload, the personnel assigned on 1 July included 14 officers, 9 airmen and 7 Department of the Air Force (DAF) civilians. By the end of the year this had increased to 35 officers, 24 airmen, 10 DAF civilians, 3 technical representatives, and 1 Spanish national.

SAC Aircraft Operations in the Sixteenth Area

## Military Aircraft in Spain

Procedural Agreement Number 14, Operation of Military Aircraft, signed in November 1954, authorized US military aircraft to overfly, land, and takeoff in Spain, or in territory under Spanish control. Flights were to be conducted in accordance with duly approved flight plans, and the "... American crews will be governed by the Rules of flight in force in Spain and by the instructions given by regional or local Air Traffic Control Authorities."<sup>26</sup> Clearances for U.S. military and/or contract aircraft could be issued by the "commanders of United States Military activities," and this was then to be coordinated with regional and local Air Traffic Control Centers (ATCC). Provision was made for 12 hours advance notice of squadron flights, if possible, to the Spanish authorities, and US military aircraft were authorized to land and take-off from any Spanish base in case of emergency.

Provisions in the *USAF Foreign Clearance Guide*, dated 1 November 1957, included the following, under aircraft entrance requirements:

1. a. Except from the following clearance requirements are: (a) air rescue missions (which may proceed in filing of flight plan) provided full report is furnished JUSMG as soon as possible; and (b) support schedules, MATS, 322nd Air Division, 'flogwing,' regularly scheduled courier, or logistic support flights previously approved by JUSMG or by CINCNELM arrangements....
  - b. For overflights of five aircraft or less, clearance is *not* required.
  - c. For overflights of six aircraft or more, 72-hour advance notice *is* required. Confirmation prior to take-off is necessary.
  - d. For landings of five aircraft or less at Spanish bases with USAF facilities, clearance is *not* required.
  - e. For landings at Spanish bases *with no USAF facilities*, 72-hour notice *is* required.
  - f. For landings of six or more aircraft, 72-hour notice is required. Confirmation prior to take-off is necessary.

As may be seen in paragraph 1-f, this requirement did not agree with the US-Spanish agreements.<sup>3</sup>

Included in this document were provisions for air space for training, for bombing and gunnery ranges (to be mutually agreed), and base management was to be settled between the Spanish and US commander for each base. Accidents, as well as search and rescue, would call for cooperation between the two forces. Weather stations established by the US would accomplish interchange of information with Spanish as desired. The final paragraph provided for lifting of restrictions or limitations in event of either imminent or actual hostilities.

Aircraft arriving from the US via Portugal were required to obtain clearance to either land or overfly that country.<sup>27</sup>

Control of USAF aircraft within Spain was governed by a Sixteenth regulation. This provided that each flight should conform to existing flight rules, that the crews should be qualified, and that the mission was essential and timely.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Interview, Lt. Col. Charles Hodges and M/Sgt J.B. Eihausen with Historian, 16 AF, 20 March 1958, Col. Hodges contacted JUSMG on this discrepancy.

### Moroccan Flights

Utilization of USAF bases in Morocco entailed no problem, but the USAFE detachment 2, Rabat, required advance notification when flights of three or more were entering, overflying, or landing at Cazes, USAF bases, or Port Lyautey/Kenitra. Formation or individual flights refueling in Morocco at bases other than USAF sites required 36 hours advance notice, and flights requiring airspace reservations required 21 days' notice.<sup>29</sup>

### Mid-East Operations

SAC operations in the mid-east were limited in October due to the banning of overflights of certain politically unsettled countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. This action isolated Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, since SAC directed that neither tactical nor administrative aircraft were to land there until further notice. For Dharam Air Base, Saudi Arabia, tactical aircraft were barred for the remainder of 1957, with provision for utilization of the base by these aircraft after 1 January 1958, providing clearance was obtained from USAF to permit the necessary overflights. Administrative aircraft could land with the necessary clearances. In accordance with this, SAC revised operations that had been scheduled for this area.

### Spanish Base Exercises

In mid-1957 only one of the three Spanish bases assigned for use by the USAF was available for operational exercises by B-47s. Thus, Zaragoza Air Base was the only one utilized under SAC air operations plan for FY-58, i.e., July 1957 through June 1958, which required that 15 B-47s exercise the Spanish bases monthly. However, the 7th Air Division, from whose bases the planes operated, recommended in October that this number be reduced to 10 aircraft monthly. This requested change was based on United Kingdom rotations under the Alert Force concept. In reply, SAC reduced the requirement to that requested by the Seventh: 10 each month, with five going to Zaragoza and five to Torrejon. This change was based on the supposed availability of Torrejon for operational exercises, and the Sixteenth was queried on the status of construction and agreements that would permit sending the B-47s to Madrid in November. In reply, the Sixteenth stated that it would not be possible to land at Torrejon during the November Spanish Base Exercises, since agreements with the Spanish on let-down procedures had not been finalized. These procedures were complicated by the proximity of Barajas Airport, a commercial facility.

At the end of 1957 B-47 operations in Spain had been limited to Zaragoza, although six refueling operations with KC-97s had been accomplished at San Pablo, near Seville. The agreements on landing patterns at Torrejon had not been completed, and the southeastern Spanish base, Moron, was still under construction.

San Pablo Exercises

USAF utilization of San Pablo Air Field, three miles east-northeast of Seville, was originally planned as an AMC depot. However, by mid-1957 construction plans had been modified, the depot being eliminated, with support type buildings only. Users of this field were the USAF, the Spanish Air Force (SAF), civil airlines, and *Hispano Aviación*, the aircraft factory. This later named organization used this site for testing and fly-away purposes.

Two runways were available for use, with a third, permanently closed to prevent overflying of USAF construction, which was used for parking of aircraft:

SAN PABLO RUNWAYS			
Active			
Size	Type	Capacity	Orientation
7050' X 260'	Concrete	148,000 lbs.	east/west
6390' X 160'	Asphalt on Concrete	148,000 lbs.	northeast/southwest
Inactive			
5000' X 160'	Concrete	148,000 lbs.	north-northwest/ south/southwest

This base, while not planned as a permanent USAF operational site, was included in SAC operations scheduled for FY-58, as a tanker refueling base. Thus, the Fifth queried the SAC Liaison Team in Madrid on recommendations for dates to exercise this site. However, no reply was received to this message and the Division set up a tentative schedule for one exercise per month. As the aircraft were to be from the rotational unit at Ben Guerir, all exercises were scheduled for Mondays as this would leave the remainder of the week for support of rotational aircraft on *Operation Reflex*. The schedule was as follows:

SAN PABLO EXERCISE SCHEDULE, FY-58		
Air Refueling Squadron	Date	Code Name
44th	29 July 1957	Sweet Corn
	19 August 1957	Blue Eyes
	16 September 1957	Colony Club
376th	28 October 1957	Dice Box
	18 November 1957	Elm Grove
	16 December 1957	Foam Rubber
68th	27 January 1958	Hawk Killer
	17 February 1958	Golden Leaf
	17 March 1958	Indian Basket
308th	28 April 1958	Killer Whale
	19 May 1958	Lead Pencil
	16 June 1958	Lug Wrench

The Sixteenth relayed this information to Seville, stating that the KC-97s would carry support personnel and equipment, would be self-supporting, and would be restricted to terminal VFR conditions. Following this the Sixteenth's Operations Directorate published *Operations Directive Number 2*, for *Sweet Corn*.<sup>30</sup>

With an X-Day of 29 July, the general situation was that a "... requirement exists to familiarize San Pablo personnel with SAC functions and develop the base capability to support the SAC mission. Five KC-97 aircraft will be dispatched to San Pablo Air Base, Spain." The Sixteenth was to provide the base with a petroleum-oil-lubricant (POL) site team for cross-training in servicing of the KC-97s, but other activities were to be simulated. The ground control approach (GCA) system was to be exercised upon landing since personnel manning this facility were on a training status.

After three months of KC-97 exercises the Fifth queried the Second Air Force on the possibility of reducing the requirement for the refueling unit at Ben Guerir to provide the aircraft. The message stated that only 18 of the 20 aircraft on rotational duty at Ben Guerir were available for scheduling,<sup>4</sup> and that five of these were detached to the United Kingdom (UK) under Seventh

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<sup>4</sup> One KC-97 was on IRAN, another AOCF for approximately 60 days, due to storm damage.

Air Division control. Of the remaining 13, three were on 30-minute EWP alert and one on emergency strip alert, with an additional plane assigned on secondary strip alert. Requirements for support of *Operation Reflex* were as follows:

... 6 sorties (5 tankers plus 1 weather scout), on a 1 for 1 basis 4 days each week, or 3 sorties (3 tankers, one of which is a weather scout), on a 2 for 1 basis, 4 days each week.<sup>31</sup>

To relieve an overloaded schedule for the 376th Air Refueling Squadron (AREFS), it was recommended that one of three methods be followed: (1) the detachment of tankers to the UK be reduced to three, (2) that the EWP strip alert aircraft be used as emergency strip alert aircraft on a calculated risk basis, and (3) reduce to two aircraft those scheduled for San Pablo.

In response to this, SAC revised the schedules, but such change was not to be effective until January 1958. At that time the Lajes tanker rotational unit was to assume the responsibility and continue the exercises monthly.

Planning for utilization of the Spanish bases called for the discontinuance of San Pablo as a refueling spot upon the availability of Moron. Based on this, the Sixteenth wired SAC in early December and requested discontinuance of this operation after the mid-month December exercise. However, if the need for continuing this type of activities existed after the first of 1958 for this area, then it was suggested that it be accomplished at Moron. (No information was available in files to permit this Division to prepare a brief on the first San Pablo exercise, *Sweet Corn*.)

*Operation Blue Eyes*, 19 Aug, was observed by a three-man team from the Sixteenth. Generally, it was felt that the base was "operational" from a support standpoint, which it had not been in the previous operation. However, such items as some of the manuals required were not available, crowded conditions existed in the combined communications center, control room and critique area, and weather information was not received from Sidi Slimane prior to aircraft departure.

*Colony Club*, in September, involved five KC-97s of the 44 AREFS. One item noted on this was the lack of a runway sweeper; however, one was on requisition to Mallory AF Depot. For the next exercise one was borrowed from Moron Air Base.

