WEBVTT 00:00.709 --> 00:03.509 OK . My name is George Ross , and I 00:03.509 --> 00:05.860 served in the fifty-fifth from July 00:05.860 --> 00:08.890 1980 through uh February of 00:08.890 --> 00:12.350 1986 . During that time I 00:12.350 --> 00:15.630 had transitioned in as a KC-135 00:15.630 --> 00:17.590 aircraft commander . But when you 00:17.590 --> 00:19.969 arrive at the 55th back in those days , 00:20.069 --> 00:22.125 if you were not receiver qualified , 00:22.125 --> 00:24.350 you automatically made a co-pilot . So 00:24.350 --> 00:26.517 that's a good thing . So you go for an 00:26.517 --> 00:28.628 aircraft commander in one aircraft to 00:28.628 --> 00:30.683 be a co-pilot in the next airplane . 00:30.683 --> 00:32.739 But that was a fun time and we had a 00:32.739 --> 00:34.850 whole bunch of us come in and at that 00:34.850 --> 00:36.961 time there was probably about a dozen 00:36.961 --> 00:39.294 of us came in in the summer of 1980 and . 00:39.819 --> 00:42.220 We all were all former aircraft 00:42.220 --> 00:44.331 commanders and so we all got a chance 00:44.331 --> 00:46.331 to fly in this program called ACE , 00:46.659 --> 00:48.492 which is the accelerated copilot 00:48.492 --> 00:50.659 enrichment program , and you got to go 00:50.659 --> 00:52.939 fly T-38s and so that was kind of fun 00:52.939 --> 00:54.860 to give you some some additional 00:54.860 --> 00:57.659 experiences uh in flying . So it was 00:57.659 --> 01:01.430 mostly geared SAC had that program 01:01.430 --> 01:03.486 because young co-pilots didn't get a 01:03.486 --> 01:05.541 chance to do a lot of navigating and 01:05.541 --> 01:07.708 flying on their own . So they gave you 01:07.708 --> 01:09.874 some chances to fly these little T-38s 01:10.110 --> 01:12.277 to give you some more experience , but 01:12.277 --> 01:14.499 we had all flown T-38s in the past , so 01:14.499 --> 01:17.269 it was all really pretty fun . Um , I 01:17.269 --> 01:18.825 was a captain when I when I 01:18.825 --> 01:21.230 transitioned in and I got promoted to 01:21.230 --> 01:23.980 major while I was here . I was in the 01:23.980 --> 01:26.389 wing flying as an as a first as a 01:26.389 --> 01:28.111 co-pilot , then as an aircraft 01:28.111 --> 01:30.278 commander , then as a as an instructor 01:30.278 --> 01:34.129 pilot in the wing . From 1980 to 01:34.129 --> 01:37.370 1983 and then in July of 01:37.370 --> 01:40.050 '83 , I was transferred over to 01:40.050 --> 01:42.650 strategic Air Command headquarters and 01:42.650 --> 01:44.706 the , the director of reconnaissance 01:44.769 --> 01:47.050 office . And so that was led in by Bill 01:47.050 --> 01:49.870 Ernst , later by Dan Peterson . Uh , 01:49.930 --> 01:52.041 but our job over there was , was kind 01:52.041 --> 01:54.690 of multifold . We had , uh , we run 01:54.690 --> 01:57.639 actions and we would learn and , and , 01:57.650 --> 01:59.769 uh , get approval of routes that we 01:59.769 --> 02:01.769 were gonna fly that were unique and 02:01.769 --> 02:03.880 different . At the time , a couple of 02:03.880 --> 02:06.470 examples like that we developed a 02:06.470 --> 02:08.789 program the routes to fly against the 02:08.789 --> 02:11.190 Grenada missions whenever the island of 02:11.190 --> 02:13.389 Grenada was invaded , we flew 02:13.389 --> 02:15.611 reconnaissance missions out of office , 02:15.611 --> 02:17.833 and it was a long missions , but we had 02:17.833 --> 02:20.880 to we had to get that approved to be 02:20.880 --> 02:22.658 able to do that kind of thing . 