WEBVTT 00:00.839 --> 00:03.450 OK , I'm Beau Marlin . Uh , date served 00:03.450 --> 00:06.329 with the 55th . I got to the 55th in 00:07.289 --> 00:11.090 May of 1980 and served in the 343rd as 00:11.090 --> 00:14.609 electronic warfare officer . Raven one 00:14.960 --> 00:18.930 training flight , um , evaluator , Stan 00:18.930 --> 00:22.770 Duval , um , and then moved over to 00:22.770 --> 00:26.690 what was the DOE in terms of Eent uh . 00:27.479 --> 00:30.540 Uh I guess you could call it working 00:30.540 --> 00:33.819 with the big safari guys for new 00:33.819 --> 00:35.819 equipment on the aircraft , writing 00:35.819 --> 00:37.986 checklists , validating the software , 00:37.986 --> 00:41.490 those kind of things until '85 and then 00:41.659 --> 00:44.970 went up to SAC headquarters after 85 as 00:44.970 --> 00:47.569 the RC-135 program monitor 00:47.569 --> 00:51.069 XPFR . Um , 00:51.939 --> 00:54.161 When I got to the wing , it was a first 00:54.161 --> 00:56.580 lieutenant , became a captain during 00:56.580 --> 01:00.090 that time , went up to 01:01.349 --> 01:03.516 still a captain at headquarters sack , 01:04.180 --> 01:07.300 came back to the 55th officially in 01:07.300 --> 01:11.019 1996 , where I was 01:11.019 --> 01:13.940 after I left the Pentagon , was in the 01:13.940 --> 01:17.410 343rd again , re-qualified as a Raven I 01:17.410 --> 01:20.949 and instructor . And then um in 01:20.949 --> 01:24.709 1997 , moved over and took over command 01:24.709 --> 01:28.349 of the 20 or the 45th from '97 01:28.349 --> 01:32.150 to '99 and that's when I was 01:32.150 --> 01:34.389 lieutenant colonel then after I got 01:34.389 --> 01:37.589 done with the uh 45th , I moved over as 01:37.589 --> 01:40.010 a deputy ops group commander from '99 01:40.010 --> 01:42.430 to 2000 and then left to go to War 01:42.430 --> 01:46.129 College after that . Um , now , uh , 01:46.150 --> 01:48.261 well , not really a 55th story . Uh , 01:48.269 --> 01:50.709 we got talking about uh a strange 01:50.709 --> 01:53.900 aircraft called the RC-135 X model , 01:54.720 --> 01:56.900 uh , Cobra I . Very few people know 01:56.900 --> 01:58.844 about the Cobra I . It really only 01:58.844 --> 02:02.470 existed for about 3 years . Um , and 02:02.470 --> 02:06.389 so as people start aging out , we 02:06.389 --> 02:08.500 thought we'd , you know , make , make 02:08.500 --> 02:10.833 sure people didn't forget the cobra eye . 02:10.833 --> 02:13.410 So this was when Uh , I , after I left 02:13.410 --> 02:16.100 headquarters SAC in 1988 , I went up to , 02:16.130 --> 02:20.089 uh , to , uh , Iselson in the 24th for 02:20.089 --> 02:23.009 the Cobra Ball program . On the advice 02:23.009 --> 02:25.250 of some mentors that I had , Larry 02:25.250 --> 02:27.929 Mitchell being probably the most well 02:27.929 --> 02:30.039 known one , and so I went up there , 02:30.179 --> 02:33.770 qualified in the Cobra ball as an ATS 02:33.770 --> 02:35.826 operator , advanced telemetry system 02:35.826 --> 02:39.399 operator , and at that point 02:40.210 --> 02:42.266 we had the two Cobra balls , 662 and 02:42.266 --> 02:45.259 663 , and they did . Their collection , 02:45.300 --> 02:48.619 Eilam mentioned it a little bit about 02:48.619 --> 02:51.100 uh medium wave infrared collection on 02:51.100 --> 02:54.419 ballistic missiles and in the program , 02:54.539 --> 02:56.740 the overall program was the optical 02:56.740 --> 02:59.210 airborne measurement program or OAM , 02:59.229 --> 03:01.340 and some people would recognize it by 03:01.340 --> 03:05.020 OAM . Um , the idea of being the 03:05.020 --> 03:06.798 cobra ball and it was kind of a 03:06.798 --> 03:08.964 complimentary mission , the cobra ball 03:08.964 --> 03:11.580 would do . Reentry objects as they 03:11.580 --> 03:13.691 entered the atmosphere and started to 03:13.691 --> 03:15.747 heat up , so that's where the medium 03:15.747 --> 03:17.969 wave IR system would start to pick them 03:17.969 --> 03:19.747 up , detect them , track them , 03:19.747 --> 03:21.858 characterize them . The other part of 03:21.858 --> 03:24.179 the program was the cobra eye , and 03:24.179 --> 03:27.300 this was a US Army strategic Missile 03:27.300 --> 03:31.149 Defense Command program funded again 03:31.149 --> 03:34.419 by the army . And the idea being they 03:34.419 --> 03:36.729 needed to have a sensor in an aircraft 03:36.729 --> 03:40.419 that could detect things in uh in space , 03:40.539 --> 03:42.940 in the cold atmosphere of space and 03:42.940 --> 03:45.210 reentry vehicles that were 03:45.500 --> 03:48.570 exoatmospheric . So they were in the 03:48.570 --> 03:51.220 cold of space and you would start to 03:51.220 --> 03:53.929 far you could collect on them and track 03:53.929 --> 03:56.151 them the better . So we were looking at 03:56.151 --> 03:59.250 1000 kilometers or more above the above 03:59.250 --> 04:01.250 the atmosphere and then they would 04:01.250 --> 04:03.306 start to reenter and that's when the 04:03.306 --> 04:05.417 cobra ball would pick them up as they 04:05.417 --> 04:07.083 started to heat up within the 04:07.083 --> 04:09.194 atmosphere . So the idea being is how 04:09.194 --> 04:11.417 do you develop a sensor and an aircraft 04:11.417 --> 04:13.809 to detect trash can size objects at 04:13.809 --> 04:16.679 1000 kilometers above the atmosphere . 04:17.579 --> 04:19.857 So it was pretty , pretty cosmic stuff . 04:19.857 --> 04:23.160 This is uh MIT program , so we had uh 04:23.160 --> 04:25.480 MIT software engineers and system 04:25.480 --> 04:27.591 engineers that were working with us . 04:28.089 --> 04:30.480 We had a new airplane at the time . It 04:30.480 --> 04:34.440 was 128 aircraft tail number 128 , and 04:34.440 --> 04:36.496 it was all done down at Greenville , 04:37.079 --> 04:40.279 and a group of us from the 24th from 04:40.279 --> 04:42.390 the Cobra Ball program volunteered to 04:42.390 --> 04:44.223 go down to Greenville and help . 04:44.510 --> 04:46.989 Develop the procedures , the checklists , 04:47.029 --> 04:49.540 the software with the MIT engineers . 04:50.109 --> 04:52.220 So we went down to Greenville , Texas 04:52.220 --> 04:54.980 in 1988 . early 04:54.980 --> 04:58.369 19 early 1989 , I should say , 04:58.820 --> 05:02.790 and then spent 77 days down at 05:02.790 --> 05:05.012 Greenville working with the engineers , 05:05.012 --> 05:06.679 flying with them , developing 05:06.679 --> 05:09.529 checklists that the operators would use . 05:09.579 --> 05:13.130 We only had three operators . We had a 05:13.130 --> 05:16.500 sensor operator . We had a sensor 05:16.500 --> 05:20.140 technician listed member , and we had a 05:20.140 --> 05:23.690 TC . We also had an AIA compliment . 05:24.940 --> 05:28.540 Like the 97th in the back for 05:28.540 --> 05:31.100 advisory support , but that was that 05:31.100 --> 05:33.899 was it . One sensor on the aircraft and 05:33.899 --> 05:37.100 Al had mentioned that early cobra balls 05:37.100 --> 05:39.339 there started to have a 30-inch 05:39.339 --> 05:42.429 telescope sensor . This was a 77 inch 05:42.779 --> 05:46.089 telescope sensor . And the idea being , 05:46.200 --> 05:48.311 again , it had to see objects , trash 05:48.311 --> 05:50.144 can size objects out in the cold 05:50.144 --> 05:52.820 atmosphere of space , uh , and so it 05:52.820 --> 05:55.420 had to be as cold as those objects . 05:56.500 --> 05:59.700 So it was a 77 inch telescope folded 05:59.700 --> 06:02.790 three ways . And it was 06:03.859 --> 06:05.859 a hole inside the aircraft , the 40 06:05.859 --> 06:08.679 inch hole , 40 inch square hole in the 06:08.679 --> 06:10.623 side of the aircraft that the door 06:10.623 --> 06:12.790 would slide backwards and there was no 06:12.790 --> 06:14.957 glass there . It was just a hole . And 06:14.957 --> 06:18.059 for the because of pressurization , you 06:18.059 --> 06:20.226 had a big chamber on the inside of the 06:20.226 --> 06:22.115 aircraft that was the pressurized 06:22.115 --> 06:26.049 chamber , so you had about