1 00:00:02,640 --> 00:00:06,340 Okay . Mhm . What is 2 00:00:06,340 --> 00:00:07,340 that ? 3 00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:13,360 How much ? Mhm . 4 00:00:13,740 --> 00:00:18,320 Well 5 00:00:18,320 --> 00:00:20,487 good morning , good morning . Dr kelly 6 00:00:20,487 --> 00:00:23,200 fletcher . You got a new job ? I did 7 00:00:23,210 --> 00:00:26,050 tell us about it . And how did you give 8 00:00:26,050 --> 00:00:28,328 us a little bit about your back ? Okay . 9 00:00:28,328 --> 00:00:30,850 Well so on thursday john Sherman who is 10 00:00:30,850 --> 00:00:32,850 the acting ceo of the Department of 11 00:00:32,850 --> 00:00:35,128 Defense ? He was nominated to be the D . 12 00:00:35,128 --> 00:00:37,294 O . D . C . I . O . Because of that he 13 00:00:37,294 --> 00:00:39,461 had to step down so I'm now performing 14 00:00:39,461 --> 00:00:41,794 the duties of the D . O . D . C . I . O . 15 00:00:41,794 --> 00:00:44,017 I started on thursday so you gotta take 16 00:00:44,017 --> 00:00:46,072 it easy on me . It is my second full 17 00:00:46,072 --> 00:00:48,294 day here at work . Um before that I was 18 00:00:48,294 --> 00:00:50,870 serving as Mr Sherman's deputy . Um and 19 00:00:50,870 --> 00:00:53,037 I've been with you d . c . i . o . for 20 00:00:53,037 --> 00:00:55,490 about 18 months uh mostly in a resource 21 00:00:55,490 --> 00:00:58,330 rule . Prior to that I have been at dHS 22 00:00:58,330 --> 00:01:00,497 at headquarters and then before that I 23 00:01:00,497 --> 00:01:02,608 had been the at the Department of the 24 00:01:02,608 --> 00:01:04,780 Navy in their ceo shops your passion 25 00:01:04,780 --> 00:01:07,610 for cybersecurity goes back a few days . 26 00:01:07,620 --> 00:01:09,453 I would say that you come to the 27 00:01:09,453 --> 00:01:11,509 position well prepared more than two 28 00:01:11,509 --> 00:01:13,120 days , more than two days of 29 00:01:13,120 --> 00:01:15,287 cybersecurity and also resourcing . So 30 00:01:15,287 --> 00:01:17,176 that's where I started my federal 31 00:01:17,176 --> 00:01:19,730 career . Was it Osd Cape ? And looking 32 00:01:19,730 --> 00:01:22,750 at it spend cybersecurity spend 33 00:01:23,020 --> 00:01:25,240 trying to understand how we pay for 34 00:01:25,240 --> 00:01:27,407 these important capabilities . Okay so 35 00:01:27,407 --> 00:01:29,296 as the former G . Two I think you 36 00:01:29,296 --> 00:01:31,518 probably were reasons that my money was 37 00:01:31,518 --> 00:01:33,629 diverted but we're gonna have a great 38 00:01:33,629 --> 00:01:33,610 conversation anyway . Look we're in the 39 00:01:33,610 --> 00:01:35,332 middle of a strategic reset in 40 00:01:35,332 --> 00:01:37,054 Department of Defense and that 41 00:01:37,054 --> 00:01:39,332 obviously is going to have some impact , 42 00:01:39,332 --> 00:01:41,499 but in the priority of things when you 43 00:01:41,499 --> 00:01:43,630 think about the strategic reset our 44 00:01:43,630 --> 00:01:46,310 ability to ensure that we can maneuver 45 00:01:46,310 --> 00:01:48,088 in cyberspace is one of the top 46 00:01:48,088 --> 00:01:50,310 priorities in this threat environment . 47 00:01:50,310 --> 00:01:52,421 So where do you think we are in terms 48 00:01:52,421 --> 00:01:54,588 of the priority that the department is 49 00:01:54,588 --> 00:01:56,600 giving to the world , that urine of 50 00:01:56,600 --> 00:01:58,822 cybersecurity ? I think this is a great 51 00:01:58,822 --> 00:02:01,040 question . So I think that we are 52 00:02:01,040 --> 00:02:03,151 getting smart about it right now . So 53 00:02:03,151 --> 00:02:05,720 this is truly an inflection point . Um 54 00:02:05,720 --> 00:02:07,664 I would say for the last couple of 55 00:02:07,664 --> 00:02:09,387 decades we've been making risk 56 00:02:09,387 --> 00:02:11,609 decisions about vulnerabilities in both 57 00:02:11,609 --> 00:02:13,664 cybersecurity um and vulnerabilities 58 00:02:13,664 --> 00:02:15,664 and technology in general . Right . 59 00:02:15,664 --> 00:02:17,387 We've not been fighting a very 60 00:02:17,387 --> 00:02:20,040 technically uh competent adversary and 61 00:02:20,040 --> 00:02:22,096 because of that we've made different 62 00:02:22,096 --> 00:02:24,151 decisions and we need to make in the 63 00:02:24,151 --> 00:02:26,207 future . So that's one thing I would 64 00:02:26,207 --> 00:02:28,373 say is our adversary has changed . Our 65 00:02:28,373 --> 00:02:28,200 next adversary is going to be able to 66 00:02:28,200 --> 00:02:30,311 take advantage of the vulnerabilities 67 00:02:30,311 --> 00:02:32,422 that we know we have . Um and they're 68 00:02:32,422 --> 00:02:34,644 gonna be able to link that with kinetic 69 00:02:34,644 --> 00:02:36,756 attacks and that is going to create a 70 00:02:36,756 --> 00:02:39,540 super complex war fight . Uh the kind 71 00:02:39,540 --> 00:02:41,873 of warfare that we've never seen before . 72 00:02:41,873 --> 00:02:44,040 The other thing I want to highlight is 73 00:02:44,040 --> 00:02:46,096 the environment , right ? So um it's 74 00:02:46,096 --> 00:02:48,373 our spectrum environment in particular . 75 00:02:48,373 --> 00:02:51,010 Um this is incredibly congested . Um 76 00:02:51,010 --> 00:02:53,288 and that's true here in the us . Right , 77 00:02:53,288 --> 00:02:55,454 we're all using our cell phones Ramona 78 00:02:55,454 --> 00:02:57,900 5G . Um it's not bad , but it does 79 00:02:57,900 --> 00:03:00,122 create for a more complex environment . 80 00:03:00,122 --> 00:03:02,122 So as we look at the future , we're 81 00:03:02,122 --> 00:03:04,289 gonna need to be able to hop around in 82 00:03:04,289 --> 00:03:06,456 the spectrum . We're gonna have to use 83 00:03:06,456 --> 00:03:06,410 different spectrums . We've been using 84 00:03:06,410 --> 00:03:08,632 radios for a long time , but the way we 85 00:03:08,632 --> 00:03:10,799 use a radio is going to have to change 86 00:03:10,799 --> 00:03:12,966 really dramatically . Um And the third 87 00:03:12,966 --> 00:03:15,077 thing I would say , which I think the 88 00:03:15,077 --> 00:03:17,299 department has really rallied around is 89 00:03:17,299 --> 00:03:19,410 that in the next war fight we need to 90 00:03:19,410 --> 00:03:21,354 use data and ai to our advantage , 91 00:03:21,354 --> 00:03:23,577 right ? We need the right folks to have 92 00:03:23,577 --> 00:03:25,577 the right data at the right time to 93 00:03:25,577 --> 00:03:27,688 make the right decision . And I think 94 00:03:27,688 --> 00:03:29,854 we all understand that that's going to 95 00:03:29,854 --> 00:03:28,860 shape the war fight . That's going to 96 00:03:28,860 --> 00:03:31,530 