The first of the 376 AREFS operations to San Pablo, *Dice Box*, included five KC-97s departing Ben Guerir on 28 October. However, one aircraft air aborted due to inflight refueling (IFR) hydraulic leak. Leaving Morocco at 0630Z, the first plane arrived at 0854Z, utilizing the

GCA which was in training status, with excellent results. Ground handling and refueling was expeditiously accomplished, with proper safety precautions being observed, but cross-training was limited since the aircraft departed between 1500Z and 1600Z that afternoon. On the return flight the tankers met five 68th Bomb Wing B-47s, although that Wing had been notified that only two of the four KCs were capable of air refueling. The lead and number four tankers accomplished rendezvous, off-loaded the required 13,000 pounds of fuel and provided dry hook-ups. The number three tanker worked three APN12/APN76 rendezvous with their receiver, but the number two plane had no communications with their receiver until they were over Ben Guerir Air Base. All planes were diverted to Sidi Slimane due to high, gusty winds at the southern Moroccan base, but the tankers returned to Ben Guerir the next afternoon.

The November exercise, *Elm Grove*, involved five KC-97s, and was also observed by a team from the Sixteenth. The first three aircraft arrived at seven-minute intervals, and refueling action was accomplished within 45 minutes. The other two aircraft arrived two hours later and were refueled within 30 minutes. The oil and oxygen servicing capacity was not simulated for this exercise. In the communication area, a power failure of about 45 minutes occurred, but service was restored prior to the landing of the first aircraft. However, adequate weather data was not available as a result of this failure.<sup>32</sup> The report from the 376 AREFS observed that the Control Room lacked ultra- and very-high frequency (UHF and VHF) communications facilities, and that some of the manuals required for this operation were still not available. It was noted also that maintenance capability was extremely limited with no R-4360 tools available. It was felt, however, that considerable improvement had been made since the previous exercise.

The five KC-97s departed San Pablo, starting at 1457Z, and all were in route cell formation by the time the base altitude of 15,500 feet was reached by the lead aircraft. Rendezvous, refueling and dry hook-ups with three B-47s of the 68th Bomb Wing were accomplished as scheduled. One receiver was delayed on take-off and therefore not refueled. One of the tankers developed IFR hydraulic trouble at the orbit and left the formation just prior to reaching the Moroccan coast.

The last exercise by the 376 AREFS to San Pablo was *Foam Rubber*, on 16 December. Four aircraft participated with training in tanker cell formation and simulated refueling, as well as celestial and radar navigation practice.<sup>5</sup> All aircraft were cleared and made GCA runs. After arrival simulated servicing activity was held for oil, oxygen and anti-detonation injection (ADI)

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<sup>5</sup> One aircraft aborted due to electrical short in APS-42R/T unit which caused fumes, and an IFR hydraulic leak.

servicing which was considered satisfactory. However, extremely limited base EWP maintenance was again noted, which, it was felt, could be eliminated by the pre-positioning of an R-4360 built-up engine and tools, along with a limited supply of KC-97 parts.<sup>6</sup> The control room and command post operation were considered very satisfactory but installation of UHF and VHF communications were still considered as necessary.<sup>33</sup> This exercise differed from previous ones in that the KCs more nearly approached the recommended EWP configurations for this base of 120,000 pounds landing weight and 155,000 pounds gross take-off weight. The final report on this operation state that "... KC-97s which weigh 120,000 pounds upon landing were serviced with 13,000 pounds of 114/145 aviation gasoline and 12,000 pounds of JP-4, resulting in 145,000 gross pounds weight for take-off. The Base is considered capable for an EWP servicing of 10,000 pounds of 115/145 and 25,000 pounds of JP-4 for each of 20 KC-97s in eight hours' time."<sup>34</sup>

### Zaragoza Exercises

Located four miles from west of Zaragoza, Spain, the air base consisted of two runways: Sanjurjo and Valenzuela. The first of these was in existence prior to the arrive of the USAF, but was resurfaced, resulting in an asphalt runway, 9923' X 197'. This strip was also utilized by civil airlines and the SAF. Valenzuela was of US construction, 12,100' X 100' with two 1000' ends of twelve-inch concrete, and two 1000' overruns. Original planning had been for the stationing of a SAC fighter wing at this site, utilizing the Sanjurjo runway, with KB-29s providing an air refueling capability. Valenzuela was originally planned for bomber operations. However, over the four years passing after signing of the agreements, SAC fighter wing requirements were deleted and an Air Defense Squadron was scheduled in here for 1958.<sup>35</sup>

During the last half of 1957 there were certain operational limitations at this base since only the Sanjurjo runway was used during the first two exercises. It was not until September that the first flight tests were made on the new strip. These tests were necessary since the profile showed a depression, and definite information was required on take-off procedures. Thus, during *Operations Eastwood* and *Block Chain* test flights were made.

In Eastwood an aircraft performance engineer of the 40th Bomb Wing conducted tests in a B-47 with a take-off gross weight of 180,000 pounds. Based on the length of the runway the final report stated that with a full internal fuel load any temperature over 80° Fahrenheit would be

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<sup>6</sup> Twelve each B-5 type maintenance stands were reported as being shipped from Ben Guerir to this base.

critical. With regard to the “dip” the bottom of the depression on an east take-off was reached at 7000 feet, and extreme care had to be taken since the 7/10% slope could cause the aircraft to become airborne prior to the take-off speed. On a west departure, the dip was reached at the 3000-foot marker and since take-off speed could not be attained in the distance, there could be a slight feeling of lightness in the controls. The data compiled from eight flights may be found in a chart on the following page.

The November operation, *Block Chain*, involved aircraft of the 68th Bomb Wing, and SAC directed that they be utilized to conduct test take-offs. On 6 November one B-47 accomplished five “touch and go’s” on Valenzuela and the aircraft commander reported to apparent effects on either departure or arrival. The next day heavy-weight take-offs were made by four B-47s, with the first aircraft airborne at approximately 7500 feet, and the remaining three at 7000 feet. None of the pilots reported any trouble when leaving the runway. For this latter operation the corrected weights were 186,359; 179,292; 188,864; and 186,989 pounds. Temperature, from 1300Z to 1500Z, the time of operations, was 51° Fahrenheit.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The wind reported was 360/04 knots at 1300Z; 270/10-15 at 1400Z; and 260/15-25 at 1500Z.

VALENZUELA TAKE-OFF DATA - B-47 AIRCRAFT								
Temperature	60° E	60° W	70° E	70° W	80° E	80° W	90° E	90°W
Pressure Altitude	650'	650'	650'	650'	650'	650'	650'	650'
Acceleration	5000	4000	5000	4000	4000	4000	5000	5000
Check	117K	108K	115K	105K	106K	123K	107K	110K
Go-No-Go	7000	6000	7000	6000	6000	6000	7000	7000
	135K	129K	133K	126K	126K	124K	125K	128K
T. O. Speed	154K							
T. O. Distance	9531	9000	10139	9574	10747	10150	11558	10915
Critical Field Length	10848'	10271'	11558'	10915'	12167'	11489'	13180'	12455'
Emergency Best Flare	171K							
Flaps Up Stall	195K							

Source: Letter, 3974th Air Base Squadron to 16th Air Force, subject: Performance Data --Valenzuela runway (B-47 Aircraft), dated 26 Sep 1957.

The six exercises involving B-47s at Zaragoza during the last half of 1957 were:

EXERCISES AT ZARAGOZA AIR BASE, SPAIN July - December 1957		
B-47s	Date	Code Name
14	23-24 July 1957	Brush Fire
12	13-14 August	Firebox
14	10 September	East Wood
18	10 October	Dark Night
4	6 November	Block Chain
5	11 December	Cash Box

The first of these, *Brush Fire*, involved aircraft of the 40th Bomb Wing,<sup>36</sup> and in addition to the 15 B-47s, three C-47s and one C-119 arrived with support personnel. Following the arrival of the B-47s, the base support teams received training, with the exception of the ammunition, CBR (chemical, biological, and radiological) and chaff teams. The basic flow charts had been set-up for a three-hour turn-around although the 40th Bomb Wing plan called for a three and one-half hour on-ground operation. During the first day of the exercise, it was found that the refueling activity time exceeded that forecast since some of the aircraft required the use of two refuelers. However, the second day refueling time improved considerably.

The primary problem during this exercise came from the unstabilized shoulders of the 75-foot-wide taxiways. This resulted in dirt and rocks being blown onto the taxiways, making it necessary to sweep following each aircraft departure. Based on this, a ten-minute take-off time between planes was necessary. Prior to departures on the second day the shoulders were watered and rolled with improved conditions. The Sanjurjo runway, utilized in this exercise, was of asphalt overlay, and five instances of jet-blast damage occurred. Thus, in the recommendations it was stated that, while no repairs were necessary during this exercise, “serious consideration should be given to converting the first three hundred or four hundred feet of each end ... to concrete.”<sup>37</sup> (No information was available to permit including data on the next operation: *Fire Box*.)

Operation East Wood preparation started on 9 September when a maintenance task force of four officers and 39 airmen, with the necessary support equipment, arrived at Zaragoza Air Base from Greenham Commons, UK. This group remained until the twelfth when they returned to their home station. Of the 15 B-47s departing the UK on the tenth, only 13 participated in the scheduled enroute mission and accomplished post-strike at Zaragoza. One of the aircraft returned to England due to loss of the number three engine, and one departed late, and thus flew directly to Spain.

The same problem of runway shoulders existed in this exercise, and the active runway was used for taxiing, which necessitated ten-minute intervals for take-offs. It was also noted that run-up pods or concrete extensions were not yet available to permit avoiding of jet blast damage. There was no lighting available of the taxiways and the runway lights were only temporary since permanent type fixtures were being installed. Refueling of eight of the aircraft was accomplished effectively but the last six were delayed up to one and a half hours due to waiting for the refueling truck. However, it was pointed out that the completion of the refueling pit hydrant system would eliminate this problem.

Liquid oxygen and servicing equipment was not available but was flown in by the maintenance team. Personnel to perform maintenance functions were in short supply and aircraft with major problems were not permitted to land at this base; however, minor maintenance was taken care of so that all aircraft could have taken off within three hours after landing.