maybe 36 06:26.049 --> 06:28.216 inches to walk around this thing going 06:28.216 --> 06:30.438 to the cockpit on the right side of the 06:30.438 --> 06:32.605 aircraft , but otherwise it was it was 06:32.605 --> 06:36.489 a contained pressurized chamber and 06:36.489 --> 06:38.656 the sensor itself , when you're taking 06:38.656 --> 06:41.600 off and landing , would move forward 06:41.600 --> 06:44.410 and plug into the front of the air its 06:44.410 --> 06:48.089 little docking mechanism and it was 06:48.089 --> 06:50.145 because I had mentioned it has to be 06:50.145 --> 06:52.311 cold , it was liquid nitrogen cooled . 06:52.829 --> 06:54.662 So they replaced one of the fuel 06:54.662 --> 06:56.773 bladders in the front of the aircraft 06:56.773 --> 06:58.885 with a deer , and I can't remember if 06:58.885 --> 07:01.107 it was 300 gallons , but it's a massive 07:01.107 --> 07:03.329 deer and it was liquid nitrogen and you 07:03.329 --> 07:05.440 completely always cycle , fill up the 07:05.440 --> 07:07.607 sensor with liquid nitrogen to keep it 07:07.607 --> 07:11.029 cold , and it had to be cold and 07:11.029 --> 07:12.973 because it was all liquid nitrogen 07:12.973 --> 07:16.230 cooled , the electronics in it were all 07:16.230 --> 07:19.730 gold . So the story was at the time , 07:19.779 --> 07:21.835 and I can't validate it accurately , 07:21.835 --> 07:23.946 but it was a billion dollars sensor . 07:23.946 --> 07:26.168 It was a one of a kind sensor , billion 07:26.168 --> 07:28.279 dollar sensor . The whole program was 07:28.279 --> 07:30.446 about $3 billion but the sensor itself 07:30.446 --> 07:32.501 was about a billion dollars . So the 07:32.501 --> 07:34.612 idea being once it's stowed forward , 07:34.612 --> 07:37.170 once you take off , um you open up the 07:37.170 --> 07:39.570 slide back the door . The sensor would 07:39.570 --> 07:41.792 slide backwards and rotate to the right 07:41.792 --> 07:44.809 to look out to the , you know , to the 07:44.809 --> 07:48.089 atmosphere , if you will . And um then 07:48.089 --> 07:50.311 you would start picking targets to do . 07:50.570 --> 07:53.649 So , uh again , brand new program , it 07:53.649 --> 07:56.959 was Honestly kind of quirky because 07:56.959 --> 07:59.292 they were working out the software bugs . 07:59.292 --> 08:01.769 So you'd pull the sensor out , you look 08:01.769 --> 08:03.936 up and do what it needs to do to start 08:03.936 --> 08:05.880 tracking objects , and there would 08:05.880 --> 08:07.936 always be , you know , a glitch . It 08:07.936 --> 08:10.269 would stop . The software would hang up . 08:10.269 --> 08:12.380 You'd have to reboot it , so you have 08:12.380 --> 08:14.436 to bring it back in , replug it in , 08:14.436 --> 08:16.436 reboot , start all over again . And 08:16.436 --> 08:18.158 this is how we tried , and the 08:18.158 --> 08:20.269 engineers flew with us when we , when 08:20.269 --> 08:19.820 they could , uh , when we weren't in 08:19.820 --> 08:21.876 the actual , when we brought it back 08:21.876 --> 08:24.042 and we weren't in the actual sensitive 08:24.042 --> 08:27.399 area . They would fly with us , but 08:27.609 --> 08:29.665 when we finally brought the aircraft 08:29.665 --> 08:32.650 back to Iselson in '89 . 08:33.750 --> 08:35.917 They flew with us when we were outside 08:35.917 --> 08:38.139 of the area , but then we started to do 08:38.139 --> 08:40.472 operational missions out of out of Shia , 08:40.472 --> 08:43.109 out of Eriksson , and we followed very 08:43.109 --> 08:45.220 much the same procedures as the Cobra 08:45.220 --> 08:47.830 ball did . We fly in different tracks , 08:47.950 --> 08:51.250 of course , but the idea being that 08:51.750 --> 08:53.861 for training , of course , you didn't 08:53.861 --> 08:56.028 have these objects all the time out in 08:56.028 --> 08:58.194 space . So what we did for training is 08:58.194 --> 09:00.306 we got satellite , low Earth orbiting 09:00.306 --> 09:03.580 satellite the tables . So you knew when 