be incredibly critical . But I think 97 00:03:31,530 --> 00:03:33,586 that we're not all understanding the 98 00:03:33,586 --> 00:03:35,808 investments that are needed and sort of 99 00:03:35,808 --> 00:03:37,919 the more boring stuff , right ? Ai is 100 00:03:37,919 --> 00:03:40,030 super cool . You know what I need , I 101 00:03:40,030 --> 00:03:42,141 need bandwidth , I need just fiber on 102 00:03:42,141 --> 00:03:44,197 the ground and that's kind of boring 103 00:03:44,197 --> 00:03:46,363 but that's how this works . Right . So 104 00:03:46,363 --> 00:03:48,810 leader literacy in terms of 105 00:03:48,810 --> 00:03:50,866 understanding the commitment and the 106 00:03:50,866 --> 00:03:52,977 resilience that's ahead . What's your 107 00:03:52,977 --> 00:03:55,020 sense ? Are we , are we seeing 108 00:03:55,030 --> 00:03:56,974 department of Defense leaders that 109 00:03:56,974 --> 00:03:58,697 maybe didn't grow up with your 110 00:03:58,697 --> 00:04:00,752 background , understanding this is a 111 00:04:00,752 --> 00:04:03,030 contested battle space , the C . I . O . 112 00:04:03,030 --> 00:04:04,863 S . Aren't just here to tell you 113 00:04:04,863 --> 00:04:06,863 whether the networks are up or down 114 00:04:06,863 --> 00:04:08,863 data is secure or not . Do you feel 115 00:04:08,863 --> 00:04:10,808 like you've got the support of the 116 00:04:10,808 --> 00:04:12,919 Department of Defense Leaders and the 117 00:04:12,919 --> 00:04:14,919 services and the department on this 118 00:04:14,919 --> 00:04:16,919 journey ahead . Yeah . So I think I 119 00:04:16,919 --> 00:04:19,141 would say yes . I would say we're still 120 00:04:19,141 --> 00:04:21,363 shaping how we resource it . And as you 121 00:04:21,363 --> 00:04:23,530 know , uh when we look at resourcing , 122 00:04:23,530 --> 00:04:25,752 we're looking I'm looking at 23 right ? 123 00:04:25,752 --> 00:04:27,752 And we're in 2021 . Right ? Um so I 124 00:04:27,752 --> 00:04:29,808 would say we're going to see a pivot 125 00:04:29,808 --> 00:04:31,863 both in the very near term and we're 126 00:04:31,863 --> 00:04:33,752 seeing that in the A I . And data 127 00:04:33,752 --> 00:04:35,586 accelerator initiative , the ADA 128 00:04:35,586 --> 00:04:37,697 initiative . We're seeing that in the 129 00:04:37,697 --> 00:04:39,586 attention to Jazz . See to this , 130 00:04:39,586 --> 00:04:41,474 attention is coming from the very 131 00:04:41,474 --> 00:04:43,530 highest levels . So I think that's a 132 00:04:43,530 --> 00:04:45,419 good sign those conversations are 133 00:04:45,419 --> 00:04:47,641 welcoming . It's not . Yeah , I want to 134 00:04:47,641 --> 00:04:49,641 talk about No , I actually know the 135 00:04:49,641 --> 00:04:51,863 future of Department Defense is relying 136 00:04:51,863 --> 00:04:54,086 on that . Let's talk about one of these 137 00:04:54,086 --> 00:04:53,670 important initiatives and that Zero 138 00:04:53,670 --> 00:04:57,670 Trust , Zero Trust obviously there was 139 00:04:57,670 --> 00:04:59,670 an announcement earlier this summer 140 00:04:59,670 --> 00:05:01,781 that we would create a program office 141 00:05:01,781 --> 00:05:04,340 to help oversee the department's I 142 00:05:04,340 --> 00:05:06,720 guess drive to really accelerate toward 143 00:05:06,720 --> 00:05:08,980 this new new security framework . Where 144 00:05:08,980 --> 00:05:11,147 do you think we are ? We were supposed 145 00:05:11,147 --> 00:05:13,369 to announce it this month or next month 146 00:05:13,369 --> 00:05:15,591 where we are And how does it change the 147 00:05:15,591 --> 00:05:17,702 way the departments and services have 148 00:05:17,702 --> 00:05:19,647 been looking at cybersecurity when 149 00:05:19,647 --> 00:05:21,758 they're thinking about the Zero Trust 150 00:05:21,758 --> 00:05:23,980 program Office , what does that mean to 151 00:05:23,980 --> 00:05:26,202 know ? Yeah , that's a great question . 152 00:05:26,202 --> 00:05:28,369 So the Zero Trust Program Office is an 153 00:05:28,369 --> 00:05:30,702 important step within the U . D . C . I . 154 00:05:30,702 --> 00:05:32,924 O to say how do we get after this ? But 155 00:05:32,924 --> 00:05:32,360 I would say that there's a ton of work 156 00:05:32,360 --> 00:05:34,304 happening in the Zero Trust domain 157 00:05:34,304 --> 00:05:36,471 throughout the department . Um some of 158 00:05:36,471 --> 00:05:38,527 that is being led by disa by general 159 00:05:38,527 --> 00:05:40,749 Skinner at Disa . Some of that is being 160 00:05:40,749 --> 00:05:42,804 led by D O D Ceo as we're sort of in 161 00:05:42,804 --> 00:05:44,860 the interim steps of standing up our 162 00:05:44,860 --> 00:05:44,720 program office and then some of that is 163 00:05:44,720 --> 00:05:46,942 happening in the military departments , 164 00:05:46,942 --> 00:05:48,998 our our other components . So NSA is 165 00:05:48,998 --> 00:05:51,331 doing a lot of good work in this domain . 166 00:05:51,331 --> 00:05:53,553 I think the thing about zero trust that 167 00:05:53,553 --> 00:05:55,720 struck me recently is that really it's 168 00:05:55,720 --> 00:05:57,553 just being honest about where we 169 00:05:57,553 --> 00:05:59,664 actually are . So I think this is all 170 00:05:59,664 --> 00:06:01,831 information that I think we know , but 171 00:06:01,940 --> 00:06:04,320 you know , a decade ago my data was in 172 00:06:04,320 --> 00:06:06,430 my computer and if it wasn't in my 173 00:06:06,430 --> 00:06:08,597 computer , it was in a server that was 174 00:06:08,597 --> 00:06:10,874 like maybe under my friend Bill's desk . 175 00:06:10,874 --> 00:06:13,097 Like it was , it was on my network , it 176 00:06:13,097 --> 00:06:15,319 was in what we call the Dodon . Right ? 