Operation *Dark Night*, in October, involved both Spanish and Moroccan bases, and supported a Second Air Force order.<sup>38</sup> Both Zaragoza and Torrejon were originally slated for receiving post-striking aircraft (B-47s), but approved let-down procedures for the latter base precluded such utilization. As a result, Zaragoza was exercised, but not Torrejon.<sup>39</sup> Additionally, the 19 AREFS KC-97 strip alert tanker was shifted to Zaragoza from Torrejon.

A Second Air Force *Task Force* was deployed from MacDill Air Force Base, to Zaragoza for this exercise, with manning and organization in accordance with SAC Manual 400-1A, *Air Echelon and Staging Team Tables, B-47 Wing*. There were two exceptions to the outlined manning, however, since 14 air police and one autopilot repairman were omitted from the team. The 18 B-47s and the one KC-97 were received and launched approximately as scheduled. The problems that had been encountered in the previous exercises still were met in this operation. Additionally, no CBR equipment or trained personnel were available. Mobile radio for maintenance and security control were not on hand, and power failures occurred during the exercises. The final report stated that the normal base operations were minimized during this period, and that the cooperation of base personnel was outstanding.<sup>40</sup>

An observer team from the Sixteenth participated in this exercise and summarized the problem area as follows:

Lack of Ground Communications – none from Control Tower to Control Room, crash station, TVOR. No ground radio for maintenance and security.

Lack of facility rated GCA personnel – not reliable under actual weather conditions.

Undermanning of AACS personnel – Example – No radar or teletype machines.

Shortage of trailer hitches on maintenance vehicles for moving equipment.

Lack of LOX /liquid oxygen/ capability.

Water/alcohol facilities taxed to maximum due to limited production and storage facilities.<sup>41</sup>

The November maneuvers of *Block Chain* involved four B-47s of the 68th Bomb Wing arriving on the sixth, and departing 22 hours later for their home station, Brize-Norton, UK.<sup>8</sup> Some problems were met prior to landing due to TVOR (terminal VHF omnidirectional range) failure, and to the “very weak” Spanish beacon. No difficulties were encountered in refueling and servicing, and the aircraft were ready for departure four hours after landing. The filing of ATC clearances for the return flight became a problem as communications between Zaragoza and Paracuelos, the ATC site, were out for a time. As a result, it was recommended by the Sixteenth observer team that clearance for return flights be obtained prior to departure from the home station.<sup>42</sup>

*Cash Box* in December scheduled five B-47s of the 68th Bomb Wing to this base. Three of these aircraft arrived as scheduled and landed at 15-minute intervals, but the fourth was slightly over one hour late due to engine trouble on take-off. The fifth developed radar and N-1 compass problems and remained in the UK. The Sanjurjo runway was exercised on landing, and the Valenzuela on take-off with no problems being reported from the “dip.” The mission report stated that all aircraft would have met the required three-hour post-strike turn-around time. Some minor problems were met, including a misunderstanding concerning grounding cable requirements, which were not carried aboard the tactical aircraft, and this delayed refueling slightly. Also, the 3974th provided a C-47 to airlift the required liquid oxygen carts from Torrejon, and the crew reported considerable spillage. It was recommended that when transportation of LOX was required it be accomplished by surface means rather than by aircraft as a matter of flying safety. Communications outages were less than in previous exercises, although some delay in receipt of hourly weather data was encountered. During this operation a “pony” teletype circuit was set up in the Control Room, thus providing prompt treatment of communications.

### Moroccan Operations

The Alert force concept, as exemplified by Operation Reflex, was in being at the two Moroccan bases of Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir during the last half of 1957. B-47s were on alert at Sidi Slimane, were armed, and ready for take-off, while at Ben Guerir, KC-97s were available

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<sup>8</sup> Five B-47s had been scheduled but one air aborted.

for refueling sorties. This subject will be discussed by the 3906th Air Base Group, Sidi Slimane, in their histories, since this was not within the Sixteenth control during this period.

The KC-97s at Ben Guerir participated in the San Pablo exercises as shown earlier in this chapter, and this base also was included in *Dark Night*. For this, the Task Force was activated in accordance with local operations orders (44-58), with the Task Force Headquarters and control elements being manned by resources of both units. The first tanker of the 378 AREFS, UK, arrived on 7 October, the last on 9 October, with redeployment starting on 17 October. In support of this mission, three B-47 weather scout aircraft were deployed from the 306th Bomb Wing, MacDill, and arrived on 8 and 9 October. Departure of all B-47s was accomplished from 14 to 16 October, supported by the KC-97s, without incident.

The final mission report of the Task Force stated that there "... were no problem areas detected during 'Dark Night' that were of a magnitude that would handicap execution of the Ben Guerir EWP."<sup>43</sup> However, two items were mentioned as problem areas. The first of these was a delay in manning of key positions of the Task Force Headquarters due to MATS support aircraft being delayed 48 hours. The other involved weakness in combat reporting which resulted from lack of qualified personnel to handle this phase of the operation.

At Sidi Slimane, the 3927th Reconnaissance technical Flight supported *Operation Game Time* in August by processing of film from this exercise. Processing of visual film averaged one hour and fifty-three minutes for a roll of 40 feet. Radar film was handled in one hour, eight minutes, but the length of the film was not a primary factor in determining processing time since 80 per cent of the handling time was spent prior to its introduction into the processing machines. With reference to the B-51 reports, this Flight stated that:

Average time spent preparing B-51 report was seven minutes. Four minutes for research and three minutes for typing. Consolidation of two thirds of the B-51 reports led to short period for typing. Under EWP conditions no B-51 could be prepared in seven minutes, if range and azimuth were determined from film. So, this seven minutes is applicable only to this type of operation.<sup>44</sup>

## Summary

At first the Sixteenth headquarters actually participated in exercises only to the extent of receiving and sending messages in regard to operational movement. In *Game Time*, for example, the Sixteenth received messages from 0430Z, 5 August, until the morning of 8 August, but at that time the other participating headquarters (2 AF, 5 AD, SAC), decided that this overloaded the circuits and discontinued such teletypes. However, later in the day this headquarters was again included and continued to receive messages until the completion of the exercise at 1600Z, 10 August. In general, control room personnel were able to follow units but the interruption meant that some units were “lost” during the time of non-receipt of messages. Six circuits were available for this exercise, and 864 hours in operation were logged with 86 hours outage.

From this time on, the Sixteenth increased its participation in the various exercises, and in November published an office instruction which outlined publication dates, method of transmission, and type of reproduction methods to be used, as well as outlining the various staff responsibilities to accomplish such orders.<sup>45</sup>

However, during this period observer teams visited the bases being exercised, thus acquainting themselves firsthand with operational problems, and this permitted making realistic and firm recommendations for future activities both in Spain and Morocco.

In general, EWP support capability in Spain was definitely limited due to lack of facilities at Zaragoza; Torrejon was not open to this type of traffic due to lack of an agreement on flight patterns; Moron was not open to B-47 traffic, and San Pablo was utilized on an emergency type operation pending availability of Moron.

In Morocco, the bases were capable of supporting the EWP under either the Alert Force concept, or under the former rotational type of operation. Thus, the two active bases, Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir had a definite part in planning. However, the other SAC base, Boulhaut, was utilized solely as a stand-by site. However, Nouasseur Air Base, under AMC Command in Morocco, could be utilized by strategic aircraft.

## CHAPTER IV

### DEFENSE DIVISION

While planning the construction of strategic bases in Spain, it was realized that such sites would require protection by an adequate warning system with related defense capability. Such activity was not within the capability of the [Spanish Air Force] SAF. Thus, in the basic agreements, provisions were made for the US to support the Spanish defense efforts by providing military and material assistance to the SAF for this purpose. Essentially, then, the USAF had two responsibilities within their field in Spain: one was to provide protection for USAF installations within the country, the other, to support the build-up of SAF facilities to permit them to defend their own borders. To accomplish this, two related functions were included in the basic agreements: a radar warning net and planned stationing of USAF fighter squadrons at the bases.

On 13 Apr 1956, Generalissimo Franco, as head of the Spanish Government, established the *Mando de Defensa Aerea* (Air Defense Command), which removed this function from control of either the Army or the Air Force and placed it directly under his supervision. While this was highly desirable and a step in the right direction, cooperative air defense underwent a close scrutiny by both USAF and SAF personnel during the next two years.

As stated above, defense of US installations by USAF personnel was a granted fact, as well as the sovereign right of Spain to defend her own borders. The problem was then as to the delineation of responsibilities insofar as control of aircraft ordered airborne for interception and combat. The personnel scheduled to man the controller spots were to include both nationalities. The bases were technically under the command of the Spanish, but the USAF would both relinquish control of its own personnel to this Commander. In turn, neither would the USAF accept, nor would the Spanish give, operational control of their forces to the US.

Another facet of this problem was the basic difference between the armed forces of the two countries with regard to delegation of authority. The American forces substantiated the need for long hours of training by delegating responsibility. However, to the Spanish, command and operational control were one and the same. With these opposites in mind, long discussions were held during these formative years concerning the utilization of the two-nation control stations.

By the end of 1956 the Spanish stand was that:

... We were now wasting our time by discussing air defense further and that discussions should be terminated as should construction on our bases because the Americans apparently cannot meet the provisions of the Defense Agreement wherein the Americans agree to contribute to the 'effective air defense of Spain.' In his opinion, without single command and control (General Rubio) and without obviating the possibility of conflicting orders from USAF Headquarters, there can be no 'effective air defense of Spain.'<sup>46</sup>

The importance planned by the Spanish on the defense aspect came to the front in early 1957 when dissatisfaction was expressed with construction timing. Specifically, it was pointed out by them that earlier discussions had indicated a greater degree of responsibility on the part of the US in providing adequate assistance in this field. They realized that in event of hostilities the strategic bomber sites would be the first targets in Spain, and one Spanish officer stated that if it were up to him "...he would recommend delay of SAC operations until the defense system..." was completed. At this time, SAC was scheduled to become operational within Spain in early 1958.