09:03.580 --> 09:05.636 the satellite was going to pass over 09:05.636 --> 09:08.179 within your field of regard and we , we 09:08.179 --> 09:10.419 tracked those . And we were very 09:10.419 --> 09:12.530 successful in doing that for training 09:12.530 --> 09:14.752 and it was good for operational aspects 09:14.752 --> 09:16.919 of it as well , but the idea being you 09:16.919 --> 09:18.975 could track these satellites as they 09:18.975 --> 09:21.619 moved over and the uh because the 09:21.619 --> 09:23.730 sensitivity of the sensor , you could 09:23.730 --> 09:26.109 tell the temperature of the satellite . 09:26.650 --> 09:28.594 So you could tell if it was dead , 09:28.789 --> 09:30.956 meaning because it was so cold , or if 09:30.956 --> 09:33.067 it was the standby or if it was still 09:33.067 --> 09:35.530 active . And we did this for both 09:36.700 --> 09:39.890 Russian satellites , Chinese satellites , 09:39.900 --> 09:42.530 and US satellites . So that was the way 09:42.530 --> 09:45.929 we did our training . So that led up to 09:46.380 --> 09:49.150 an operational mission against a 09:49.150 --> 09:52.090 Russian missile test into the Kamchatka 09:52.090 --> 09:54.146 Peninsula . So we were up there with 09:54.146 --> 09:57.520 the cobra ball . And uh doing our 09:57.520 --> 09:59.631 training , moving up and down track , 09:59.631 --> 10:01.631 tracking satellites to just kind of 10:01.631 --> 10:03.440 warm up . And we got a launch 10:03.440 --> 10:05.607 notification , an X-ray notification . 10:05.607 --> 10:07.773 And so , OK , great , we're lined up , 10:07.773 --> 10:09.773 we're ready to go , the system goes 10:09.773 --> 10:12.760 down . Murphy's law , the system goes 10:12.760 --> 10:14.982 down , it's like , oh no . So we had to 10:14.982 --> 10:17.880 bring it back in , reboot it , and as 10:17.880 --> 10:19.991 luck would have it , there's a lot of 10:19.991 --> 10:22.158 luck there . We got the system up . It 10:22.158 --> 10:24.158 was collecting just in time for the 10:24.158 --> 10:26.324 event to come in . And so that was the 10:26.324 --> 10:28.539 first time for the cobra eye to 10:28.539 --> 10:31.719 actually detect , track , and 10:31.719 --> 10:34.719 characterize a reentry vehicle outside 10:34.719 --> 10:38.159 the atmosphere and everybody was 10:38.159 --> 10:41.090 thrilled about it . Um , and for that , 10:41.130 --> 10:43.186 the crews , we had two crews on that 10:43.186 --> 10:45.409 mission . We had a Standoval crew , and 10:45.409 --> 10:48.809 I was on that as the Standoval TC and 10:48.809 --> 10:52.330 then we had another Cobra I crew with 10:52.330 --> 10:54.770 us , so we had 2 crews on board . Um , 10:55.770 --> 10:57.881 we were in the seat at the time , the 10:57.881 --> 11:00.103 Standeval crew for the collect , but we 11:00.103 --> 11:02.690 had 22 back end crews and then uh a 11:02.690 --> 11:05.080 typical front end crew . Bill Zaer was 11:05.080 --> 11:07.650 the the AC and I can't remember who the 11:07.650 --> 11:10.969 rest of his crew were . But , um , kind 11:10.969 --> 11:13.191 of , so that was the big news . We , we 11:13.191 --> 11:15.302 got back , they analyzed the data and 11:15.302 --> 11:17.358 they were thrilled and uh for that , 11:17.530 --> 11:21.479 the combined crews won the 1989 11:22.369 --> 11:24.480 15th Air Force Reconnaissance Crew of 11:24.480 --> 11:27.289 the Year award and the O'Malley Award 11:27.289 --> 11:29.511 for the best reconnaissance crew in the 11:29.511 --> 11:31.669 Air Force . So , um , the other fun , 11:31.909 --> 11:33.687 fun facts with this , with this 11:33.687 --> 11:36.179 aircraft is because again , the sensor 11:36.179 --> 11:38.630 always had to have liquid nitrogen 24 11:38.630 --> 11:41.390 hours a day . Um , and we had where 11:41.390 --> 11:43.630 most aircraft have a fuel bingo where 11:43.630 --> 11:45.797 when they run out of fuel they have to 11:45.797 --> 11:47.741 return to base . We had a nitrogen 11:47.741 --> 11:49.852 bingo . Because you could not