177 00:06:15,319 --> 00:06:17,652 Like it was within my network . And now , 178 00:06:17,652 --> 00:06:20,610 especially as we move to do D365 , we 179 00:06:20,610 --> 00:06:22,777 moved to infrastructure as a service , 180 00:06:22,777 --> 00:06:24,999 we moved to other software as a service 181 00:06:24,999 --> 00:06:26,943 providers . My dad isn't inside my 182 00:06:26,943 --> 00:06:28,832 Dodon right . And I think I'm not 183 00:06:28,832 --> 00:06:31,054 saying anything that's surprising . But 184 00:06:31,054 --> 00:06:33,277 I think that the way that we set up our 185 00:06:33,277 --> 00:06:35,388 security architecture , which was the 186 00:06:35,388 --> 00:06:37,554 right thing to do at the time was that 187 00:06:37,554 --> 00:06:36,850 we said , hey , we're gonna build a big 188 00:06:36,850 --> 00:06:39,017 wall , we're gonna have a moat , we're 189 00:06:39,017 --> 00:06:41,128 gonna put alligators in it . And then 190 00:06:41,128 --> 00:06:43,239 in the interim we'll have some like , 191 00:06:43,239 --> 00:06:43,200 you know , some guys driving around and 192 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:45,620 sort of checking . But mostly we're 193 00:06:45,620 --> 00:06:47,787 going to focus on this perimeter of my 194 00:06:47,787 --> 00:06:49,620 network and I'm gonna protect my 195 00:06:49,620 --> 00:06:51,842 network because my network actually had 196 00:06:51,842 --> 00:06:53,953 my data , but that's not where I live 197 00:06:53,953 --> 00:06:56,064 anymore . Uh and I think that we made 198 00:06:56,064 --> 00:06:58,231 the right choice to get out of there , 199 00:06:58,231 --> 00:07:00,453 but that means that I need to move to a 200 00:07:00,453 --> 00:07:02,509 zero trust model , right ? I need to 201 00:07:02,509 --> 00:07:02,380 say , how do I protect my data ? I 202 00:07:02,380 --> 00:07:04,324 don't , I don't need to protect my 203 00:07:04,324 --> 00:07:06,436 network , I have to protect my data . 204 00:07:06,440 --> 00:07:09,320 Um so as we get after that identity is 205 00:07:09,320 --> 00:07:11,320 really important . That's something 206 00:07:11,320 --> 00:07:13,487 that we're focusing on . And then disa 207 00:07:13,487 --> 00:07:15,653 has stood up this thunderdome effort , 208 00:07:15,653 --> 00:07:17,764 which is what they're terming they're 209 00:07:17,764 --> 00:07:19,876 they're moved to zero Trust . So this 210 00:07:19,876 --> 00:07:21,987 is providing some enterprise services 211 00:07:21,987 --> 00:07:24,098 to the department to help them enable 212 00:07:24,098 --> 00:07:23,940 zero Trust . But I would say in some 213 00:07:23,940 --> 00:07:26,051 domains , right , it's my job just to 214 00:07:26,051 --> 00:07:28,380 provide oversight or minimums . So 215 00:07:28,390 --> 00:07:30,334 we're encouraging , you know , the 216 00:07:30,334 --> 00:07:32,557 services and other components to pursue 217 00:07:32,557 --> 00:07:34,779 pursue zero trust in their own networks 218 00:07:34,779 --> 00:07:36,740 as well . Okay . So people process 219 00:07:36,740 --> 00:07:38,980 technology governance , um , you know , 220 00:07:38,980 --> 00:07:41,147 one of the things I've read about Zero 221 00:07:41,147 --> 00:07:43,369 trust is certainly the technology there 222 00:07:43,369 --> 00:07:46,900 to enable drive to that security 223 00:07:46,900 --> 00:07:49,067 concept , but ensuring that we get the 224 00:07:49,067 --> 00:07:50,844 strategy correct before we make 225 00:07:50,844 --> 00:07:52,956 decisions before we leave the house , 226 00:07:52,956 --> 00:07:55,067 we know what we're trying to create . 227 00:07:55,067 --> 00:07:57,289 Will they be able to use that office to 228 00:07:57,289 --> 00:07:59,344 find best practice of of agencies or 229 00:07:59,344 --> 00:08:01,678 services or elements that are out ahead ? 230 00:08:01,678 --> 00:08:03,567 Is that resources that one of the 231 00:08:03,567 --> 00:08:05,900 aspirations for the office ? Absolutely . 232 00:08:05,900 --> 00:08:08,011 So something I feel really passionate 233 00:08:08,011 --> 00:08:10,011 about is that we are we have a huge 234 00:08:10,011 --> 00:08:12,122 scope and scale issue and duty as you 235 00:08:12,122 --> 00:08:14,178 know , right , we've an unbelievable 236 00:08:14,178 --> 00:08:16,067 number of users with all sorts of 237 00:08:16,067 --> 00:08:18,440 different missions . Um but we are not 238 00:08:18,440 --> 00:08:20,496 always the leaders . So part of what 239 00:08:20,496 --> 00:08:22,718 that office is doing is reaching out to 240 00:08:22,718 --> 00:08:24,829 industry and saying , how did you get 241 00:08:24,829 --> 00:08:24,670 to zero trust ? What are the smart 242 00:08:24,670 --> 00:08:26,726 things you're doing ? Something that 243 00:08:26,726 --> 00:08:28,837 we're really working on and as we get 244 00:08:28,837 --> 00:08:30,470 to like practices as well as 245 00:08:30,470 --> 00:08:32,640 technologies is changing the culture 246 00:08:32,640 --> 00:08:35,490 around where is the adversary ? So if 247 00:08:35,500 --> 00:08:37,556 my adversaries in my network first , 248 00:08:37,556 --> 00:08:39,667 I'm just gonna assume the adversaries 249 00:08:39,667 --> 00:08:41,722 in the network . Um and that changes 250 00:08:41,722 --> 00:08:43,833 how I do things right . If you assume 251 00:08:43,833 --> 00:08:46,056 the robbers in the house , that changes 252 00:08:46,056 --> 00:08:48,111 how you protect your valuables . And 253 00:08:48,111 --> 00:08:48,010 the other thing is that that changes 254 00:08:48,010 --> 00:08:50,190 the culture around um what should 255 00:08:50,190 --> 00:08:52,610 defenders be doing ? I want defenders 256 00:08:52,620 --> 00:08:55,430 to ferret out adversaries in my network 257 00:08:55,440 --> 00:08:57,950 and success for them is finding them 258 00:08:57,950 --> 00:08:59,783 quickly , fighting through their 259 00:08:59,783 --> 00:09:01,894 presence in my network and then we're 260 00:09:01,894 --> 00:09:04,117 moving them rapidly . And so instead of 261 00:09:04,117 --> 00:09:06,228 saying success is the adversary never 262 00:09:06,228 --> 00:09:08,117 coming in , that's just proactive 263 00:09:08,117 --> 00:09:09,839 defense , constant , resilient 264 00:09:09,839 --> 00:09:12,460 attention . So part of this is your 265 00:09:12,470 --> 00:09:14,910 trust issues born on the heels of our 266 00:09:14,910 --> 00:09:17,010 or in conjunction with the joint 267 00:09:17,020 --> 00:09:19,930 warfighting cloud capability and um 268 00:09:19,930 --> 00:09:22,097 we've heard the C I O S talk about the 269 00:09:22,097 --> 00:09:24,263 journey that's necessary , the urgency 270 00:09:24,263 --> 00:09:26,470 of moving on with it , um the 271 00:09:26,470 --> 00:09:28,800 importance to a cybersecurity 272 00:09:28,810 --> 00:09:30,710 professional like yourself of 273 00:09:30,710 --> 00:09:32,610 understanding there is greater 274 00:09:32,610 --> 00:09:34,610 capability to be gained when we can 275 00:09:34,610 --> 00:09:36,721 move into those modern environments . 