This impasse continued, but it was realized that a solution must be found during the winter months of 1957-1958, for the first radar station became operational, on a training bases, during the last half of 1957. The Spanish had remained firm in their contention that all defense forces must remain under Spanish control, but this concept was completely unacceptable to the Americans. However, in the fall of 1957 informal word came to the Americans that the staff of the Spanish defense organization had proposed to General Rubio, who commanded this section, a plan whereby the USAF and SAF controllers, sitting side-by-side, would each control their own forces. This was followed in November by a meeting which gave indication that a workable agreement between the two countries was about to become a reality. The subject of who would take action in any of the three types of fighter activity was discussed at length, and considered (1) training scrambles against known friendly aircraft, (2) scrambles against unknown aircraft for identification, and (3) engagement of identified hostile aircraft. It was indicated by the Spanish that they now felt that such "decision authority should be delegated to the lowest possible level commensurate with the time /that would be/ available for decision."

Both forces had to keep in mind throughout all of these discussions that the American personnel were to be eventually withdrawn from the control sites, if the planning ideas of the past

were followed. On the other hand, whether or not USAF fighter aircraft would be removed from duty within Spain was not known. However, with the planned buildup of SAF capability, and provided that retaliatory and defense ability existed in other countries of this area, such action might be possible. (It must be remembered that Spain was not a member of NATO, as pointed out in Chapter I.)

In the November 1957 meeting mentioned above, General Navarro of the SAF mentioned that the Iberian Pact with Portugal provided for the two countries to exchange information, and in case of war, to form a single air defense effort. From the American standpoint, however, it was pointed out that the USAF representatives could not enter into an exchange of information with a third party, and that any discussion on this would necessarily be through JUSMAG. However, the existence of such an agreement from a defense standpoint was to the advantage of the American forces.

#### Aircraft Control and Warning Network

Early in the talks between the two countries, the Spanish were told that construction plans included a radar warning net of approximately 11 stations with one Air Defense Control Center (ADCC). This was not considered by the US as an obligation, however, and was later reduced to ten stations and one ADCC site.

In anticipation of this network, Technical Schedule Number 1, signed in 1953, provided that sites "... for aircraft control and warning stations may be established in locations to be agreed upon by the technical authorities of both countries."<sup>47</sup> This was followed in April 1954 by a second mention in the same document that called for acquisition of real estate for communications-electronics installations:<sup>48</sup>

The United States Forces may install and maintain an aircraft control and warning system at such locations as may be mutually agreed between the appropriate Spanish and United States military authorities. This system will be operated jointly with the Spanish Air Force.

The estimated real estate required for such sites was established in an annex to the above-mentioned document as follows:

Microwave, early warning, heavy weight: 20 hectares; light weight: 20 hectares;  
Ground controlled intercept, medium weight: 30 hectares;  
Air Defense Control Center: 50 hectares.<sup>49</sup>

From the time this agreement was signed in the spring of 1954 until early in 1957 this program had a very uncertain future. It was not until late 1955 that the final locations for the ten sites had been selected. However, between that time and October 1956 three of the Aircraft Control and Warning (ACW) facilities were removed from the program based on geographical resurvey and, primarily, economic considerations. This left seven ACWs and one ADCC.

The Spanish were not too well pleased as they felt this left the industrialized northwestern part of Spain unprotected. But the US felt that an acceptable air defense coverage could be gained from this reduced number of sites. It was pointed out, however, that the equipment for the sites could be furnished under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) "... provided the NSC, in clarifying the military aid policy toward Spain, permits programming beyond the present monetary ceiling of \$350 million, and Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the requirements. Another contingency is JCA approval of Spanish contribution to the overall air defense resulting from recent forces, roles, and mission discussions."<sup>50</sup>



Spanish and American Aircraft Control and Warning Sites, 1957. *(Original Illustration, with enhancements)*

The control center for Spain was finally settled at Torrejon Air Base, Madrid. Manning of this center, and of the seven sites was to be by the 65th Air Division (Defense), with satellite squadrons for the various ACW locations.

The problems facing this organization had not all been solved by early 1957, for although USAF approval had been given for construction of seven ACW and one ADCC sites, funds were available for only the ADCC and four of the ACW facilities: Villatobas, Constantina, Rosas, and Benidorm. However, specifications for the remaining sites of Inoges, Gora Makil and Soller, had

been completed.<sup>51</sup> Funds were obtained later in the year and construction of these last three was started.

Of the seven sites, three were to be capable of “scrambling” aircraft – Inoges, Villatobas and Constantina. The remaining sites were for warning but could control aircraft after they were airborne. The range of the various sites was such that, for example, the Villatobas range overlapped that of Benidorm, to the east and thus extended to the Mediterranean.<sup>52</sup>

These sites were to become the only ones under SAC control in this part of the world. However, in the overall picture, they added an important link in aircraft control and warning, even though they were not scheduled to all become operational until 1960. The control centers and radar stations in Europe, northern Africa and the mid-east, planned by the USAF, were as shown in the table below.<sup>53</sup>

AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING PROGRAM U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE		
Site and Type of Operation	Planned for Operation	
	End FY-1958	End FY-1959
<u>Africa</u>		
<u>Morocco</u>		
Control Center	1	1
Radar Stations	5	5
<u>Libya</u>		
Radar Stations	3	3
<u>Mid-East</u>		
<u>Saudi Arabia</u>		
Radar Station*	1	1
<u>Europe</u>		
<u>Spain</u>		
Control Center	1	1
Radar Stations	0	5
*Passive Detection		

### 65th Air Division (Defense) Mission

The mission of the 65th Air Division (Defense) was outlined in a directive published by the Sixteenth in September 1957, and included the following items:

- In coordination with the appropriate Spanish Defense agencies develop joint air defense doctrine, procedures, tactics, techniques, operations, and training programs.
- Identify pertinent air movements to the maximum capability of assigned resources.
- Engage and destroy or neutralized hostile aircraft in accordance with jointly approved rules of identification and engagement.
- Issue appropriate air defense warnings to U. S. military units in Spain.<sup>54</sup>

To accomplish this the organization was authorized direct communications with related USAF and SAF air defense agencies.

### Organization and Manning

The USAF notified the Sixteenth in October 1956 that the 871st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron was to be constituted on or about 8 February 1957, and that the Headquarters of the Sixty-Fifth would be assigned on 8 April 1957.<sup>55</sup> Thus, the Sixteenth published an order on this with a headquarters complement authorized of 43 officers, 2 warrant officers and 159 airmen.<sup>56</sup> From the time of its activation until 4 June, headquarters personnel shared offices in the Ministerio del Aire building in Madrid with other Sixteenth components. Then for three months, it was located in Madrid, and at last, on 1 October, made its final move – to Torrejon Air Base.

For the 871st ACW, a general order published by the Sixteenth activated the organization in January 1957, with station at Villatobas, Spain.<sup>57</sup> The squadron was in place during the last half of 1957. Provision for the manning of the second site, Constantina, was accomplished when the 872nd ACW squadron became a part of the Division on 1 July 1957. These people were stationed at Seville, Spain, awaiting completion of construction at the site.<sup>58</sup>

Personnel-wise the Division was not in arrears as far as actual manning went because of the slippages in the construction program. For example, the beneficial occupancy date of the ADCC slipped from August to November 1957, but was finally accepted on the fifteenth of that month. Since the sites were to be jointly manned by Spanish and Americans, personnel lists were screened for those having both the requisite specialty codes and a bilingual ability. When

necessary, qualified personnel not having Spanish language ability were sent to school to gain this added qualification prior to being assigned to Spain.

Some problems were met during the early days of the Sixty-Fifth existence, however, in that sufficient manning had not been provided for administrative spots, such as personnel, information and related activities. Thus, when it came time for the Division to assume independent action on 1 July, the people to accomplish the day-by-day routine activities were not always available. This situation was relieved some by assigning of “additional duty” titles to persons already on the spot, but it did not compensate at all times for having suitably trained people authorized and assigned.

Since basic planning called for eventual phase-out of American personnel at these sites, it was necessary to have on hand Spanish who were trained in the electronics and control fields. However, such persons did not exist and as a result a training program had to be established for them. MAAG obtained quotas for SAF personnel to attend ZI [Continental U.S.] schools and by January 1957 there were 192 Spanish who had either completed courses or were in schools.<sup>9</sup> Nine fields of studies were offered, and such personnel then were used either at the sites or as instructors in the SAF Communications School at Cuatro Vientos, near Madrid.

Upon return of these trainees to Spain it was not always possible to assign them to duty using this newly acquired knowledge. Primarily this was because by mid-1957 only one ACW site, Villatobas, was in the process of having equipment installed. Thus, some were lost to the service and to the ACW program before a spot was open for them. In other cases, assignment was not possible since Spanish law required the stationing of individuals to bases near their homes.

### Fighter Squadrons

As seen in Chapter I, the bases outlined in the agreements for operation of fighter squadrons included Torrejon, with one fighter-interceptor squadron; Sanjurjo-Valenzuela Air Base with two strategic fighter wings; and Muntadas (Reus) Air Base, with one fighter-interceptor squadron.

However, in the four years following this agreement plans changed frequently, with the result that at the end of 1957 it was not known definitely exactly what units would be assigned to Spain. For example, at Zaragoza the SAC fighter wing requirements were deleted and an Air

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<sup>9</sup> These included Ground Electronics Officer, Air Electronics Officer, Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications Officer, Ground Radio Operator, ACW Radar Repairman, ACW Radar Maintenance Technician, Radio Repairman Ground Equipment, [and] ACW Operator.

Defense Squadron was scheduled for 1958. In any event, by the end of 1957 the defense network was not capable of handling such groups.

### Summary

Planned as a joint Spanish-American operation, the air defense set-up in Spain was only slightly underway operationally by the end of 1957, as the result of slippage in construction. The difficulties of a united operation between the two forces had not all been ironed out, but hope was high for an early solution, so that when sites did come into capability, that the two, SAF and USAF, could cooperate.