run out 11:49.852 --> 11:51.963 of nitrogen for the sensor because it 11:51.963 --> 11:53.908 would start to warm up , and if it 11:53.908 --> 11:56.130 warmed up too much , you could not cool 11:56.130 --> 11:55.840 it down . It was kind of like a chain 11:55.840 --> 11:58.640 reaction on a nuclear chain reaction , 11:58.650 --> 12:00.706 except this one would happen to be a 12:00.706 --> 12:02.983 nitrogen . So if it warmed up too much , 12:03.010 --> 12:05.066 all the rest of the components would 12:05.066 --> 12:07.121 start to warm up and you wouldn't be 12:07.121 --> 12:09.530 able to cool them down in time to 12:09.530 --> 12:12.369 prevent , I presume a catastrophic 12:12.369 --> 12:15.049 explosion of the sensor . So it always 12:15.049 --> 12:17.271 had to have the liquid nitrogen on it . 12:17.409 --> 12:19.576 Uh , at the same time , because on the 12:19.576 --> 12:22.289 ground , it had , uh , we had sensor uh 12:22.289 --> 12:24.345 field service representatives that , 12:24.345 --> 12:27.130 that babysat it 24 hours a day , make 12:27.130 --> 12:29.799 sure it had liquid nitrogen on it . But 12:29.799 --> 12:32.049 the fun fact was this was the only 12:32.049 --> 12:35.179 aircraft that the Air Force had that 12:35.489 --> 12:37.409 had to be refueled when it was on 12:37.409 --> 12:39.465 ground power . Normally you shut all 12:39.465 --> 12:41.298 the power off and you refuel the 12:41.298 --> 12:43.465 aircraft . Couldn't do that because we 12:43.465 --> 12:45.687 had to have all the nitrogen pumps that 12:45.687 --> 12:47.687 still working , so it always had to 12:47.687 --> 12:50.330 have power on it 24 hours a day . So it 12:50.330 --> 12:52.386 was refueled and all the maintenance 12:52.386 --> 12:54.552 was always done with full power on the 12:54.552 --> 12:56.552 aircraft . So it was an interesting 12:56.552 --> 13:00.380 mission . So we did that . We had a uh 13:00.380 --> 13:02.900 Boeing at the time had a very similar 13:02.900 --> 13:05.011 program . They called it the Airborne 13:05.011 --> 13:08.739 optical adjunct AOA . It was a 747 with 13:08.739 --> 13:12.229 a very similar sensor . Um , they , 13:13.270 --> 13:15.679 they never succeeded in getting a 13:15.679 --> 13:19.510 collect , but um , the program was 13:19.510 --> 13:22.510 deactivated um when the , when the 13:22.510 --> 13:24.621 aircraft , when the , the winging the 13:24.621 --> 13:27.140 24th moved down to , to Omaha . And I 13:27.140 --> 13:29.362 thought about it yesterday . We went to 13:29.362 --> 13:31.529 Stratcom , and I think the real reason 13:31.529 --> 13:33.751 it was deactivated was because that was 13:33.751 --> 13:35.973 the time when the Cold War was over and 13:35.973 --> 13:38.084 we started to have the strategic arms 13:38.084 --> 13:41.500 reduction talks and we notified them 13:41.500 --> 13:43.722 when we did the ballistic missile tests 13:43.722 --> 13:45.889 and they did likewise . So I think the 13:45.889 --> 13:47.889 idea was , well , we're going to be 13:47.889 --> 13:50.000 reducing all of these nuclear weapons 13:50.000 --> 13:49.979 and testing and everything , so we 13:49.979 --> 13:51.979 really don't have to have this very 13:51.979 --> 13:54.739 expensive program out there . The AOA , 13:54.869 --> 13:57.789 the Boeing AOA still continued as a 13:57.789 --> 13:59.840 program , but I don't think it ever 13:59.840 --> 14:02.062 collected anything . So we were able to 14:02.062 --> 14:04.619 be the only program that I'm aware of 14:04.869 --> 14:07.229 that actually collected long wave 14:07.229 --> 14:10.340 infrared targets of 14:11.590 --> 14:13.534 both the spacecraft and of reentry 14:13.534 --> 14:16.950 vehicles coming in . So that's 14:16.950 --> 14:20.030 the fun facts on the Cobra program . Uh , 14:20.059 --> 14:22.320 moved down to Omaha and the Cobra I 14:22.320 --> 14:24.376 became 128 , became one of the Cobra 14:24.376 --> 14:27.340 balls that still exists today . So 14:27.340 --> 14:30.309 that's the X model , the RC 135 .