276 00:09:36,721 --> 00:09:38,666 The reality is we're gonna live in 277 00:09:38,666 --> 00:09:40,610 legacy and we're gonna live in the 278 00:09:40,610 --> 00:09:42,666 future , but as you think about that 279 00:09:42,666 --> 00:09:44,832 cloud initiative one , are you excited 280 00:09:44,832 --> 00:09:46,999 about it or are you preparing yourself 281 00:09:46,999 --> 00:09:49,166 for the , the stress that this journey 282 00:09:49,166 --> 00:09:51,277 has been a long one already ? But the 283 00:09:51,277 --> 00:09:53,443 introduction of poly cloud is going to 284 00:09:53,443 --> 00:09:55,666 be difficult for a lot of organizations 285 00:09:55,666 --> 00:09:57,832 to get their minds around , but from a 286 00:09:57,832 --> 00:09:59,999 cyber professional , I guess send some 287 00:09:59,999 --> 00:10:02,166 words of encouragement to say why this 288 00:10:02,166 --> 00:10:04,388 is going to be so important as not only 289 00:10:04,388 --> 00:10:06,610 we look at bringing zero trust in , but 290 00:10:06,610 --> 00:10:08,777 really being able to leverage advanced 291 00:10:08,777 --> 00:10:10,999 technologies for cyber defense . Yeah , 292 00:10:10,999 --> 00:10:14,200 so J W C C am I excited ? I am so 293 00:10:14,200 --> 00:10:17,620 excited . It is about time . So in just 294 00:10:17,630 --> 00:10:19,741 to sort of catch folks up , J W C C . 295 00:10:19,741 --> 00:10:21,852 It's a multi cloud environment , it's 296 00:10:21,852 --> 00:10:23,908 at every classification level and it 297 00:10:23,908 --> 00:10:26,020 provides capabilities to the edge . 298 00:10:26,020 --> 00:10:28,131 Right ? Folks who may be disconnected 299 00:10:28,131 --> 00:10:30,353 folks who may have low band with . Um , 300 00:10:30,353 --> 00:10:32,660 we are doing a lot of smart things as 301 00:10:32,660 --> 00:10:34,820 we pursue J W C C to make it really 302 00:10:34,820 --> 00:10:36,653 useful . The other thing that is 303 00:10:36,653 --> 00:10:38,876 exciting to me is that folks are asking 304 00:10:38,876 --> 00:10:41,098 for , right . So when we talk to combat 305 00:10:41,098 --> 00:10:43,320 commanders , they say , you know what I 306 00:10:43,320 --> 00:10:45,431 need any cloud , I need cloud at this 307 00:10:45,431 --> 00:10:47,431 classification level . Um , I don't 308 00:10:47,431 --> 00:10:49,542 want to minimize , there's been a lot 309 00:10:49,542 --> 00:10:51,709 of excellent work done in cloud in the 310 00:10:51,709 --> 00:10:53,876 department . Um , and those clouds are 311 00:10:53,876 --> 00:10:53,160 being widely used , but they aren't 312 00:10:53,160 --> 00:10:55,216 available to everyone and they don't 313 00:10:55,216 --> 00:10:57,493 have all the capabilities that we need , 314 00:10:57,493 --> 00:10:59,493 feels like we're at that inflection 315 00:10:59,493 --> 00:11:01,640 point of our pivot from pilots to 316 00:11:01,650 --> 00:11:03,761 enterprise and there's been so much , 317 00:11:03,761 --> 00:11:05,817 so many great ideas out there and so 318 00:11:05,817 --> 00:11:08,039 many great experiments . But it is time 319 00:11:08,039 --> 00:11:09,983 we as a department just decided we 320 00:11:09,983 --> 00:11:12,094 gotta put our shoulders into this and 321 00:11:12,094 --> 00:11:14,094 get at it . And what I'm sensing is 322 00:11:14,094 --> 00:11:16,150 your energetic about it . Your staff 323 00:11:16,150 --> 00:11:18,372 knows there's a lot of work ahead , but 324 00:11:18,372 --> 00:11:20,594 it's not something that's deterring you 325 00:11:20,594 --> 00:11:22,650 from slowing down at all . We got to 326 00:11:22,650 --> 00:11:24,872 move . We gotta move . So they're great 327 00:11:24,872 --> 00:11:26,817 a huge shout out for folks sort of 328 00:11:26,817 --> 00:11:28,928 clamoring for this capability , which 329 00:11:28,928 --> 00:11:31,150 is incredibly as opposed to I just make 330 00:11:31,150 --> 00:11:33,261 that change happen on somebody else's 331 00:11:33,261 --> 00:11:33,240 tenure . I'm starting to see Commander 332 00:11:33,240 --> 00:11:35,462 saying , help me understand why this is 333 00:11:35,462 --> 00:11:37,684 so important . What can I do to lean in 334 00:11:37,684 --> 00:11:39,573 and get my people already on that 335 00:11:39,573 --> 00:11:41,407 subject ? This transition to new 336 00:11:41,407 --> 00:11:43,518 technologies , new environments , new 337 00:11:43,518 --> 00:11:45,684 frameworks . It's all dependent on the 338 00:11:45,684 --> 00:11:47,851 professionals that we have either from 339 00:11:47,851 --> 00:11:50,073 industry but we have in our services we 340 00:11:50,073 --> 00:11:52,200 have in the department . So the big 341 00:11:52,200 --> 00:11:54,144 question of everybody in the world 342 00:11:54,144 --> 00:11:56,367 that's digitally transforming is how do 343 00:11:56,367 --> 00:11:59,800 we get retained ? Train the talent ? So 344 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:01,940 you've been at this a few days , um 345 00:12:01,950 --> 00:12:04,460 what's your sense of how is the 346 00:12:04,460 --> 00:12:06,460 department attacking the problem of 347 00:12:06,460 --> 00:12:09,470 talent , talent management and how is 348 00:12:09,470 --> 00:12:11,840 it keeping some of its best people or 349 00:12:11,850 --> 00:12:14,017 borrowing some of the best people from 350 00:12:14,017 --> 00:12:16,072 industry or academia to help on this 351 00:12:16,072 --> 00:12:17,850 journey . Yeah , town is really 352 00:12:17,850 --> 00:12:20,120 important and I'll tell you every time 353 00:12:20,120 --> 00:12:22,231 I like here this question I have this 354 00:12:22,231 --> 00:12:24,410 like uh like because I don't want 355 00:12:24,410 --> 00:12:26,632 anyone to think that what I'm saying is 356 00:12:26,632 --> 00:12:28,688 I don't have phenomenal talent . You 357 00:12:28,688 --> 00:12:31,110 know , I have an awesome team and and I 358 00:12:31,110 --> 00:12:33,443 would include my team in both the D . C . 359 00:12:33,443 --> 00:12:35,443 I . O . The team Adisa and the team 360 00:12:35,443 --> 00:12:36,943 that we see the technology 361 00:12:36,943 --> 00:12:38,777 professionals sort of across the 362 00:12:38,777 --> 00:12:40,943 department . We have amazing folks and 363 00:12:40,943 --> 00:12:42,999 I think a lot of our folks are there 364 00:12:42,999 --> 00:12:45,110 just because of the mission . Right ? 365 00:12:45,110 --> 00:12:47,166 Um , so first things first we have a 366 00:12:47,166 --> 00:12:49,388 great team . Um The second thing is how 367 00:12:49,388 --> 00:12:51,499 do I retain them and how do I recruit 368 00:12:51,499 --> 00:12:53,666 new folks to be part of the team . And 369 00:12:53,666 --> 00:12:55,554 what the secretary has said is he 370 00:12:55,554 --> 00:12:57,721 really thinks that we need to find the 371 00:12:57,721 --> 00:12:59,832 full range of talent that the U . S . 372 00:12:59,832 --> 00:13:01,554 Has to offer . And this really 373 00:13:01,554 --> 00:13:03,721 resonated with me because I think that 374 00:13:03,721 --> 00:13:05,777 this is it pertains to diversity and 375 00:13:05,777 --> 00:13:07,943 sort of the way that we generally view 376 00:13:07,943 --> 00:13:10,166 diversity but also regional diversity . 