Early in 1958 the ADCC at Torrejon was still under construction, and one site, Villatobas was occupied and ready for operation. The status of the remaining sites was as follows:

AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SITE STATUS SPAIN		
Calendar Year and Quarter	Beneficial Occupancy Date	Operational
<u>1958</u>		
First		
Second	Constantina	
Third	Benidorm	
Fourth	Rosas, Inoges	Constantina
<u>1959</u>		
First		Benidorm
Second	Gora Makil	Rosas, Inoges
Third		
Fourth	Soller	
<u>1960</u>		
First		Gora Makil
Second		
Third		Soller
Fourth		
Source: Historian, 65th Air Division (Defense)		

## CHAPTER V

### COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

#### Agreements in Spain

The Technical Agreement Annex to the Defense Agreement stated that the “Government of the United States is authorized to make use of all public services in Spanish territory, in the same circumstances and with the same rates applicable to the Spanish Armed Forces.”<sup>59</sup> Article X of this same agreement stated that land would be furnished or rights of way established so that the US could construct, maintain and service telecommunications facilities. Following this Technical Schedule Number 1, concerning the acquisition and development of land, rights of way and facilities at each location provided for work to fulfill communications requirements.<sup>60</sup> The next mention of this subject was in Technical Schedule 3, concerning utilization of agreed areas, and stated that:<sup>61</sup>

Communications Facilities. The utilization by the United States forces of telecommunications and navigational and aircraft control and warning systems proposed for development on, in the immediate vicinity of, and on rights-of-way outside of, the agreed areas will be as mutually agreed in a separate Technical Schedule to the Technical Agreement dated 26 September 1953.

Procedural Agreement Number 7, signed on 30 April 1954, provided for establishing of communications-electronics facilities in Spain in the following categories: land-line and radio communications, control towers, aids to navigation and approach control, and in aircraft control and warning. In general, the United States could:

... provide communications-electronic facilities and services as required in support of its own forces in Spain under the terms of the Agreements ... excepting that, in general and where available, land-line telephone, telegraph and teletype services may be procured through local resources.

... construct, install, operate and maintenance the telecommunications, navigational and aircraft control warning system on, in the immediate vicinity of, and on the rights-of-way established outside of the agreed areas.<sup>62</sup>

#### Land-Line and Radio Communications

Land-line requirements for the American bases was to be coordinated with those of the Spanish Military Forces, and development of circuits required that civil and military telecommunication authorities be kept advised or projected requirements. US owned devices for

coding and/or scrambling could be installed in accordance with this agreement. Equipment for communication with the navigation facilities located off the bases was approved, with the routing of the land-lines being subject to mutual agreement.

Radio facilities, with frequencies acquired through normal channels, were authorized, and security devices could be utilized here as on land-lines. Essentially, this agreement provided for:

A major radio communications facility as a link in the world-wide United States military network.

Such other lesser radio communication facilities as ... required ... in Spain.  
...for communications with United States military aircraft engaged in long range serial flight to or from Spain and areas contiguous thereto.

Such other radio facilities as contribute to the normal welfare and training ... may include ... military amateur radio system ... and such low powered on-base broadcast stations as may be required.

Annex 1 to this procedural agreement provided for an estimated acreage required for these radio facilities, divided into two categories. The first was for major radio facilities to serve as a link in a worldwide US command and administrative net, and provided for 225 hectares for a transmitter antenna farm, and 450 hectares for a receiver antenna site. Then, if the facilities outlined in this provision were not on base, the sites required adjacent to each agreed area proposed for development as an air base provided for 25 hectares for the transmitter, and 30 for the receiver antenna. In addition, provision was made for a radio squadron, mobile, with a real estate requirement for one installation of 150 hectares.

### Organization in Spain

During the time the SAC Liaison Team was in existence the responsibility for operating of communications facilities to support SAC activities was vested in this organization.<sup>10</sup> Then when the Sixteenth ceased to be a special operating activity and became part of SAC, these personnel were transferred to the 49th Communications Squadron.<sup>63</sup> The 17 people involved then formed the nucleus of the Squadron in Spain. At the same time the 49th Communications Squadron (Division) located at Sidi Slimane Air Base, Morocco, was deactivated and was redesignated as the 49th Communications Squadron (AF) with station at Torrejon Air Base, Madrid, Spain. The

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<sup>10</sup> From July 1956 through Jun 1957, ref. Chap. I, this volume.

functions of communications support at Sidi Slimane were vested then in the 3906th Operations Squadron. In Spain, the Squadron was assigned to the Sixteenth, and attached to the 3970th Air Base Group for administrative and logistical support.<sup>64</sup>

The original complement transferred from the Liaison team was [number omitted from original text] officer and 16 airmen. This had increased to three officers and 51 enlisted men by the end of July. Further arrivals brought the strength, in December 1957, to nine officers and 154 airmen, as compared to an authorized strength of 11 officers and 164 airmen.

#### Mission, 49th Communications Squadron

The responsibilities of the Squadron were delineated in a Sixteenth regulation on 4 September and called for operating and maintaining the SAC major teletype relay center at Torrejon Air Base, Spain, the single side band SOCS radio stations at selected bases, a SAC telephoto network terminal, and equipment for voice and facsimile encryption in support of SACCOMNET.<sup>65</sup>

Nine days later a Change in Unit Mission letter was published which expanded on the regulation and provided for engineering and installation of fixed weather facilities in Spain and Morocco at SAC bases (29 facilities planned); maintenance of government-owned outside telephone cable systems for weapons storage areas at the three Spanish sites; installation and maintenance of government-owned 102A key equipment in Spain; installation and maintenance of Dimaphon weather intercommunications system for Spain, and maintenance of Moroccan equipment. In addition, on-call assistance for the African sites was included, and while it was felt that none of these items alone presented a large enough workload to justify assigning maintenance teams, the letter pointed out that the theater-wide scope required a centrally located team that could handle these projects.<sup>66</sup>

#### Sixteenth Organizations

Within the Headquarters, Sixteenth, for the period of 1 July through 15 August 1957, the functions of the Communications Division were split between the Operations and the Materiel Directorates. During this time the responsibilities of engineering, installation, and maintenance were assigned to Materiel. However, it was realized that this was a duplication of effort and, as the result of a study, functions and personnel concerned were moved from materiel to Operations

on 15 August. The reorganization within the Operations Directorate then provided for three branches within the Communications-Electronics Division: Telecommunications, Programs and Engineering, and Electronics Systems.<sup>67</sup> In July three items of responsibilities were transferred from the Fifth to the Sixteenth:<sup>68</sup>

All phases of the USAF Program for communications;

Monitoring military construction programs supporting the communications-electronics program;

Review of communications-electronics schemes and proposals prepared by other engineering-installations agencies;

Responsibility for the communications-electronics portions of P-458, 341, 457, and 482 programs.

The remainder of the functions were turned over to the Sixteenth in mid-November 1957, thus completing this phase of the Fifth's phase-out.<sup>69</sup>

#### Relay Center, Torrejon Air Base

When SAC assumed command of the Spanish bases on 1 July, teletype circuits which were cryptographic secure were available to both the Fifth and Seventh Air Division, to Torrejon and Zaragoza Air Base, and in addition one line to the AIRCOMNET was operational for only unclassified messages. A week later a full time, on-line teletype circuit to SAC headquarters was activated.<sup>70</sup> These facilities were located on the third floor of the Generalissimo Building in Madrid, with only very limited space being available. In late September more space was gained when the relay center was moved to the first floor of the same building after the 1981st Airways and Air Communications Squadron (AACS) moved to Torrejon on 25 September. When the move was completed on 2 October, the Center had available 10 full duplex on-line terminals, one duplex off-line connection to the AIRCOMNET, three half-duplex on-line terminals, and three tape outing positions.

On 1 December a full period teletype circuit to Naples, Italy, was utilized for SAC traffic from Madrid. This line, routed through Paris, terminated at *Air South*. With a monthly cost of \$4000 per month for the French and Italian portions of this line, the Sixteenth queried USAFE in December on the possibility of changing this route for more economical operation. This was based

on the fact that the USAF-CTNE (Compani Telefonica Nacional de Espana) contract included utilization of lines east to Minorca.<sup>71</sup>

... Request you investigate feasibility of following route: Madrid – Barcelona – Palma (Majorca) – Minorca – Oristano (Sardinia) – Rome – Naples. This routing should increase reliability and quality and decrease costs ... International Tel and Tel has 12 channel tropo-scatter from Minorca into Sardinia. Also desire to investigate availability of facilities along the same routing for Barcelona Air Traffic Control Center – Rome Flight Service voice circuit to be called April 58.

The complete activation of the relay center was originally planned for an operational date of 1 December, at which time the 49th Communications Squadron would assume this function from the Sidi Slimane facility. It was anticipated that the facility at Torrejon would be available for occupancy on 31 August but slippages in construction delayed installation of equipment until 10 December. By around-the-clock work installation was completed by 31 December with a total of 17 duplex on-line and one duplex off-line positions being completed. Twenty circuits were terminated between the Tech Control Patch Panel and the AACS Tech Control at Torrejon to provide testing before the actual cut-over of operations from the downtown area. Two full duplex circuits were installed between the new Center and the Generalissimo Building to handle Control and Adjutant traffic until the Sixteenth would move to the base. Cut-over of operations from Madrid to Torrejon was planned for 4 January 1958.

One of the problems encountered in establishing adequate communications for SAC within Europe was the lack of cross-border facilities between Spain and France. The on existing Paris-Madrid voice frequency teletype carrier system was full, and the two lines for SAC were held up pending establishment of a second channel. In December it was understood that both the CTNE and the PTT (Postes, Telephone et Telegraph, in France) portions of the lines were complete but that the circuit lacked the cross-border connection. In early December USAFE was asked to assist in accomplishing this action with regard to the PTT in France to permit early operation of this line.

By mid-February 1958, full period on-line relay facilities were available as follows:

ON-LINE RELAY FACILITIES, 1958	
Torrejon Air Base, Spain	
To	Circuits
<u>United States</u>	
Headquarters, Strategic Air Command	5
Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana	2
<u>England</u>	
7th Air Division, High Wycombe	1
<u>Morocco</u>	
Ben Guerir Air Base	1
Nouasseur Air Base	1
Sidi Slimane Air Base	1
<u>Italy</u>	
Naples (Air South)	1
<u>Spain</u>	
Air Ministry, Madrid	1
Task Force, Headquarters, Torrejon	1
Moron Air Base	1
Sevilla, 3977th Support Wing	1
Zaragoza Air Base	1
<u>Turkey</u>	
Incirlik Air Base	1

In addition, on-call, on-line facilities were available to Lajes Field, Azores; Wheelus Air Base, Libya, and San Pablo Air Base, Spain. On Torrejon, two lines for handling to a “secret” classification were installed to each the control room, and to the Adjutant, 3970th Air Base Group. The only non-cleared circuit was to the AACS.

