WEBVTT 00:00.550 --> 00:03.349 My name is Henry Duby Junior . 00:04.800 --> 00:08.699 I was known in the unit as Hank . And 00:08.699 --> 00:11.220 I joined the fifty-fifth in the summer 00:11.220 --> 00:15.180 of 1964 with the deactivation of the 00:15.180 --> 00:18.450 40th bomb wing , which was co-located 00:18.940 --> 00:20.940 with the fifty-fifth at the time at 00:20.940 --> 00:24.479 Forbes . Uh , following a 00:24.479 --> 00:26.690 training into the fifty-fifth , I 00:26.690 --> 00:30.579 deployed in late February of 00:30.579 --> 00:34.169 '65 to Yokota with uh Colonel 00:34.169 --> 00:37.889 Madison's crew and our crew number was 00:37.889 --> 00:41.319 E96 . It was during that 00:41.319 --> 00:44.560 deployment that Even though it was a 00:44.560 --> 00:48.279 Cold War , we had activity that 00:48.279 --> 00:52.119 uh became Hostile action . 00:53.430 --> 00:55.349 During the time I was with the 00:55.349 --> 00:59.189 fifty-fifth , I was uh first as a 00:59.189 --> 01:02.310 first lieutenant . I was activated into 01:02.310 --> 01:06.260 the regular Air Force and then uh 01:06.750 --> 01:09.629 during my stay with the 55th did make 01:09.629 --> 01:12.459 captain and became a crew commander . 01:14.230 --> 01:17.430 Uh , I served from 64 to 01:17.430 --> 01:19.870 69 with the 55th . 01:21.860 --> 01:25.519 Back to the hostile action , it was 01:25.519 --> 01:29.360 actually the 27th of April of 01:29.360 --> 01:33.120 1965 , which next month will be 01:33.120 --> 01:36.010 60 years . Of 01:36.629 --> 01:40.069 this particular action which occurred 01:40.410 --> 01:43.010 off the coast of North Korea , about 70 01:43.010 --> 01:46.769 miles from the port of uh Wusan . And 01:46.769 --> 01:49.900 that happens to be following our action , 01:49.930 --> 01:53.519 the same area where the USS Pueblo 01:53.849 --> 01:57.459 was captured . And is still held 01:57.750 --> 02:01.309 as a vessel by the North Koreans . 02:02.599 --> 02:05.680 But uh we were proceeding parallel to 02:05.680 --> 02:08.940 the coastline on the twenty-seventh of 02:08.940 --> 02:12.429 April and we received a report 02:13.910 --> 02:16.860 via radio that we had bogies closing . 02:18.250 --> 02:21.649 We were in clear air . And 02:21.649 --> 02:24.850 I received permission from Colonel Math 02:24.850 --> 02:28.660 to rotate my seat to activate the fire 02:28.660 --> 02:32.130 control system which was normally uh 02:32.130 --> 02:34.529 behind the seat . When you rotated your 02:34.529 --> 02:36.585 seat , then it was in front of you . 02:37.000 --> 02:40.990 And so I also had a camera 02:41.750 --> 02:45.750 for uh photo taking when the aircraft 02:45.750 --> 02:48.910 were in close proximity to us . And it 02:48.910 --> 02:51.630 was during the time I was looking 02:51.630 --> 02:54.820 through the lens of the camera that I 02:54.820 --> 02:57.970 observed gunfire being 02:58.509 --> 03:01.570 directed at the aircraft . And of 03:01.570 --> 03:03.737 course , not only did it pass over the 03:03.737 --> 03:06.479 canopy , but it , we felt the impacts 03:06.729 --> 03:09.130 and I called immediately , they're 03:09.130 --> 03:12.130 shooting at us . And uh 03:13.020 --> 03:16.259 By that time , the first pass of this 03:16.259 --> 03:19.850 flight of two MG 17s had been completed . 03:20.910 --> 03:24.220 I requested permission to return fire , 03:24.259 --> 03:26.148 and Colonel Matt said , shoot the 03:26.148 --> 03:30.020 bastards . So the 03:30.020 --> 03:32.589 gun system was active by this time . 