377 00:13:10,166 --> 00:13:12,277 Um Just as an anecdote . So I grew up 378 00:13:12,277 --> 00:13:14,650 in Portland Oregon and um go docks 379 00:13:14,920 --> 00:13:17,820 blazer blazers . 380 00:13:19,050 --> 00:13:22,260 Thank you . Um But 381 00:13:22,640 --> 00:13:24,696 I didn't know anyone for the federal 382 00:13:24,696 --> 00:13:26,807 government . I didn't know anyone who 383 00:13:26,807 --> 00:13:28,973 is a duty civilian . Like didn't occur 384 00:13:28,973 --> 00:13:31,140 to me that was like a space that there 385 00:13:31,140 --> 00:13:33,196 was jobs like it just write it truly 386 00:13:33,196 --> 00:13:35,140 never hit my radar that this was a 387 00:13:35,140 --> 00:13:37,362 thing that could happen . And the way I 388 00:13:37,362 --> 00:13:39,584 came into the federal government is Osd 389 00:13:39,584 --> 00:13:41,640 Cape at the time had a program where 390 00:13:41,640 --> 00:13:43,807 they were trying to recruit people who 391 00:13:43,807 --> 00:13:45,807 had phds in technical fields and uh 392 00:13:45,807 --> 00:13:47,807 some work experience you know maybe 393 00:13:47,807 --> 00:13:49,807 engineering something like that and 394 00:13:49,807 --> 00:13:51,973 didn't know anything about D . O . D . 395 00:13:51,973 --> 00:13:54,196 Right ? And they found me and I fit all 396 00:13:54,196 --> 00:13:53,820 of those you know I just really nailed 397 00:13:53,820 --> 00:13:56,140 it and I they flew into the pentagon . 398 00:13:56,140 --> 00:13:58,251 I was like oh my God the pentagon you 399 00:13:58,251 --> 00:14:00,307 know it's bigger than my time . Yeah 400 00:14:00,307 --> 00:14:02,530 this is crazy . Yeah and and then I 401 00:14:02,530 --> 00:14:04,474 started and it turns out that this 402 00:14:04,474 --> 00:14:06,697 couldn't have been a better fit right ? 403 00:14:06,697 --> 00:14:08,752 I love , I love the mission . I love 404 00:14:08,752 --> 00:14:11,080 the shape of the work . Uh , and I , I 405 00:14:11,080 --> 00:14:13,700 think so all that to say there are 406 00:14:13,710 --> 00:14:15,877 innovative things that folks are doing 407 00:14:15,877 --> 00:14:17,821 and I would say they're sort of in 408 00:14:17,821 --> 00:14:19,766 silos of finding the right folks , 409 00:14:19,766 --> 00:14:22,050 aggressively pursuing talent , um , to 410 00:14:22,050 --> 00:14:24,320 meet the secretary's objective within 411 00:14:24,320 --> 00:14:26,431 the cyber domain . I think we've done 412 00:14:26,431 --> 00:14:28,376 something really exciting . And at 413 00:14:28,376 --> 00:14:30,598 first it felt boring truthfully right . 414 00:14:30,598 --> 00:14:32,764 So we said , What , what are the cyber 415 00:14:32,764 --> 00:14:35,098 rules ? And we split them into 54 rules , 416 00:14:35,098 --> 00:14:37,264 your systems administrator , your fill 417 00:14:37,264 --> 00:14:39,487 in the blank . And then we went through 418 00:14:39,487 --> 00:14:41,487 and we carefully plotted each human 419 00:14:41,487 --> 00:14:43,542 into these roles . And so now you're 420 00:14:43,542 --> 00:14:45,820 just like sort of binning and counting . 421 00:14:45,820 --> 00:14:48,070 But then we harness and data analytics 422 00:14:48,070 --> 00:14:49,792 to actually look and we looked 423 00:14:49,792 --> 00:14:51,792 regionally , we looked across these 424 00:14:51,792 --> 00:14:53,903 very specific job types and we're now 425 00:14:53,903 --> 00:14:55,903 able to say like , and I'm going to 426 00:14:55,903 --> 00:14:57,737 give an example that is possibly 427 00:14:57,737 --> 00:14:59,737 incorrect . But in Kansas city it's 428 00:14:59,737 --> 00:15:01,459 really hard to recruit systems 429 00:15:01,459 --> 00:15:04,260 administrators . Mm um , and so then we 430 00:15:04,260 --> 00:15:07,180 can target right , we can provide some 431 00:15:07,190 --> 00:15:10,060 recruitment and retention , um , you 432 00:15:10,060 --> 00:15:12,282 know , dollars to get that done . And I 433 00:15:12,282 --> 00:15:14,504 think that's really , really valuable . 434 00:15:14,504 --> 00:15:16,560 Yeah . And I think also , I think in 435 00:15:16,560 --> 00:15:18,782 this period of up skilling this amazing 436 00:15:18,782 --> 00:15:21,070 workforce , which I have prior prior to 437 00:15:21,070 --> 00:15:23,730 company industry and accenture 34 years 438 00:15:23,730 --> 00:15:26,430 in uniform . Um , so share your passion 439 00:15:26,430 --> 00:15:28,650 for those in uniform and our civilians 440 00:15:28,650 --> 00:15:30,761 who are part of the federal service , 441 00:15:30,761 --> 00:15:32,983 but also that partnership with industry 442 00:15:32,983 --> 00:15:35,206 right now , which can up skill and then 443 00:15:35,206 --> 00:15:39,100 provide that that um teammate until 444 00:15:39,110 --> 00:15:42,380 that we we move our folks that latest 445 00:15:42,380 --> 00:15:44,491 technology or something like that . I 446 00:15:44,491 --> 00:15:46,436 think there's something to be said 447 00:15:46,436 --> 00:15:48,547 there and I think that public private 448 00:15:48,547 --> 00:15:50,602 partnership of attracting the talent 449 00:15:50,602 --> 00:15:52,790 and from um industry , that's , you 450 00:15:52,790 --> 00:15:55,010 know , candidly in some cases ahead in 451 00:15:55,010 --> 00:15:57,066 the digital transformation journey . 452 00:15:57,066 --> 00:15:59,121 But coming back into this context to 453 00:15:59,121 --> 00:16:01,177 share those lessons learned and then 454 00:16:01,177 --> 00:16:03,343 you helping them understand to fed fit 455 00:16:03,343 --> 00:16:05,121 this or make this secure in our 456 00:16:05,121 --> 00:16:07,177 environment . Here's some additional 457 00:16:07,177 --> 00:16:06,850 things . So I think it's going to 458 00:16:06,860 --> 00:16:09,082 require some teamwork and I think , you 459 00:16:09,082 --> 00:16:11,270 know , teamwork probably one of the 460 00:16:11,270 --> 00:16:13,492 most things . Let's talk about that for 461 00:16:13,492 --> 00:16:15,548 a second , you know , and the day to 462 00:16:15,548 --> 00:16:17,603 day basis you've got an awful lot to 463 00:16:17,603 --> 00:16:19,714 balance in the new role that you just 464 00:16:19,714 --> 00:16:19,130 stepped into and the ones that you had 465 00:16:19,130 --> 00:16:21,190 before , it was certainly not a role 466 00:16:21,190 --> 00:16:23,246 first lacquer but you've got to work 467 00:16:23,246 --> 00:16:25,650 with across the government , the C . I . 