## Single Side Band Facilities

### Madrid Installation

At the time the 49th Communications Squadron assumed responsibility for the Madrid single side band (SSB) facilities, the station was located on the ninth floor of the Generalissimo Building. However, this site was not satisfactory since adequate space was not available for antennae construction. Utilization was unsatisfactory during the first month due to a lack of trained people to operate the switchboard for the SOCS (Strategic Operations Control System) line, but qualified personnel arrived in August. As a result, the station went on a 24-hour, 7-day week, on 17 August.

Construction and installation of the antennae required at Torrejon Air Base was started in mid-July when a technical representative of the Collins Company, England, arrived with eight workers. By 20 August the antennae had been completed but to meet the 23 August deadline of contact with SAC it was necessary to lay the copper antennae leads above ground, as ditches had not yet been dug for underground installation. The leads were hooked into the system, the transmitter tuned, and the antennae loaded for a contact at 1531Z, 23 August, which was successful. Four days later a ditch-digger was obtained so the leads were disconnected, re-laid underground, and reconnected as a permanent installation.

Equipment in use was an SSB-1 system which utilized a KWS-1/75A4 transmitter and receiver assembly with phone patch capability. A SOCS air/ground facility was installed using a BC-610 transmitter with an R-388-URR receiver, which also provided phone patch service. This was activated at Torrejon in November and provided three frequencies. A SOCS drop between this facility and the control room was installed in November enabling aircraft to make contact with the control room by direct patch.

In November a direct SOCS line connected Madrid with SAC, and thus provided two routes for calling the ZI. The other one was by the way of the Seventh Air Division in England. A requirement existed for backup communications between the Spanish bases, and between Torrejon in Spain and Ben Guerir in morocco. It was found that three AN/GRC-26 units were available in *Seaweed* storage, one at each base in Spain. One GRC-26 was installed and operating at Ben Guerir. To provide a full capability, SAC was requested to assist in transferring two additional GRC-26 units to Spain. This equipment arrived and one unit was sent to Moron, the

other given to the 49th Communications Squadron at Torrejon. This insured a separate SOCS voice net in Spain as well as a separate SACCOMNET HF system between bases.

#### Other SSB Stations

In addition to the SSB station at Torrejon, the type of communication facility was operated by the 49th Communications Squadron at Lajes in the Azores, Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, and Adana in Turkey. This latter station joined the net on 10 December 1957 and was operated by two persons from the Squadron. This meant that the Squadron ran all SSB stations with the exception of the Sidi Slimane facility which was operated by their Base Communications organization.

Future planning included a facility at Wheelus, Zaragoza, moron, Nouasseur and Ben Guerir. Also, discussions were underway to provide circuits to the north through Bilbao, Spain, and then to England.

#### Tropospheric Scatter Circuit

With installation started in May 1957, the Sidi Slimane-Seville tropospheric scatter circuit was accepted on 8 November and turned over to USAF forces for operational use. This facility provides 11 voice and 12 teletype channels and was part of the SACCOMNET.<sup>72</sup> Then days after its acceptance tests were run from Sidi Slimane on circuit extensions to Wheelus, Adana, and Dhahran. These showed a 94, 74 and 50 percent circuit efficiency, respectively.

## CHAPTER VI

### PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

#### Personnel

##### Admission to Spain

Admission of US forces into Spain was basically covered in the Technical Agreement Annex:<sup>73</sup>

For the implementation of this agreement the United States may assign to territory under Spanish jurisdiction members of the United States forces. The United States shall furnish to Spain a list of the names and nationalities of non-military members of the United States forces who are brought into such territory who are not nationals of the United States. In this latter case, however, Spain reserves to itself the right of admission.

\* \* \* \*

If the status of any person assigned to Spain under paragraph 1 of this Article should change in such a manner that his status should become conditional, the United States authorities shall notify the Spanish authorities and shall, if such person is required by the Spanish authorities to leave Spain, assure his departure from Spain within a reasonable time at no cost to the Spanish Government.

For the purpose of this agreement, the term members of the United States forces was defined as: (1) military personnel of the US armed forces; (2) technicians and personnel accompanying, serving with or employed by these forces; and, (3) members of the families of these two groups of persons.

Passports were not required by military personnel, but provision was made for identification cards or tags to be filed with the Spanish. Non-military members had to have passports, but in both cases visa, alien registration and immigration inspection requirements did not apply.<sup>74</sup> Finally, in July 1954, a procedural agreement was signed concerning these papers. It confirmed the use of the US identification cards for military personnel in lieu of a passport, and that a visa would not be required for civilians. This agreement, however, made provision for a special JUSMG identification card, printed in Spanish, for certification of status in Spain for both types of employees.<sup>75</sup> In addition, civilians arriving for work in Spain were required to surrender their passports temporarily to the US Provost Marshal, and received a stamp indicating clearance by the *Direccion General de Seguridad* (Security Service).


### Assignment of Americans to Spain

Technical Schedule 3, concerning utilization of the agreed areas, provided that:<sup>76</sup>

The bases specified in Technical Schedule No. 1 and the aircraft control and warning system, communications and other support facilities will be maintained with the minimum personnel necessary to support emergency operation and training of United States military units. In addition, a minimum number of fighter interceptor squadrons and necessary support activities, cooperating with the Spanish Air Force in air defense, may be stationed thereon.

An agreement concerning personnel in Spain was signed on 26 September 1953, which reiterated the above cited paragraph on minimum number of personnel, and also provided for a gradual attainment of strength levels. Personnel on rotational training were considered in addition to such strength, but also would not exceed the “true minimum necessary” and the number could be subject to change, as agreed by the appropriate authorities. However, provision was made that limitations would be removed in the event of imminent hostilities.<sup>77</sup>

The number of American personnel serving with the various organizations had reached a total of 2,848 in July 1956, and was up to 6,451 in December 1957. These figures included both military and civilian employees, but excluded dependents.<sup>78</sup> Of the July 1956 figures, the USAF accounted for 50 per cent of the total, while in December 1957 this had risen to 74 per cent. Navy, Army, and State Department percentages remained relatively stable, but civilian contract personnel, as a per cent of the total, declined from 33 to 12 in this period. A chart showing this data may be found below:



Military and Civilian Personnel Assigned to Spain, by Service, July 1956 - December 1957 (Original Illustration)

In addition to the 2,848 employees in July 1956 there were 3,760 dependent personnel residing in Spain. This represented 57% of the total. By December 1957 this had declined slightly to 53, with 7,458 dependents of a total of 13,999 US citizens. Of the total in Spain in July 1956 the USAF accounted for 54% of the dependents, while in December 1957, this had risen to 73%.

Since the USAF was the principal employee in Spain, the December 1957 distribution of personnel through Spain reflected utilization of the three bases: Madrid, 59%; Zaragoza, 10%; and Seville, 20%.

In view of the large number of Americans arriving in Spain, a language program was inaugurated which provided for a 60-hour on-duty training class for military and civilian personnel. Military personnel were required to attend, and civilians if the local commander deemed it necessary. Attendance of dependents in these courses was to be on a space-available basis. Additionally, the University of Maryland overseas program provided off-duty, college credit, courses.

#### Clothing Regulations

Members of the US forces were permitted to wear uniforms while on duty, and civilian clothes when off duty. However, while the offices of the Sixteenth were stationed in downtown Madrid, personnel wore civilian clothes during duty hours. Basically, for all stations in Madrid, clothing had to be in accordance with local customs, and in Spain, this required a coat and tie as part of the male attire, while for women wearing of extremely cut dresses or slacks was frowned upon. Directives were published by JUSMG and then by the Sixteenth on the subject.<sup>79</sup>

#### Import and Export of Personal Effects

Personal effects, furniture and household goods could be imported either by the US authorities or by commercial channels for use by members of the services. Such importation had to be certified by US authorities whose names had been furnished the Spanish as customs agents. Property thus imported could not be transferred to Spanish nationals or to foreigners in Spain by way of sale, gift, or barter, unless such transfer was authorized by appropriate authorities. Such items could be disposed of, however, to other US force members. To supplement the basic provisions, a procedural agreement was signed in mid-1954.<sup>80</sup> Such property was also exempt from all taxes and duties and could be taken freely out of Spanish territory. This exemption from taxes also applied to incomes and property that might be acquired in Spanish territory due to the

temporary presence of US forces in the country. Purchase of Spanish goods on the local market for personal consumption, and for services, was to be the same as for Spanish nationals. Exportation was to be without customs or other charges. Included in this portion of the agreements was also a provision that members of the Spanish Armed Forces having to enter territory under US jurisdiction would have the same rights as members of the Spanish Embassy, and would be accorded the same status, privileges, and immunities, according to rank.

To enforce the import provisions, the Sixteenth published, in September 1957, a regulation concerning prohibited activities in Spain, which stipulated the conditions for purchasing at American retail outlets and the giving of gifts and/or resale of such items to local nationals.

### Personal Vehicles

With regard to the operation of vehicles in Spain, the Spanish agreed to "... honor, without driving test or fee, driving permits by a competent agency in or of the United States ... or issue its own permits without test or fee to such persons ...". Added to this were two documents covering the issuance of drivers' licenses and the registration of vehicles. The licenses were to be processed by the Ministry of Public Works, and was to be valid until the departure of the person from Spain or upon change of status. For the vehicles, port authorities were authorized to issue a B-26 pass, which was free of taxes and charges, with a validity of one year, but provisions were made for a three-year renewal. License plates were provided for with certain blocks of numbers being reserved for use by US personnel. A contract was executed with a Madrid firm for these plates, and upon registration of the car the plates were prepared, and then purchased by the owner. Registration, other than payment for the plates, was free of taxes and fees.

Provision was made permitting personnel to sell cars to the Spanish Government under existing agreements in a Sixteenth regulation. However, this provided for only those authorized movement of privately owned vehicles on a space required basis at Government expense, which effectively barred DAF civilians from making such sales.