03:33.339 --> 03:35.910 And they , the two fighters had fallen 03:35.910 --> 03:38.669 back in preparation for coming in on 03:38.669 --> 03:41.470 another pass or I suspected was going 03:41.470 --> 03:45.320 to be another pass . So I put my head 03:45.320 --> 03:49.000 in the scope , was able to lock on the 03:49.000 --> 03:52.509 lead aircraft , and they were outside 03:52.509 --> 03:54.565 of the effective range of the guns , 03:54.600 --> 03:58.559 which was 3100 yards . So as they came 03:58.559 --> 04:01.039 in closer and I , of course , had the 04:01.039 --> 04:03.139 foot activated switch for the 04:03.139 --> 04:06.080 microphone for Intercom , and I was 04:06.080 --> 04:08.199 keeping the crew advised of what was 04:08.199 --> 04:10.310 going on . I said , they're closing , 04:10.310 --> 04:13.330 they're closing . Well , all of a 04:13.330 --> 04:16.690 sudden , the gun radar skipped 04:16.690 --> 04:19.790 lock . And I could see that it went 04:19.790 --> 04:23.649 back into a search mode . And so 04:23.649 --> 04:25.649 we had a malfunction of the gunnery 04:25.649 --> 04:27.970 system for whatever reason , at that 04:27.970 --> 04:31.799 time , I didn't know . So I took manual 04:31.799 --> 04:34.260 control of the guns with the joystick , 04:34.910 --> 04:38.700 and as the first mid closed , I 04:39.399 --> 04:41.619 tried to approximate , I tried to lock 04:41.619 --> 04:44.309 on again , which I couldn't do , and I 04:44.309 --> 04:47.470 tried to approximate his position to 04:47.470 --> 04:50.470 return fire . Again , it was just the 04:50.470 --> 04:52.510 lead aircraft that was doing the 04:52.510 --> 04:56.459 shooting . And uh I 04:57.029 --> 05:00.339 returned fire of 2 or 3 seconds . 05:02.070 --> 05:05.950 He broke off and #2 stayed away from us . 05:07.549 --> 05:11.380 As Lee broke off , #2 started 05:11.950 --> 05:15.500 to get in position to start shooting . 05:16.260 --> 05:19.260 All this time , the crew , uh , Colonel 05:19.260 --> 05:22.670 Madison had already received a heading 05:22.670 --> 05:25.980 to turn away from the land mass and was 05:25.980 --> 05:29.179 descending , trying to head for a cloud 05:29.179 --> 05:31.679 deck which was visibly below us . 05:33.109 --> 05:36.470 The 2nd aircraft came in and I started 05:36.470 --> 05:39.480 shooting at him . I was not able again , 05:39.829 --> 05:43.609 not able to lock on . And retain Oakha . 05:44.380 --> 05:47.829 But uh , He broke off 05:48.119 --> 05:51.519 his pass . And here comes the lead 05:51.519 --> 05:55.309 again . And I started shooting . 05:55.440 --> 05:58.480 I tried to lock on , not able to , when 05:58.480 --> 06:01.359 he was at 3100 yards , I approximated 06:01.359 --> 06:04.640 his position with where I knew dead 06:04.640 --> 06:08.470 center was on the aircraft . And uh 06:08.470 --> 06:10.910 started shooting . He never did the 06:10.910 --> 06:14.660 return fire and it was on that pass 06:14.660 --> 06:18.390 that I observed him pull up to a nose 06:18.390 --> 06:21.750 high altitude , and then he fell off on 06:21.750 --> 06:25.600 one wing and went straight down . And 06:25.600 --> 06:28.519 at that time we were at 16,000 ft . 06:30.190 --> 06:33.950 Number 2 started coming back in again 06:34.299 --> 06:37.279 and I was shooting at him . He did a 06:37.279 --> 06:40.839 very , very slow turn to what would 06:40.839 --> 06:44.029 have been his left uh to head back to 06:44.029 --> 06:47.839 the coastline and departed the 06:47.839 --> 06:51.570 area . It was after 06:51.570 --> 06:55.510 that time that I was telling the 06:55.510 --> 06:58.070 crew , you know , we were trailing 06:58.070 --> 07:02.000 vapor and smoke and that we obviously 07:02.000 --> 07:05.579 were on fire . No flames were visible , 07:05.709 --> 07:08.709 but then uh we started running an 07:08.709 --> 07:11.750 emergency checklist and trying to 07:11.750 --> 07:15.109 update our ETA to return to base if we 07:15.109 --> 07:17.309 could make base , which was Dakota . 