468 00:16:25,650 --> 00:16:27,650 O . Responsible for so much for the 469 00:16:27,650 --> 00:16:29,650 Department of Defense , Information 470 00:16:29,650 --> 00:16:31,761 Systems , Data Security , making sure 471 00:16:31,761 --> 00:16:33,990 the information technology roadmap for 472 00:16:33,990 --> 00:16:36,820 the department is sound and and 473 00:16:36,820 --> 00:16:39,480 properly resourced . Um but in terms of 474 00:16:39,480 --> 00:16:41,536 your partnership with us cyber com , 475 00:16:41,536 --> 00:16:43,758 you know , I'm fascinated um talk about 476 00:16:43,758 --> 00:16:45,924 that partnership and when a new threat 477 00:16:45,924 --> 00:16:47,950 emerges tomorrow morning or this 478 00:16:47,950 --> 00:16:50,006 afternoon . How do you work together 479 00:16:50,006 --> 00:16:52,117 and how do how would you describe and 480 00:16:52,117 --> 00:16:54,339 characterize that relationship ? Yeah , 481 00:16:54,339 --> 00:16:56,506 that's a great question . So the C I O 482 00:16:56,506 --> 00:16:58,339 and cyber palm have a very close 483 00:16:58,339 --> 00:17:00,339 relationship . We meet with general 484 00:17:00,339 --> 00:17:02,870 houstonians team every week and a lot 485 00:17:02,870 --> 00:17:05,148 more frequently when something pops up . 486 00:17:05,148 --> 00:17:07,148 So I would say the first thing is a 487 00:17:07,148 --> 00:17:09,203 really clear line of communication , 488 00:17:09,203 --> 00:17:11,426 you know , at the top , which is um you 489 00:17:11,426 --> 00:17:13,481 know , so I'm comfortable sending an 490 00:17:13,481 --> 00:17:15,648 email , making a phone call , uh is it 491 00:17:15,648 --> 00:17:17,814 a weekend ? Great . We'll do this . No 492 00:17:17,814 --> 00:17:19,926 problem . Um so what is the weekend ? 493 00:17:19,926 --> 00:17:21,981 That's right , that's right . I hear 494 00:17:21,981 --> 00:17:24,150 their Saturdays , right . Um and then 495 00:17:24,150 --> 00:17:26,150 what I would say is that I think is 496 00:17:26,150 --> 00:17:28,317 very important is throughout my team . 497 00:17:28,317 --> 00:17:30,372 Right ? So at every level folks have 498 00:17:30,372 --> 00:17:32,372 appear that they're engaging with , 499 00:17:32,372 --> 00:17:34,650 right ? And our arses . So Dave mccune , 500 00:17:34,650 --> 00:17:36,840 who's now acting as my deputy , he , 501 00:17:36,850 --> 00:17:38,961 you know , his whole team , sort of , 502 00:17:38,961 --> 00:17:41,017 all of them know , somebody is cyber 503 00:17:41,017 --> 00:17:43,072 come to call to say , hey , what are 504 00:17:43,072 --> 00:17:42,720 you doing about this ? Do I need to 505 00:17:42,720 --> 00:17:44,580 track this ? So we're getting 506 00:17:44,580 --> 00:17:46,860 collaboration at every level . Okay , 507 00:17:46,870 --> 00:17:48,926 so the team sport is there , I noted 508 00:17:48,926 --> 00:17:51,037 that in your previous life , you were 509 00:17:51,037 --> 00:17:53,360 into the into DHS and protecting 510 00:17:53,360 --> 00:17:55,416 infrastructure . Now you're with the 511 00:17:55,416 --> 00:17:57,770 department , um what would you give the 512 00:17:57,770 --> 00:17:59,826 grades of the department and helping 513 00:17:59,826 --> 00:18:01,937 DHS protect critical infrastructure , 514 00:18:01,937 --> 00:18:04,103 what does that partnership look like ? 515 00:18:04,103 --> 00:18:06,214 Yeah , that's a great question . So , 516 00:18:06,214 --> 00:18:06,040 first I just want to give a shout out 517 00:18:06,040 --> 00:18:09,190 to Cisa . So I I wasn't very familiar 518 00:18:09,190 --> 00:18:12,580 with this until I went to DHS uh and 519 00:18:12,580 --> 00:18:14,850 when I got there I was like , man , 520 00:18:14,860 --> 00:18:16,693 this is one of the most exciting 521 00:18:16,693 --> 00:18:18,749 missions in the federal government , 522 00:18:18,749 --> 00:18:20,971 The mission that Cisa has . Um not only 523 00:18:20,971 --> 00:18:22,749 they're responsible for federal 524 00:18:22,749 --> 00:18:25,082 cybersecurity outside of sort of beauty . 525 00:18:25,082 --> 00:18:27,193 I see , but they also are responsible 526 00:18:27,193 --> 00:18:29,290 for engaging with just , are you an 527 00:18:29,290 --> 00:18:31,480 industrial partner ? Right . Do you or 528 00:18:31,480 --> 00:18:33,702 not even a partner , you know , are you 529 00:18:33,702 --> 00:18:35,758 an american company who's struggling 530 00:18:35,758 --> 00:18:37,980 with cyber security ? Uh They are there 531 00:18:37,980 --> 00:18:40,450 to help . That is a huge deal . So we 532 00:18:40,450 --> 00:18:42,730 engaged pretty regularly with lisa and 533 00:18:42,740 --> 00:18:44,684 I would say that the place that we 534 00:18:44,684 --> 00:18:46,740 overlap the most is with information 535 00:18:46,740 --> 00:18:48,962 sharing . Okay , so they're responsible 536 00:18:48,962 --> 00:18:51,370 for information sharing across across 537 00:18:51,370 --> 00:18:53,850 sort of the commercial sector and were 538 00:18:53,850 --> 00:18:56,017 responsible for the defense industrial 539 00:18:56,017 --> 00:18:58,560 base . Um and we have two main 540 00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:00,671 engagement points with them , D . C . 541 00:19:00,671 --> 00:19:02,560 Three , the Defense cybersecurity 542 00:19:02,560 --> 00:19:04,930 center , and then also um N . S . A . 543 00:19:04,930 --> 00:19:07,350 Cyber collaboration center and talk a 544 00:19:07,350 --> 00:19:09,628 little bit about what S . A . Is doing . 545 00:19:09,628 --> 00:19:11,461 I think it's it's very cool . So 546 00:19:11,461 --> 00:19:13,628 they're they're focused on big defense 547 00:19:13,628 --> 00:19:15,628 industrial based companies and when 548 00:19:15,628 --> 00:19:17,739 they say their collaboration center , 549 00:19:17,739 --> 00:19:19,961 they are a collaboration centre . Um so 550 00:19:19,961 --> 00:19:22,128 they are really trying to say , hey we 551 00:19:22,128 --> 00:19:24,294 have some exquisite information at the 552 00:19:24,294 --> 00:19:25,961 N . S . A . Um but also these 553 00:19:25,961 --> 00:19:27,739 commercial entities , these big 554 00:19:27,739 --> 00:19:29,720 companies , they have some pretty 555 00:19:29,730 --> 00:19:32,170 unique and interesting information . 556 00:19:32,520 --> 00:19:34,520 And so we're working to collaborate 557 00:19:34,520 --> 00:19:36,631 sort of for the common good ? Right . 