### Spanish Personnel

The Technical Agreement annex provided for the hiring of Spanish nationals by the US or its contractors or agencies:<sup>81</sup>

... and it shall be the policy of the United States or its contractors or agents, to prefer the employment of Spanish civilian personnel where in its judgement they are available and are qualified to do the work involved. The conditions of

employment and work, in particular wages, supplementary payments including bonuses, conditions for the protection of workers and the withholding and payment of contributions for social security, shall be governed by the legislation of Spain in the manner agreed in pertinent technical schedules.

To support this paragraph a procedural agreement, with an interpretive note, was signed on 26 September 1955.<sup>82</sup> This agreement defined the organizations to which this directive applied, and as such it included the USAF, but excluded certain attaches, State Department personnel, etc. It provided for creation of internal management regulations with regard to personnel and conditions of work of native employees, as well as for insurance, salaries, living allowances, etc. Such payments were to be based on the prevailing practices. Position tenure was to be indefinite, based on termination of the work or service, or by changes of scope and projects due to exigencies.

Regulations governing labor were to be submitted to the Spanish Ministry of Labor for approval. Additionally, an advisory committee was to be established for study of labor practices, labor procurement and related areas, as well as for the handling of grievances.

The interpretative note provided that certain components of the *Unified Social Insurance Program* would be participated in by the United States as an employer: old age insurance, sickness insurance, professional education fund, technological unemployment, and family subsidiary.

Provision for hiring of such personnel was contained in a Sixteenth regulation concerning recruiting practices and outlined the procedures to be followed.<sup>83</sup>

#### Administrative Services

With the exception of complete publications responsibility, the Adjutant administrative functions were transferred from the Fifth to the Sixteenth by 20 November, as follows:

- |              |   |
|--------------|---|
| 1 October:   | a. Administrative Security and Compromise Program;              |
|              | b. Records Management Functions;                                |
|              | c. Forms Management;  |
| 20 November: | a. Command Postal Supervision in the North African Area;        |
|              | b. Staff Supervision of Non-Cryptographic Registered documents; |
|              | c. Staff Supervision of Cosmic Documents;                       |
|              | d. Staff Supervision of Baghdad Pact material.                  |

In preparing to assume Adjutant functions from the Fifth, the Sixteenth obtained a complete set of publications such as regulations and forms. These were then distributed to the interested

offices, thus furnishing a basis for Sixteenth publications. The subsequent revision, recission, or issuance of new directives was then accomplished. There was no definite cut-off date for these publications since not all of the functions of the Fifth would be taken over until January 1958. By December the Sixteenth had 59 regulations in effect, of which 15 had been issued prior to 1 July 1957 but which remained in force since they still applied. Of the 48 supplements to USAF regulations and manuals in effect, 10 were from the earlier organization, and one AFPI supplement had been printed. Forms that were required for Sixteenth use were screened and reproduced as necessary.

### Postal Services

Phasing out of the Fifth posed a problem insofar as supervision of the postal organization in Morocco was concerned. These units were directly under the control of the 7025th Air Postal Group, with headquarters in Germany, and Sixteenth could not, under this circumstance, perform staff visits, make inspections, or supervise the operations of activities of this type in the North African area. When SAC was queried on this, Lt. Col. Forrest A. Brandt, Adjutant, replied that he was not in favor of taking over additional support type functions unless SAC assumed area jurisdiction. However, in view of the importance of supervision for this activity, discussions were held with the USAFE Adjutant and the 7025th Commander, and they agreed to submit the initial request to USAF. Early in December a message from SAC indicated that if it was deemed essential for the 13th Air Postal Squadron (Spain) to assume control of these units, as recommended by the Sixteenth, then action should be initiated to change the delineation of responsibilities between the US bases in the southern area that was being negotiated between USAFE and the Sixteenth.

Handling of official mail between the Moroccan and Spanish areas was accomplished by courier aircraft since there were no regularly scheduled MATS or commercial flights between the two areas. The Fifth operated two flights per week from Sidi Slimane to Madrid, leaving Morocco on Tuesday and Saturday, and returning to Madrid on Monday and Thursday. However, these flights were subject to changes based on mission requirements. Late in November SAC queried the Sixteenth on availability of mailing services, and stated that they would request assistance of USAF if delays were resulting in unsatisfactory mail service. In reply, the Sixteenth stated that there was a "time lag of 16 to 18 days round trip." SAC then asked concerning flight schedules, and where the delays were in transit time, if such information was available. They were told that

no scheduled flights were available and that assistance was requested. By the end of the year no concrete action had been taken to relieve this unsatisfactory condition.

The agency for handling of mail in Spain was the 13th Air Postal Squadron, with headquarters in Madrid, and two detachments: one at Seville [Detachment 1, APO 284], the other at Zaragoza [Detachment 2, APO 286]. One detachment was to have been activated at Moron on 1 July but this was not accomplished [This would have been Detachment 5]. In addition, a detachment at Barcelona was organized to assume responsibility for processing of parcel post at that port, but this function, with the three personnel concerned, was transferred to Madrid [Detachment 8]. The responsibility for operational control for this function was assigned to the Adjutant early in 1958.

A mission regulation for the 13th Air Postal Squadron was published in early 1958, as well as the required regulations for the mailing of gifts from this overseas area.

Provision for handing of mail in Spain was included in the Annex to the Defense Agreements:<sup>84</sup>

The United States may establish, maintain and operate within the facilities and areas in use by the United States forces under this Agreement United States Military post offices for the use of members of the United States forces in the transmission of mail between such post offices in Spain and between such post offices and other United States post offices.

The handling of official courier packages was provided for in a separate procedural agreement which permitted customs declaration for such packages, with immunity from customs inspection. In this case, the "... official courier of United Forces will present to the Customs Authorities, in duplicate, at the point of entry the standard form used by the United States Military Forces to request clearance of such property at international border points of entry."<sup>85</sup> However, since couriers of the Sixteenth traveled by military aircraft, no problem had been encountered in this type of entry. Additionally, such a form was not used, but couriers were supplied with a letter signed by the Adjutant which permitted entry through customs when necessary.


### Operational Problems

Early activities of the Adjutant's Officer were hampered by a lack of personnel and supplies as well as space and operating equipment. Additionally, the various offices in the Madrid

Area were scattered over the city and at Torrejon Air Base, thus making pickup and delivery of mail a time-consuming project. (See map, following page)

Personnel-wise, on 1 July, there were three officers, 11 airmen and one American civilian assigned. However, gains over the next six months resulted in assignment of an additional officer and 13 airmen bringing the total to 4 officers, 24 airmen and 1 civilian.

Originally the function of this organization was to administer the command postal service, records management program, forms management program, conduct publication and reproduction control activities, and to exercise staff supervision over subordinate units. Then, on 1 September, the mission was changed to include staff reports for command control of the administrative security and compromise program, which included unit censorship action.



## **STAFF, 16TH AIR FORCE, 31 DECEMBER 1957**

Commander: Maj. Gen. H. K. Mooney, USAF, 589A

Deputy Commander: Col. William E. Creer, USAF, 1742A

Chief of Staff: Col. Kenneth E. Marts, USAF, 4416A

Deputy Chief of Staff: Lt. Col. Clare H. Royce, 6401A

Adjutant: Lt. Col. Edolyne J. Reynolds, USAF, A01297429

Chaplain: Lt. Col. Alphonse B. Slivinski, USAF, 18756A

Comptroller: Col. George T. Bland, USAF, 859A

Information Services: Lt. Col. George Schenkein, USAF, 9643A

Inspector General: Col. Henry G. Hamby, Jr., USAF, 3891A

Installations-Engineering: Col. John T. Trotter, USAF, 3012A

Intelligence: Col. Paul J. Heran, USAF, 6018A

Judge Advocate: Col. Dracos B. Burke, USAF, 4942A

Materiel: Col. Michael J. Galer, USAF, 5272A

Operations: Col. Bernard V. Ogas, USAF, 4518A

Personnel: Col. Antonio N. LaGrippo, USAF, 2391A

Plans: Col. Martin C. McWilliams, USAF, 4322A

Safety: Lt. Col. Clarence A. Lakin, USAF, A0429077

Surgeon: Col. Andres G. Oliver, USAF (MC), 19127A

Squadron: Major William A. Williford, USAF, A0579678

(For changes during the period of 1 July through 31 December 1957, see Exhibit 3.)

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5th Air Division; 65th Air Division (Defense);

3926th Air Base Group;

49th Communications Squadron;

3927th Reconnaissance Technical Flight;

JUSMG, Spain, 1952-1953;

Staff and Directorates, 16th Air Force.

### Files

Directorates of Plans, Operations; Adjutant.

## DISTRIBUTION

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Joint United States Military Group, Madrid, Spain Historical Division	1	
Sixteenth Air Force Historical Division	10	1