02:25.490 --> 02:27.768 Later , while I was at SA headquarters , 02:27.768 --> 02:30.100 we had the Korean airline shoot down 02:30.100 --> 02:33.820 over Russia . And so our job 02:33.820 --> 02:36.940 was then at the headquarters was to 02:36.940 --> 02:39.500 direct our missions out of Kadina Air 02:39.500 --> 02:42.070 Base or wherever we had some out of as 02:42.070 --> 02:44.389 well to go down there and try to track 02:44.389 --> 02:46.589 the activity that was going on . The 02:46.589 --> 02:48.830 Russians were all over the place . They 02:48.830 --> 02:51.509 thought they shot down an RC-135 when 02:51.509 --> 02:53.620 in fact they had shot down a civilian 02:53.620 --> 02:55.842 airplane . And so that was a big deal , 02:55.842 --> 02:58.065 and that was part of we , we were there 02:58.065 --> 02:59.953 on , on that for a number of days 02:59.953 --> 03:02.009 trying to get all the information to 03:02.009 --> 03:04.231 collect everything to see if they could 03:04.231 --> 03:06.231 salvage any survivors , which there 03:06.231 --> 03:09.250 were no survivors at all . Um , Anyway , 03:09.289 --> 03:12.490 I stayed in the wing uh for uh SAC 03:12.490 --> 03:15.539 headquarters until 1986 , and then in 03:15.539 --> 03:19.160 1986 I was transferred to the Pentagon 03:19.610 --> 03:21.809 and our jobs at well I 03:21.809 --> 03:25.029 regress here a little bit back at Sack 03:25.029 --> 03:27.679 was another job that we had , we had to 03:27.690 --> 03:30.330 to take the daily operational mission 03:30.330 --> 03:32.729 briefing to the the commander in chief 03:32.729 --> 03:34.729 of the strategic Air Command called 03:34.729 --> 03:36.979 SinSA . And that was Benny Davis . It 03:36.979 --> 03:38.880 was always a hoot to brief him , 03:39.179 --> 03:40.957 four-star general , he was , he 03:40.957 --> 03:43.068 couldn't hear very well . He'd sit in 03:43.068 --> 03:45.290 the front row and look up at you know , 03:45.290 --> 03:47.512 and he'd give all these briefings about 03:47.512 --> 03:47.339 the missions . It was pretty funny , 03:47.380 --> 03:49.580 but if there was something unique that 03:49.580 --> 03:51.691 happened , we would have had to brief 03:51.691 --> 03:54.059 that out . And then also in some cases 03:54.059 --> 03:56.115 when there was going to be a special 03:56.115 --> 03:58.281 mission , we would have to brief those 03:58.281 --> 04:00.448 out special mission example . We would 04:00.448 --> 04:02.670 fly sometimes coordinated missions with 04:02.670 --> 04:06.529 the SR-71s or other strategic Air 04:06.529 --> 04:08.889 command aircraft in that situation , we 04:08.889 --> 04:11.710 would go into the area you I can 04:11.710 --> 04:15.089 recall off the top I had some Baltic 04:15.089 --> 04:17.256 missions we would fly would fly out of 04:17.256 --> 04:20.209 RAF Mildenhall in the UK , fly with the 04:20.209 --> 04:24.079 tanker , and we would be . In the 04:24.079 --> 04:26.679 air refueling position and go into the 04:26.679 --> 04:29.940 Baltic like that . And so from the 04:29.940 --> 04:32.570 defense of the Russians at the time , 04:33.279 --> 04:35.446 they can only see one blip , so it was 04:35.446 --> 04:37.799 like one airplane and then the SR-71 04:37.799 --> 04:39.855 would take off and they would fly up 04:39.855 --> 04:41.966 high into the into the Baltic as well 04:42.119 --> 04:45.799 and then The SR-71 would make it a 04:45.799 --> 04:49.070 radical turn and and go to supersonic 04:49.880 --> 04:52.899 plus speed straight at Germany 04:56.390 --> 04:58.612 Russian control area and all the radars 04:58.612 --> 05:00.723 would pop up . We would then separate 05:00.723 --> 05:02.834 from the thing with all our airplanes 05:02.834 --> 05:05.001 and we'd collect all the data that was 05:05.001 --> 05:07.168 called a coordinated and that was that 05:07.168 --> 05:06.920 was really fun . We would do that . We 05:06.920 --> 05:08.920 had to do planning for that kind of 05:08.920 --> 05:11.031 thing and then execute that mission . 