558 00:19:36,631 --> 00:19:38,742 Right . And that really is , you know 559 00:19:38,742 --> 00:19:40,964 if you re reflect on this journey we've 560 00:19:40,964 --> 00:19:43,187 been on for the past 10 , 20 years just 561 00:19:43,187 --> 00:19:43,030 trying to figure out how to talk to 562 00:19:43,030 --> 00:19:45,610 each other and establishing the will to 563 00:19:45,610 --> 00:19:47,940 do it , then establishing the cadence 564 00:19:47,940 --> 00:19:49,940 to do it . And then recognizing the 565 00:19:49,940 --> 00:19:51,718 defense of this country and the 566 00:19:51,718 --> 00:19:53,884 protection of our citizens is going to 567 00:19:53,884 --> 00:19:56,107 take everybody's best efforts so that's 568 00:19:56,107 --> 00:19:58,107 going to continue to evolve . And I 569 00:19:58,107 --> 00:19:58,100 think the military Culture Department 570 00:19:58,100 --> 00:20:00,044 of Defense culture of teeming with 571 00:20:00,044 --> 00:20:02,211 everybody and everybody bringing their 572 00:20:02,211 --> 00:20:04,211 best is gonna be super helpful . Um 573 00:20:04,211 --> 00:20:06,160 Okay so I'm gonna let you put your 574 00:20:06,160 --> 00:20:08,490 resource hat on um you know as somebody 575 00:20:08,490 --> 00:20:10,768 that undoubtedly when you were up at D . 576 00:20:10,768 --> 00:20:12,934 O . D . P . 80 and there was something 577 00:20:12,934 --> 00:20:14,990 I cared about but it didn't make the 578 00:20:14,990 --> 00:20:17,046 cut line . I forgive you because you 579 00:20:17,046 --> 00:20:18,990 have to make difficult , difficult 580 00:20:18,990 --> 00:20:21,101 choices . Um There is a sense um from 581 00:20:21,101 --> 00:20:23,268 all communities that boy Department of 582 00:20:23,268 --> 00:20:24,934 Defense has been investing in 583 00:20:24,934 --> 00:20:26,934 cybersecurity there is going to say 584 00:20:26,934 --> 00:20:29,157 forever . Well that's not really true . 585 00:20:29,157 --> 00:20:30,823 But for decades and yet those 586 00:20:30,823 --> 00:20:32,850 investments , the threats keep 587 00:20:32,860 --> 00:20:35,410 proliferating , the complexity keeps 588 00:20:35,410 --> 00:20:38,900 increasing and you know the budgets are 589 00:20:38,900 --> 00:20:41,011 they're not finite and so you have to 590 00:20:41,011 --> 00:20:43,233 make wise choices . So if somebody that 591 00:20:43,233 --> 00:20:45,150 can bring that trade off , that's 592 00:20:45,150 --> 00:20:47,317 strategic understanding of what has to 593 00:20:47,317 --> 00:20:49,539 be done , what needs to be done in what 594 00:20:49,539 --> 00:20:51,980 sequence . Um how do you think about 595 00:20:51,990 --> 00:20:53,934 like what are you excited about in 596 00:20:53,934 --> 00:20:56,157 terms of what's coming that might offer 597 00:20:56,157 --> 00:20:58,460 some efficiency that allows us then to 598 00:20:58,460 --> 00:21:00,980 do investments to move toward a more 599 00:21:00,980 --> 00:21:03,580 modern infrastructure and more modern 600 00:21:03,590 --> 00:21:05,646 approach to defending our networks , 601 00:21:05,646 --> 00:21:07,868 defending our data . Yeah , I love this 602 00:21:07,868 --> 00:21:09,590 question . So I've been really 603 00:21:09,590 --> 00:21:11,423 passionate about sort of driving 604 00:21:11,423 --> 00:21:13,368 efficiency um for years and what I 605 00:21:13,368 --> 00:21:15,479 would say is there are places that we 606 00:21:15,479 --> 00:21:17,479 can be more efficient and something 607 00:21:17,479 --> 00:21:19,646 that I'm really excited about is as we 608 00:21:19,646 --> 00:21:21,701 pivot to zero trust this isn't about 609 00:21:21,701 --> 00:21:23,923 just buying new tools , right ? Um This 610 00:21:23,923 --> 00:21:26,146 is also about saying , where do we have 611 00:21:26,146 --> 00:21:28,090 things stood up that we don't need 612 00:21:28,090 --> 00:21:30,034 anymore ? Right . Do we need those 613 00:21:30,034 --> 00:21:29,640 alligators ? Let's pull out the mote . 614 00:21:29,650 --> 00:21:31,983 Let's save a little money on alligators . 615 00:21:31,983 --> 00:21:34,039 Um you know , maybe we don't need to 616 00:21:34,039 --> 00:21:36,094 maintain a refresh some of the tools 617 00:21:36,094 --> 00:21:38,150 that we already have . Um So I think 618 00:21:38,150 --> 00:21:40,206 zero trust what we're trying to do , 619 00:21:40,206 --> 00:21:42,428 really is harvest savings from pivoting 620 00:21:42,428 --> 00:21:44,483 from our old architecture to our new 621 00:21:44,483 --> 00:21:46,594 architecture and I think that's , you 622 00:21:46,594 --> 00:21:48,261 know , gonna drive some trust 623 00:21:48,261 --> 00:21:50,428 throughout the department , right ? We 624 00:21:50,428 --> 00:21:52,594 aren't just spending more um The other 625 00:21:52,594 --> 00:21:51,470 thing I will say is that will make our 626 00:21:51,470 --> 00:21:53,526 networks work better , right . If we 627 00:21:53,526 --> 00:21:55,692 can stop larding them down . The other 628 00:21:55,692 --> 00:21:57,859 critical thing is I think we've gotten 629 00:21:57,859 --> 00:21:59,970 a lot of information off our networks 630 00:21:59,970 --> 00:22:02,192 and right now cyber defenders , I think 631 00:22:02,192 --> 00:22:04,303 have a hard time figuring out what is 632 00:22:04,303 --> 00:22:06,248 most important . Uh and we need to 633 00:22:06,248 --> 00:22:08,470 leverage ai to help them right ? To say 634 00:22:08,470 --> 00:22:10,692 you have a lot of tools but we're gonna 635 00:22:10,692 --> 00:22:12,859 get the most important data , uh we're 636 00:22:12,859 --> 00:22:15,081 gonna make that available to you all to 637 00:22:15,081 --> 00:22:17,303 um you know , pursue those places where 638 00:22:17,303 --> 00:22:19,192 we're most concerned about what's 639 00:22:19,192 --> 00:22:21,414 happening . The other thing I would say 640 00:22:21,414 --> 00:22:25,250 is I I'm , you know , I'm an OsD 641 00:22:25,250 --> 00:22:27,361 K person at heart , I love finding an 642 00:22:27,361 --> 00:22:29,472 efficiency and when I think about the 643 00:22:29,472 --> 00:22:31,417 cyber domain and I think about the 644 00:22:31,417 --> 00:22:33,417 conversation we just had about this 645 00:22:33,417 --> 00:22:35,583 inflection point and who are adversary 646 00:22:35,583 --> 00:22:37,806 is it seems to me that cyber might be a 647 00:22:37,806 --> 00:22:39,806 place where we're not looking for a 648 00:22:39,806 --> 00:22:42,028 flat budget , the budget growth doesn't 649 00:22:42,028 --> 00:22:43,806 mean that we're failing to find 650 00:22:43,806 --> 00:22:45,583 efficiencies that actually just 651 00:22:45,583 --> 00:22:47,806 reflects the nature of the next fight . 