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> History, Joint United States Military Group, Spain, 7 Apr 1952 – 26 Sep 1953.
  - <sup>2</sup> Ibid., pg. 2.
  - <sup>3</sup> Ibid., pg. 5
  - <sup>4</sup> Under the supervision of Major General J. W. Spry, USAF, the survey was conducted from 22 Aug to 31 Oct 1951.
  - <sup>5</sup> History, Joint United States Military Group, Spain, 1952-1953, pgs. 5-6.
  - <sup>6</sup> Ibid., pgs. 195-196.
  - <sup>7</sup> Defense Agreement between Spain and the United States of America, signed 26 Sep 1953.
  - <sup>8</sup> Such intention would initiate a consultation period of 6 months, and, in the event concurrence was not reached, the agreement was to terminate on year after conclusion of meeting.
  - <sup>9</sup> Reference histories of the Central Air Materiel Area, Chateauroux, France, and agreements between the Government of France, and of the United States, signed in Feb 1951.
  - <sup>10</sup> Note Pursuant to the Second Paragraph of Article III of the Defense Agreement, 26 Sep 1953, signed by Ambassador Dunn and Minister Artajo.
  - <sup>11</sup> Technical Agreement Annex to the Defense Agreement dated 26 Sep 1953, signed by Ambassador Dunn and Minister Artajo.
  - <sup>12</sup> Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Spain and the U.S. signed 26 Sep 1953, by Ambassador Dunn and Minister Artajo.
  - <sup>13</sup> Economic Aid Agreement between Spain and the United States of America, dated 26 Sep 1957, signed by Ambassador Dunn and Minister Artajo, with Annex, Interpretative Notes.
  - <sup>14</sup> Published, Thursday, 19 December 1957.
  - <sup>15</sup> History, 5th Air Division, Jan-Jun 1951; This agreement was signed 22 Dec 1950.
  - <sup>16</sup> Ibid.; Agreement signed 2 May 1951.
  - <sup>17</sup> History, 5th Air Division, Jan-Jun 1957.
  - <sup>18</sup> SAC General Order 35, 1957.
  - <sup>19</sup> Ltr, USAF to 16AF, subj: USAF Program for Spain, dated 24 Oct 1956.
  - <sup>20</sup> SACR 23-7, subj: Organization – Field, Mission – Sixteenth Air Force, dated 1 Jul 1957.
  - <sup>21</sup> Statement, Assumption of Responsibility for ECM, dated 1 Nov 1957.
  - <sup>22</sup> Statement, Assumption of Responsibility for RAOC, Naples, dated 8 Nov 1957.
  - <sup>23</sup> TWX, 16 AF to SAC, DOP-4610, subj: Assumption of the 5th AD Responsibilities, dated 21 Dec 1957.
  - <sup>24</sup> TWX, 16 AF to SAC, D00-5796, subj: Assumption of Current Operations Responsibilities from 5 ADiv by 16 AF, dated 21 Nov 1957.
  - <sup>25</sup> History, 5th Air Division, Jan-Jun 1957, pg. 13.
  - <sup>26</sup> Procedural Agreement No. 14, to the 26 September 1953 Agreements, subj: Operation of Military Aircraft, dated 12 Nov 1954.
  - <sup>27</sup> USAF Foreign Clearance Guide, 1 Apr 1957.
  - <sup>28</sup> 16 AFR, 55-2, subj: Operations: USAF Military Aircraft Clearance and Control, dated 25 Apr 1957.
  - <sup>29</sup> USAF Foreign Clearance Guide, 1 Nov 1957.
  - <sup>30</sup> TWX, 16 AF to 3977 ABG, Seville, D00-5123, subj: Exercise of Spanish Bases, dated 19 Jul 1957.
  - <sup>31</sup> TWX, 5 ADiv to 2 AF, subj: TDY Air Refueling Requirements, D0-110-57S, dated 22 Oct 1957.
  - <sup>32</sup> Memorandum for the Record, D00, subj: Exercise “Elm Grove” and Staff Visit, dated 22 Nov 1957.
  - <sup>33</sup> Ltr, 376 AREFs to 16 AF, subj: Report on Exercise “Foam Rubber,” 16 Air Force Operations Order, 327-57, dated 20 Dec 1957.
  - <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
  - <sup>35</sup> Interview with Lt. Col. Nesmith, Plans Division, by Historian 16 AF, 18 March 1957.
  - <sup>36</sup> Ltr, 3974th ABS to 16 AF, subj: Narrative Mission Account for Exercise “Brush Fire,” dated 29 Jul 1957.
  - <sup>37</sup> Ibid.
  - <sup>38</sup> 16 AF Operations Order 35-57, subj: Dark Night, dated 6 Sep 1957.
  - <sup>39</sup> Ibid., Amendment 1.
  - <sup>40</sup> TWX, Zaragoza Task Force Comdr, MacDill, to 2 AF, Barksdale, ZTF-10-162, subj: M-27, dated 24 Oct 1957.
  - <sup>41</sup> DF, DOO to DO, subj: Dark Night, dated 15 Oct 1957.
  - <sup>42</sup> Memo for the Record, Lt. Col. Charles B. Hodges Jr, Chief, Operations Division, 16 AF, subj: Mission Report for Zaragoza, Exercise “Block Chain,” by 16 AF Observer Team, dated 13 Nov 1957.
  - <sup>43</sup> History, 3926th Air Base Group, Oct 1957.

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- <sup>44</sup> History, 3927th Reconnaissance Technical Flight, Aug 1957, pgs. 3-5.
- <sup>45</sup> 16 AF HOI, subj: Operations – Preparation of Operations Orders, dated 19 Nov 1957.
- <sup>46</sup> History, 6th Air Division (Defense), 8 Apr 1957-30 Nov 1957.
- <sup>47</sup> Ref. Chap. I, Technical Schedule No. 1, para. 10.
- <sup>48</sup> Ref. Chap. V, Procedural Agreement No. 7, para. 10.
- <sup>49</sup> Conversion factor: 640 acres = 1 square mile or 1 section = 259 hectares.
- <sup>50</sup> Ref. Chap. II, letter, USAF to 16 AF, subj: USAF Program for Spain, dated 24 Oct 1956.
- <sup>51</sup> 16 AF ACW Planning Guidance, dated 4 Jan 1957.
- <sup>52</sup> Interview, 16 AF Historian with Major Paul Henderson, 25 Feb 1958.
- <sup>53</sup> Document, USAF Program, Dec 1957, Program Guidance, PG-60-1.
- <sup>54</sup> 16 AF Regulation 23-9, subj: Mission of the 65th Air Division (Defense), dated 14 Sep 1957.
- <sup>55</sup> Ltr, DAF to 16 AF, subj: Activation of the Headquarters 65th Air Division (Defense) and 671st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, dated 30 Oct 1956.
- <sup>56</sup> Per 16 AF General Order 16, 1957.
- <sup>57</sup> Per 16 AF, General Order 1, 1957; assigned to 65 AD(D) per SAC General Order 35, 1957.
- <sup>58</sup> Per SAC General Order 41, 1957
- <sup>59</sup> Ref. Chap I, Technical Agreements, Article VIII.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid., para. 4-e.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid., para. 8, Technical Schedule 3.
- <sup>62</sup> Procedural Agreement Number 7 to 26 September 1953 Agreement, subj: Communications-Electronics, signed 30 April 1954; Annex 1, Estimated Real Estate Requirements for Communications-Electronics Facilities.
- <sup>63</sup> 5th Air Division Special Order 95, dated 10 June 1957, effective 1 July 1957.
- <sup>64</sup> Per SAC General Order 42, 1957; Per 16 AF General Order 49, 1957.
- <sup>65</sup> 16 AFR, 23-8, dated 4 September 1957, subj: Mission of the 49th Communications Squadron, and 23-8A, dated 21 October 1957.
- <sup>66</sup> Ltr., 16 AF to 49th Communications Squadron, subj: Change in Unit Mission, dated 13 September 1957.
- <sup>67</sup> Generally, this included, "... all C-E programming, engineering of on-base facilities, administration of the long lines service provided by contract with the Spanish telephone company (CTNE), monitoring of project funds 482 and 457, supervising installation of communications center relay equipment, communications service authorizations, AC&W C-E installations, staff supervision of C-E maintenance to include depot level provided by contract or from USAF sources, timely installation of all radio nav-aids and flight facilities, command communications, security, telecommunications, operations, methods and procedures." Ref. History, C-E Div.
- <sup>68</sup> Interview, Capt. Alan Campen, and 16 AF Historian, 31 Mar 1958.
- <sup>69</sup> TWX, 16 AF to SAC, D0CE-3528, dated 15 November 1957. This included communications annexes to current operations orders; installation-engineering for facilities that SAC has been designated as engineering-installation agency; monitoring engineering, installations, operations, maintenance and technical adequacy of all communications-electronics facilities supporting SAC missions; monitoring base cryptographic accounts and conducting of command cryptographic inspections; furnishing communications teams for SAC portions of ROAC Naples (further delegated to the 49th Communications Squadron); operational supervision of administrative telephone systems on SAC bases; Military Affiliated Radio System, providing technical assistance on communications-electronics matters to support subordinate units; dissemination of changes to SAC CEI and SAC manuals, 100 series; obtaining frequency authorizations and call signs.
- <sup>70</sup> 8 July 1957.
- <sup>71</sup> TWX, 16 AF to CINCUSAFE (ADVON), Ramstein, Germany, DOCEP-5993, subj: ELLA-911172 Madrid-Naples TTY Circuit, dated 9 December 1957.
- <sup>72</sup> Tropospheric scatter circuit provided a peak output of 2½ million watts, effective radiated power. Antennae were two 60-foot aluminum parabolic antennae. The range varied from 400-600 miles. Composite type equipment, using ionospheric propagation permitted operation of radio circuits up to 1400 miles; Accepted by the 1823d AACS Engineering and Installation Team.
- <sup>73</sup> Ref. Chap. I, note 12, Article XVI, para. 1 and 3.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid., Article XVI, para. 2.
- <sup>75</sup> Procedural Agreement No. 10 to the 26 September 1953 Agreements, subj: Passports and Identification Documents for Members of the U.S. Forces in Spain, dated 1 July 1954.
- <sup>76</sup> Ref. Chap. I, Technical Schedule 3, note 16, para. 3-a.
- <sup>77</sup> Technical Schedule No. 4, Personnel, signed 26 Sept 1953.
- <sup>78</sup> Data from 16 AF Statistical Summary, 30 Jun 1957 and 31 Dec 1957.

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<sup>79</sup> JUSMG Policy Directive No. 30.2, 1 July 1957, subj: Wearing of the Uniform and Civilian Clothing in Spain; 16 AF Supplement-1, to AFM 35-10, subj: Military Personnel, Service and Dress Uniforms for Air Force Personnel, dated 9 Jan 1958. This Supplement superseded one of 8 Oct 1957 which was virtually the same, except that the last one included and added 29-a-(4)-(a) through (e) concerning wearing of helmets by personnel riding motorcycles, etc.

<sup>80</sup> Procedural Agreement Number 9 to 26 Sep 1953 Agreements, subj: Rules Governing the Importation and Exportation of Personal Effects of Members of the United States Forces in Spain.

<sup>81</sup> Ref. Chap. I, note 12, Article XXII.

<sup>82</sup> Procedural Agreement No. 23 to 26 Sep 1953 Agreements, subj: Labor Affairs, and Interpretive Note.

<sup>83</sup> 16 AFR 40-1, subj: Civilian Personnel – Recruiting Practices, dated 22 Oct 1957.

<sup>84</sup> Ref. Chap. I, note 12, Article XIV.

<sup>85</sup> Procedural Agreement Number 8 to 26 Sep 1953 Agreements, Customs Declaration for Official Courier Packages, dated 7 May 1954.