05:11.031 --> 05:13.198 Had the opportunity to fly a couple of 05:13.198 --> 05:15.364 those myself . As well , then anyway , 05:15.364 --> 05:17.531 then after that I was then transferred 05:17.531 --> 05:19.698 back to the Pentagon and I was the pro 05:19.698 --> 05:22.130 the program manager for the RC-135 05:22.130 --> 05:24.489 program there . We worked for General 05:24.489 --> 05:27.489 George Butler , uh George Lee Butler , 05:27.790 --> 05:29.901 Butler , who eventually became Sig SA 05:29.901 --> 05:31.901 and was the last Sig SA that we had 05:31.901 --> 05:34.012 before they closed down the strategic 05:34.012 --> 05:36.290 Care Command . But while we were there , 05:36.390 --> 05:39.660 we had to develop routes for Uh , a new 05:39.660 --> 05:41.850 territory , which is not new anymore , 05:41.940 --> 05:43.779 but we had to do Southwest Asia 05:43.779 --> 05:46.019 planning and so we were going to try to 05:46.019 --> 05:49.059 fly missions nonstop out of Athens , 05:49.149 --> 05:52.899 Greece , Lion Air Base , and uh we 05:52.899 --> 05:56.420 would go from Oon , we would find a 05:56.420 --> 05:58.642 mission plan that would be flying us to 05:58.642 --> 06:01.570 Italy , and we would fly over to Italy , 06:01.820 --> 06:04.089 do a low approach over the base , 06:04.950 --> 06:07.019 cancel our flight plan , reprogram 06:07.019 --> 06:09.549 while we're in the air . In our program 06:09.549 --> 06:13.059 to Egypt . Well , That's because you 06:13.059 --> 06:15.100 couldn't fly from Greece to Egypt 06:15.100 --> 06:17.267 directly because they didn't like each 06:17.267 --> 06:19.489 other , so you couldn't do that kind of 06:19.489 --> 06:21.711 thing . So Italy and Egypt got along so 06:21.711 --> 06:23.822 we could do that . So we would fly to 06:23.822 --> 06:25.878 Egypt , get a refueling on the way , 06:25.878 --> 06:28.100 coast in , go across the Red Sea , send 06:28.100 --> 06:30.211 our guys into the Persian Gulf area , 06:30.211 --> 06:32.378 and then they would orbit for a number 06:32.378 --> 06:34.544 of hours getting another air refueling 06:34.544 --> 06:36.656 and come back , reverse their route , 06:36.656 --> 06:38.933 and then they would coast out of Egypt . 06:39.820 --> 06:42.042 As though they were going to go back to 06:42.042 --> 06:44.209 Italy and they would declare a unified 06:44.209 --> 06:47.350 emergency . And then recover into 06:47.350 --> 06:49.440 Greece . So that's how we got around 06:49.440 --> 06:51.959 all the rules of engagement with 06:51.959 --> 06:53.959 respect to the countries not liking 06:53.959 --> 06:56.181 each other . That was early on and then 06:56.181 --> 06:58.640 of course later and even now there's 06:58.640 --> 07:01.559 continuous RC-135 operations in that 07:01.559 --> 07:03.670 part of the world in Southwest Asia , 07:03.670 --> 07:05.837 but that was the beginning development 07:05.837 --> 07:07.670 of that . Those missions were 20 07:07.670 --> 07:09.503 something hours long . They were 07:09.503 --> 07:11.600 augmented by crews and it was it was 07:11.600 --> 07:14.429 quite a Quite an adventure to do that , 07:14.589 --> 07:16.989 but we had once we developed those , we 07:16.989 --> 07:19.100 had to coordinate that with the Joint 07:19.100 --> 07:20.989 Chiefs of Staff operations at the 07:20.989 --> 07:22.989 Pentagon so they would get approval 07:22.989 --> 07:25.211 worldwide to be able to do that kind of 07:25.211 --> 07:27.156 thing . So it was always something 07:27.156 --> 07:29.267 unique and different at the time that 07:29.267 --> 07:31.660 was whatever the world situation was , 07:32.230 --> 07:34.630 you had to brief the Joint Chiefs and 07:34.630 --> 07:36.852 then they would in turn pass that on to 07:36.852 --> 07:39.200 the President of the United States . So 07:39.200 --> 07:42.799 those are my times and stories . I had 07:42.799 --> 07:44.910 lots and lots of opportunities in the 07:44.910 --> 07:46.743 wing . I love flying operational 07:46.743 --> 07:49.200 missions . I did a number of those over 07:49.200 --> 07:51.880 the years flying there and also as an 07:51.880 --> 07:54.102 instructor got a chance to take some of 07:54.102 --> 07:56.324 the new people that came in the wing at 07:56.324 --> 07:58.547 later dates in my time and then trained 07:58.547 --> 08:00.769 them to fly RC-135 to teach them how to 08:00.769 --> 08:02.658 do the fueling and those kinds of 08:02.658 --> 08:04.769 things . So that's kind of my story , 08:04.769 --> 08:04.480 so .