07:18.079 --> 07:22.049 And uh The rest of the time till 07:22.049 --> 07:25.570 we coasted in was spent uh just 07:25.570 --> 07:28.570 assessing the damage . We had lost all 07:28.570 --> 07:31.130 the hydraulics . We had lost 12,000 07:31.130 --> 07:34.649 pounds of fuel out of the F main . Of 07:34.649 --> 07:36.890 course , that put our CG way forward of 07:36.890 --> 07:39.839 the nose . So we discussed 07:40.609 --> 07:44.329 uh the landing that we thought we 07:44.329 --> 07:47.859 might try to do . Colonel Matt asked if 07:47.859 --> 07:49.915 anybody wanted to just bail out over 07:49.915 --> 07:53.859 the base and be safe for sure . Nobody 07:54.100 --> 07:56.890 volunteered to do that since we still 07:56.890 --> 08:00.690 had a good airplane . So we had a 08:00.690 --> 08:03.130 T39 come up and check us over for 08:03.130 --> 08:07.049 damage , and he reported no visual 08:07.049 --> 08:10.690 damage . So we got the 08:10.690 --> 08:14.649 landing gear down and uh of course we 08:14.649 --> 08:17.929 were only on 3 engines . I didn't uh 08:17.929 --> 08:20.329 indicate during the dogfight that we 08:20.329 --> 08:23.779 had 3 engines shot out and 08:23.779 --> 08:27.500 uh we circled the base , getting lower 08:27.500 --> 08:30.779 as we could . Made a missed approach 08:30.779 --> 08:32.909 because we were too high on the first 08:32.909 --> 08:35.659 attempt , and on the second attempt , 08:36.030 --> 08:38.390 we had worked the airplane down to a 08:38.390 --> 08:41.789 lower altitude and uh touched 08:41.789 --> 08:45.179 down , but the B-47 was known 08:45.179 --> 08:49.070 for a porting attitude if 08:49.070 --> 08:51.549 you hit on the front gear because it 08:51.549 --> 08:54.320 was a tandem airplane , tandem gear . 08:55.900 --> 08:59.109 So we bounced up in the air quite hot , 08:59.510 --> 09:01.979 actually passed a helicopter that was 09:02.669 --> 09:06.099 fire suppression for us . And uh 09:06.549 --> 09:10.390 I thought that uh knowing the time 09:10.390 --> 09:12.669 delay on the , on the brake chute . 09:13.520 --> 09:16.849 That as we started coming back down for 09:16.849 --> 09:20.400 the 2nd bounce , that I should deploy 09:20.400 --> 09:23.210 the brake chute . And by the time we 09:23.210 --> 09:25.169 hit the ground , it would be full 09:25.169 --> 09:27.849 deployed and would hold us down or 09:27.849 --> 09:29.890 thought it would hold us down . Of 09:29.890 --> 09:32.609 course , we didn't know whether it had 09:33.330 --> 09:36.450 melted or caught on fire because of the 09:36.450 --> 09:40.289 previous fire that I had said , but we 09:40.289 --> 09:42.890 were lucky the brakes you held kept us 09:42.890 --> 09:46.580 on the ground . We uh braked to a 09:46.580 --> 09:49.520 halt , deployed the uh 09:50.409 --> 09:53.330 escape ladder out of the airplane and 09:53.510 --> 09:57.390 uh Shut the engines down and , and 09:57.640 --> 10:00.710 got out of the airplane and uh 10:02.780 --> 10:06.559 Just , we had our EWs 10:06.559 --> 10:08.940 actually kiss the ground . They were so 10:08.940 --> 10:12.619 happy to be back safe . No one was 10:12.619 --> 10:16.330 injured , no one was hit by shell fire 10:16.820 --> 10:19.299 and uh no one was hurt getting out of 10:19.299 --> 10:22.690 the airplane . So uh we 10:23.599 --> 10:25.880 Went to debrief and then went to the 10:25.880 --> 10:29.169 bar . I , uh 10:31.309 --> 10:34.359 The , the mission was classified secret 10:35.289 --> 10:39.210 until uh late 90s , so no action 10:39.210 --> 10:42.690 was really afforded the crew as 10:42.690 --> 10:46.650 recognition for uh for 10:46.650 --> 10:50.489 what we believe we did in uh 10:50.489 --> 10:53.280 shooting one Mg down and damaging one , 10:53.650 --> 10:57.059 but That was just an aside . We , 10:57.450 --> 11:01.299 we successfully returned . And 11:01.309 --> 11:05.169 that's really the I don't want 11:05.169 --> 11:07.330 to say the highlight of my time with 11:07.330 --> 11:11.010 the fifty-fifth , but it was one of the 11:11.530 --> 11:14.679 most memorable missions that I did for . 11:16.460 --> 11:19.979 After the uh After that mission , there 11:19.979 --> 11:22.929 were additional crew changes and then 11:23.099 --> 11:26.979 in 1967 , I did get my own crew and 11:26.979 --> 11:30.479 we flew out of Libya uh till Gaddafi 11:30.479 --> 11:34.250 took over . And And I 11:34.380 --> 11:37.700 resigned my commission in '69 and flew 11:37.700 --> 11:41.590 commercially for 32 years . Thank you .