652 00:22:47,806 --> 00:22:49,700 The nature that ai is incredibly 653 00:22:49,700 --> 00:22:51,867 important . We're gonna need resilient 654 00:22:51,867 --> 00:22:54,033 robust transport for that to work that 655 00:22:54,033 --> 00:22:56,080 costs money . Um The other thing I 656 00:22:56,080 --> 00:22:58,247 would say is , you know , I think just 657 00:22:58,247 --> 00:23:00,191 when I look personally at what I'm 658 00:23:00,191 --> 00:23:02,490 spending in my own life , Um you know , 659 00:23:02,490 --> 00:23:04,690 my phone costs more than my phone cost 660 00:23:04,700 --> 00:23:07,920 20 years ago . That's cool . My phone 661 00:23:07,920 --> 00:23:09,850 is pretty awesome . My phone is 662 00:23:09,850 --> 00:23:12,072 providing me crazy capabilities I never 663 00:23:12,072 --> 00:23:14,350 could have imagined , right , you know . 664 00:23:14,350 --> 00:23:16,183 Right ? And so I think this is a 665 00:23:16,183 --> 00:23:18,406 balance . Yeah , I know that we have to 666 00:23:18,406 --> 00:23:20,572 make hard decisions but I think a i is 667 00:23:20,572 --> 00:23:22,780 a force multiplier and I think um to 668 00:23:22,780 --> 00:23:24,947 bring that to bear we're gonna need to 669 00:23:24,947 --> 00:23:27,169 make some investments in I . T . Well I 670 00:23:27,169 --> 00:23:29,169 think the leader literacy today you 671 00:23:29,169 --> 00:23:31,224 know certainly as I entered into the 672 00:23:31,224 --> 00:23:33,280 Department of Defense and I will say 673 00:23:33,280 --> 00:23:35,169 that the very first thing that my 674 00:23:35,169 --> 00:23:37,224 company commander told me as a young 675 00:23:37,224 --> 00:23:39,336 collection and jamming platoon leader 676 00:23:39,336 --> 00:23:41,169 is embrace your signal officer , 677 00:23:41,169 --> 00:23:43,336 embrace the people that bring it . And 678 00:23:43,336 --> 00:23:45,502 I thought of all the things to embrace 679 00:23:45,502 --> 00:23:47,724 why that . And he said well you're on a 680 00:23:47,724 --> 00:23:49,613 hill , you've collected something 681 00:23:49,613 --> 00:23:49,390 significant about the enemy . How are 682 00:23:49,390 --> 00:23:51,501 you going to get that back to anybody 683 00:23:51,501 --> 00:23:54,320 who cares about it . And so uh the rule 684 00:23:54,320 --> 00:23:57,470 of the I . T . Professional in this era 685 00:23:57,480 --> 00:24:00,160 of information warfare in this era of 686 00:24:00,160 --> 00:24:02,870 information dominance it's not an 687 00:24:02,870 --> 00:24:04,870 enabler an afterthought it's at the 688 00:24:04,870 --> 00:24:06,814 forefront . And so everything that 689 00:24:06,814 --> 00:24:08,920 we're doing right now is preparing 690 00:24:08,920 --> 00:24:11,440 ourselves to accept cyber as a domain 691 00:24:11,450 --> 00:24:13,900 cyber is the place that the our 692 00:24:13,900 --> 00:24:16,122 adversaries may choose to confront us . 693 00:24:16,122 --> 00:24:18,344 And so we need to bring the same energy 694 00:24:18,344 --> 00:24:21,260 that we have to the space maritime um 695 00:24:21,740 --> 00:24:25,190 Terrestrial um to this dewayne and put 696 00:24:25,190 --> 00:24:27,420 our shoulders into it . So look I can't 697 00:24:27,420 --> 00:24:29,587 believe that we've been talking for 25 698 00:24:29,587 --> 00:24:31,531 minutes and I know that you have a 699 00:24:31,531 --> 00:24:33,698 tough schedule um and they're going to 700 00:24:33,698 --> 00:24:35,698 get back to fighting the fight . Um 701 00:24:35,698 --> 00:24:37,920 first let me thank you for your service 702 00:24:37,920 --> 00:24:39,864 and your staff for allowing you to 703 00:24:39,864 --> 00:24:42,087 break away to be here today . It's been 704 00:24:42,087 --> 00:24:44,142 incredible conversation . But if you 705 00:24:44,142 --> 00:24:46,198 were to leave our audience with what 706 00:24:46,198 --> 00:24:48,253 are the things that you need to help 707 00:24:48,253 --> 00:24:47,690 with or what are the things that what's 708 00:24:47,690 --> 00:24:49,857 the mess that you want to leave with ? 709 00:24:49,857 --> 00:24:51,968 I'd like to give you that opportunity 710 00:24:51,968 --> 00:24:54,134 and thank you again for your service . 711 00:24:54,134 --> 00:24:53,670 Well , thank you for having me and 712 00:24:53,670 --> 00:24:55,781 thank you for your service . I really 713 00:24:55,781 --> 00:24:57,892 enjoyed this . I guess I just want to 714 00:24:57,892 --> 00:24:59,892 leave the audience with a couple of 715 00:24:59,892 --> 00:25:02,003 things . The first is this pivot zero 716 00:25:02,003 --> 00:25:04,114 trust this is going to take all of us 717 00:25:04,114 --> 00:25:03,520 putting our shoulder into it and I 718 00:25:03,520 --> 00:25:06,230 don't just mean in duty . Um I mean 719 00:25:06,230 --> 00:25:08,452 really our industry partners helping us 720 00:25:08,452 --> 00:25:10,563 right , helping us with the tools and 721 00:25:10,563 --> 00:25:12,730 the technologies and the education and 722 00:25:12,730 --> 00:25:14,841 being are true partner . Um The other 723 00:25:14,841 --> 00:25:17,030 thing I want to head on is um I think 724 00:25:17,030 --> 00:25:18,974 we've spent a lot of time enabling 725 00:25:18,974 --> 00:25:21,030 telework working on our unclassified 726 00:25:21,030 --> 00:25:21,020 networks . That's been incredibly 727 00:25:21,020 --> 00:25:23,076 valuable . Our industry partnerships 728 00:25:23,076 --> 00:25:25,298 have helped us to be successful there . 729 00:25:25,298 --> 00:25:27,464 Um but I do want to spend some time on 730 00:25:27,464 --> 00:25:29,464 our most exquisite data on our most 731 00:25:29,464 --> 00:25:31,464 classified data on that data that's 732 00:25:31,464 --> 00:25:33,576 most important to the Warfighter . So 733 00:25:33,576 --> 00:25:35,798 as we pivot to work on that we're gonna 734 00:25:35,798 --> 00:25:38,076 need , we're going to help and support . 735 00:25:38,076 --> 00:25:40,298 Uh and then the last thing I do want to 736 00:25:40,298 --> 00:25:42,353 touch on is spectrum . So , uh , I'm 737 00:25:42,353 --> 00:25:44,409 really passionate about this . It it 738 00:25:44,409 --> 00:25:46,520 gets really wonky . But being able to 739 00:25:46,520 --> 00:25:48,687 share spectrum is gonna change the way 740 00:25:48,687 --> 00:25:51,020 that we fight the war . It's gonna make , 741 00:25:51,020 --> 00:25:53,020 um , the way we train different and 742 00:25:53,020 --> 00:25:55,076 it's incredibly important . So those 743 00:25:55,076 --> 00:25:57,187 are three spaces where we really want 744 00:25:57,187 --> 00:25:59,353 to partner . Just , just lots to think 745 00:25:59,353 --> 00:26:01,464 about kelly . Thank you and thank you 746 00:26:01,464 --> 00:26:01,350 so much for everything you're doing . 747 00:26:01,350 --> 00:26:03,350 And thanks again to look forward to 748 00:26:03,840 --> 00:26:06,007 working with you down the road . You , 749 00:26:06,007 --> 00:26:09,140 too . Thank you . Yeah , 750 00:26:18,140 --> 00:26:18,490 Yeah .